FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3162185760> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3162185760 endingPage "79" @default.
• W3162185760 startingPage "79" @default.
• W3162185760 abstract "After almost every economic crisis and corporate scandal, political actors announce the need for stricter regulatory measures for financial markets and companies, in an attempt to appease their voters and defend their political agenda. Regarding the latest international financial crisis, the EU responded, among other things, with comprehensive regulation of the European audit market. In the context of auditor rotation, after 17 June 2016, the duration of audit engagements should not exceed a maximum of 10 years. In this paper, we therefore investigate whether there is empirical evidence behind the 10-year threshold—or is it simply arbitrary? Our aim is to evaluate the audit market reform by the European Union (EU) (Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 and Directive, 2014/56/EU) related to the objective of improving the quality of audits. Therefore, our article addresses the most crucial element of this reform, the implementation of a mandatory audit firm rotation for public interest entities (Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Article 17). Based on a unique dataset of 11,834 firm observations from all listed companies within the EU between 2008 and 2017, we provide for the first time a discussion basis for the assessment of audit market interventions by the EU. Hence, we compare the new maximum durations with average audit tenure in the particular member states. Even where we present only descriptive results, our results at least indicate that the “magic number” 10 (years) could be more the result of a political process—i.e., a consent between the European institutions—rather than evidence based. Therefore, our findings shall serve as a first starting point in the discussion of a vast and interdisciplinary research field." @default.
• W3162185760 created "2021-05-24" @default.
• W3162185760 creator A5014553122 @default.
• W3162185760 creator A5068656885 @default.
• W3162185760 creator A5083541750 @default.
• W3162185760 date "2021-05-20" @default.
• W3162185760 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W3162185760 title "On the Political Decision of Audit Market Regulation: Empirical Evidence of Audit Firm Tenure and Maximum Durations within the European Union" @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1485535210 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1499655039 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1511212687 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1543497720 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1570607424 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1972791057 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1974580639 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W1990073159 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2003417012 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2008624682 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2014638211 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2028370400 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2059214589 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2063234046 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2076019778 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2089753078 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2113238197 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2115434286 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2148934930 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2150494104 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2152596199 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2157401357 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2161878611 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2163482696 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2167646351 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2324104895 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2339625218 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2474064762 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2510362799 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2513163481 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2517100600 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2519319525 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2553048832 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2752617332 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2767121344 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2946775755 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W2967869714 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3024340846 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3036748616 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3121938979 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3122236161 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3122882829 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3123022420 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3123638315 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3125488543 @default.
• W3162185760 cites W3125966120 @default.
• W3162185760 doi "https://doi.org/10.3390/economies9020079" @default.
• W3162185760 hasPublicationYear "2021" @default.
• W3162185760 type Work @default.
• W3162185760 sameAs 3162185760 @default.
• W3162185760 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W3162185760 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3162185760 hasAuthorship W3162185760A5014553122 @default.
• W3162185760 hasAuthorship W3162185760A5068656885 @default.
• W3162185760 hasAuthorship W3162185760A5083541750 @default.
• W3162185760 hasBestOaLocation W31621857601 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C105639569 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C140181557 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C151730666 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C170856484 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C191602146 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C199360897 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C199521495 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C2778300220 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C2779343474 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C2779547435 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C2910001868 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C105639569 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C121955636 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C139719470 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C140181557 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C144133560 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C151730666 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C162324750 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C170856484 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C17744445 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C191602146 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C199360897 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C199521495 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C199539241 @default.
• W3162185760 hasConceptScore W3162185760C2778300220 @default.

• next