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W3187506919 abstract "The two major perspectives that guide CEO compensation research include agency theory and managerialism. The latter is extended to the managerial power approach to executive compensation. These perspectives recognize the divergence of interests between the owners and management due to the separation of ownership and control in large firms. Agency theory advocates the use of two control mechanisms: executive monitoring and incentive alignment whereby management and shareholder interests are aligned with the management incentives–performance linkage. In addition to agency theory and managerialism, this paper examines the managerial power approach to executive compensation posited in Bebchuk and Fried's highly acclaimed book titled Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation published in 2004. These authors’ major claims are that due to the powerful influence of the CEO, there is a lack of arm's-length bargaining between the CEO and the board; therefore, a suboptimal executive compensation contract which does not link pay to performance results. Opposing perspectives to Bebchuk and Fried's (2004) ideas are also presented. Due to the recent corporate scandals, abuses in executive compensation have received intense public scrutiny. Lawsuits involving executive compensation were launched against various companies such as Adelphia, Disney, Enron, HealthSouth, and Tyco. This paper examines the reform efforts in the area of executive compensation on the part of Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the exchanges, shareholder activists, institutional investors, business and professional groups. These reform efforts focus on agency theory's two control mechanisms: greater monitoring of management and linking managerial incentives with performance so as to align management interests with shareholder interests. The different perspectives on executive compensation together with the reform efforts presented in this paper are intended to stimulate further thoughts and debate in the subject area. A brief outline of the paper is presented as follows. First is a discussion of two perspectives that guide CEO compensation research, notably “agency theory” and “managerialism,” which is extended to the “managerial power approach” described in Bebchuk and Fried (2004). As illustrated in the paper, Richard Grasso of the New York Stock Exchange and Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom each exercised influence over executive compensation. Next, the paper briefly highlights the governmental, business, and professional organizations’ efforts in reforming executive compensation. There are critics who argue that the managerial power approach described in Bebchuk and Fried (2004) is a one-sided approach to executive compensation. Opposing arguments are also raised against the claim that U.S. executive compensation is excessive. Some of these counterarguments are included in the discussion section of the paper, which ends with the implications for research and practice in the area of executive compensation. Tosi et al. (2000) pointed out that CEO compensation research has been guided by two perspectives: agency theory and managerialism. Using the metaphor of a contract, agency theory denotes the relationship between the principal and the agent, who performs work that is delegated by the principal (Eisenhardt 1989). Referring to a publicly held corporation, the shareholders represent the principals and the CEO represents the agent. In order to align the interests of the CEO and the shareholders, the CEO should be provided with incentives to enhance the wealth of shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990). A review of the agency theory literature indicates that agency costs may incur whenever the agent engages in opportunistic actions at the expense of the principal. The assumptions are that the agent may have interests that differ from the principal's interests, and the agent is self-centered and risk averse. To govern the relationship between the agent and the principal, an optimal contract has to be determined. In a situation whereby the principal has complete information about the agent's activities, a behavior-oriented contract is appropriate. This contract involves monitoring the agent's behavior. However, when the circumstances are as such that the principal does not have complete information about the agent's behavior which is unobservable, an outcome-based contract is called for. This type of contract induces the agent to align his/her interests with those of the principal. In addition to an agent's behavior, outcomes are also affected by macroenvironmental factors such as the economy, legislation, technology, and competition. Therefore, risk is shifted to the risk-averse agent with a contract that is based on performance outcomes. Agency costs are reduced with self-monitoring on the part of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Tosi et al. 1997, 2000). Berle and Means’ (1932) controversial book, which discusses the divergence of interests between the owner and manager due to the separation of ownership and control provides the underlying managerialist logic. Management's use of power is unchecked with this separation. Proponents of managerialism argue that executive pay is determined mainly by firm size, rather than performance. They assert that greater prestige, power and pay come with a greater scale of operations. Furthermore, by decoupling pay from performance, executives can reduce pay risk by linking pay to firm size, a more stable factor (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Tosi et al. 2000). As noted in various studies (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al. 1987; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989; Tosi et al. 2000), prior results pertaining to the relationship between CEOs’ pay and firm performance were weak and inconsistent. Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) pointed out that these weak and inconsistent prior results may be due to the lack of control for the type of ownership. They found that performance was the major determinant of executive compensation level and its rate of change for owner-controlled firms, and scale was the major determinant of executive compensation level and its rate of change for management-controlled firms. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) also found that compared to management-controlled firms, there was a higher level of monitoring and incentive alignment in owner-controlled firms. These authors pointed out that monitoring and incentive alignment, agency theory's two control mechanisms, are more necessary in management-controlled firms with widely dispersed ownership. However, this study's results indicate that monitoring and incentive alignment are less evident in management-controlled firms. Kroll et al. (1990) found that high postacquisition CEO compensation was not associated with firm performance, but with firm size and/or CEO tenure for management-controlled firms. With respect to owner-controlled firms, CEO compensation was higher with the completion of acquisitions and the firms maintained their profitability. Compensation in owner-controlled firms was not related to CEO tenure. Consistent with managerialism, managers sought to serve their interests by increasing the size of the firm. The results of Wright et al.'s (2002) study indicate how the control mechanism of monitoring advocated by agency theory moderated the relationship between executive compensation and performance. They found out that with vigilant external monitoring, executive compensation was affected by acquisition returns. With passive external monitoring, the managerialist logic was evident in that CEO compensation was influenced by acquisition-related increase in corporate size. Tosi et al. (1997) found that consistent with agency theory, when managerial incentives were aligned with owners’ interests, managerial decisions were more consistent with the owners’ welfare. However, inconsistent with agency theory, intense monitoring did not ensure that agents acted in the owners’ interests. Core et al. (1999) found that CEO compensation was explained by board and ownership structure. Greater agency problems and higher compensation for CEOs could be found in firms with weaker governance structures. These firms were also characterized by poor performance. These authors found that CEO compensation was positively related to board characteristics, which denote CEO entrenchment and/or less effective board monitoring. Various studies suggest a contingency perspective of executive compensation (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987; Combs and Skill 2003). Balkin and Gomez-Mejia's (1987) findings indicate that the effectiveness of a pay system is contingent on a match among the compensation strategy, nature of the industry, firm characteristics such as size and stage in the product cycle. Combs and Skill's (2003) findings also support a contingency perspective of key executive pay premiums, which were explained by valuable human capital in some cases, and entrenchment on the part of management in other cases. Certainly, as noted in Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987), in order to fully develop a contingency theory of compensation strategy, many more variables need to be examined. Tosi et al. (2000) attempted to examine the hypothesized relationships among CEO pay, performance, and firm size with meta-analysis that integrates the findings from a large number of studies pertaining to relationships among these variables. Prior results relating executive pay to firm performance and size were inconsistent. They found from their meta-analytic study that over 40% of the variance in CEO pay was accounted for by firm size, while less than 5% of the variance was accounted for by firm performance. In addition, they found that 5% of the explained variance in pay was accounted for by changes in firm size, and 4% of the explained variance in pay was accounted for by changes in financial performance. These authors commented that moderator variables might have contributed to the results. Various authors indicate that as there was not a strong link between pay and performance after a review of the empirical research results in the executive compensation literature, there was little support for the alignment of executive and shareholder interests with optimal contracting focus of agency theory (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Tosi et al. 2000). Compared to the agency theory's optimal contracting, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) considered the managerial power approach, which is an extension of managerialism, provides a more adequate account of executive compensation. They argued that due to managerial influence, arm's-length bargaining between the board and management over executive compensation has been lacking in public corporations. The directors favor high compensation for CEOs for the latter can exert influence over directors’ pay and the nomination process. Furthermore, the social and psychological factors such as loyalty to the CEO, the norms of collegiality, and team spirit that characterize board cohesion contribute to the board's approval of an excessive compensation package for the CEO. These authors considered that an optimal contract central to agency theory cannot result without arm's-length bargaining between management and an independent board, and that the managerial power approach explains the phenomenon of excessive executive compensation, which is not linked to performance. In other words, the managerial power approach indicates that agency theory's control mechanisms in terms of monitoring and incentive alignment whereby managerial incentives are aligned with firm performance or shareholders’ interests are not evidenced. These authors illustrated managerial power and camouflage with respect to four pay practices: power-pay relationships, use of compensation consultants, stealth compensation and gratuitous payments, and benefits to executives who are on the way out. The managerial power approach predicts that managerial power has a positive relationship with pay and a negative relationship to performance sensibility. Circumstances under which managerial power goes up include a weak board, no large outside shareholder, few institutional shareholders, and antitakeover provisions that enhance CEOs’ compensation. Compensation consultants are usually hired by the firm, and they can help in camouflaging excess pay. To ensure that they will be rehired in the future and to get other assignments with the hiring firm, they try to please the CEO by providing justification for a higher pay level. Their choice of comparative compensation data is to favor the CEO. Compensation consultants’ reports are used to justify to shareholders the executives’ pay. Stealth compensation camouflages the total amount of compensation paid to executives and the decoupling of pay from the executives’ performance. Stealth compensation includes “pension plans, deferred compensation, and post-retirement perks and consulting contracts” (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, p. 79). Prior to the adoption of the revised executive compensation disclosure rules by the SEC on July 26, 2006, executives’ retirement compensation was not required to be disclosed in the firm's publicly filed compensation tables, but it had to be disclosed in a less salient way somewhere in a firm's publicly filed documents. Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which prohibits executive loans, the loans were used to camouflage executives’ total compensation. The executive loans were made at below market rate, and firms had to report under the “other annual compensation” category of the compensation table the difference between the market rate and the below-market interest rate paid on executive loans. As the “market rate” of interest had not been defined by the SEC, firms interpreted “market rate” in a way that helped them exclude the interest difference from the compensation tables. Loans could also camouflage executives’ total compensation through loan forgiveness. If the stock value fell below the amount due on the loan, which was given to executives to buy stock, then the loan would be forgiven. This arrangement was not required to be reported in the compensation tables. Management influence can also be seen in the area of gratuitous payments for departing CEOs. These payments extend beyond the contractually specified severance arrangements. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) gave the example that when Jill Barad resigned under pressure from her position as Mattel's CEO, she received $26.4 million under her contractual agreement as termination payment and an annual retirement benefit in an amount over $700,000. The gratuitous payments she got in addition to the contractual payments include a forgiven loan amount of $4.2 million, another $3.3 million in cash to cover the taxes for a separate forgiven loan, and the vesting of her unvested options. This indicates the CEO's influence over the board. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) pointed out that nonequity compensation was weakly linked to the performance of executives. Therefore, regulators and shareholders have encouraged equity-based compensation to enhance the association between compensation and performance. However, managerial influence has been able to decouple pay from performance with these option plans. These authors discussed three features of existing option plans that contribute to pay-performance decoupling as follows: failure to filter out windfalls, use of at-the-money options and managerial freedom to unload options. As stock prices can go up due to market and industry trends, the increases in stock prices have nothing to do with executive performance. The failure of existing stock option plans to filter out these windfalls or stock price increases represents a major feature of existing stock option plans. The exercise price of at-the-money options is set at the market price of the stock on the date that the options are granted. The stock options that are granted to executives are almost all at-the-money options. The authors criticized that this “one size fits all” approach does not take into account factors that vary across different individuals, firms, industries, exercise dates, times, and so on. They illustrated with the example that in order to take inflation into consideration, some Australian and New Zealand firms have adopted an option exercise price that increases over time. However, U.S. firms are not yet ready to tie the option exercise price to the time period between the option grant date and the exercise date. These authors also pointed out that as the restrictions for unloading shares are weak, managers can freely unload shares. Therefore, managers can increase their total compensation by frequent unloading of options or shares, which are replenished with new options or shares given to them by the company. Managerial power approach to executive compensation is evidenced in many of today's scandals. The following indicates how Richard Grasso of the New York Stock Exchange and Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom each exercised influence over executive compensation. Morgenbesser (2004) provided an analysis of the civil suit against Richard Grasso, the former Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), in the following. In August 2003, the NYSE noted in a report requested by the SEC that Richard Grasso, then Chairman and CEO of the NYSE, was paid by the exchange in the amount of $139.5 million. Later, the SEC also learned that Grasso was scheduled to be paid another $48 million in compensation by the exchange. Public outcry followed, and Grasso resigned under pressure on September 17, 2003. As Grasso was the CEO of a not-for-profit organization, and not a public corporation, the compensation package he got was outrageous. Furthermore, Grasso's dual role as a regulator and CEO of the NYSE created conflict of interest because CEOs of firms he regulated were on the NYSE board and compensation committee. On May 24, 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a civil suit against Grasso after four months of investigation in order to recover for the NYSE over $100 million already paid to him. As a not-for-profit organization, the NYSE is subject to the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (the N-PCL). If compensation were unreasonable, it would be unlawful under the N-PCL. Therefore, the lawsuit against Grasso was brought under this law. Grasso was alleged in the lawsuit to have used “deception and intimidation” to obtain the huge compensation package. Another defendant named in the suit was Kenneth Langone, who headed the NYSE Compensation Committee between June 1999 and June 2003. The lawsuit alleged that Langone had misled the board about certain elements of the pay package. Spitzer stated: The case shows everything that can go wrong in setting executive compensation. The lack of proper information, the stifling of internal debate, the failure of board members to conduct proper inquiry and the unabashed pursuit of personal gain resulted in a wholly inappropriate and illegal compensation package. (Morgenbesser 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/) As the NYSE provided excessive compensation to Grasso, it was also named as a defendant for failing to comply with the N-PCL. Except for Langone, the other NYSE directors were not included in the suit for Spitzer concluded that the latter had also been misled (Morgenbesser 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/). In the latest development of the case, a New York appeals court ruled for Grasso on May 8, 2007 by dismissing four of six legal claims brought against him, and one of the dismissed claims pertains to Spitzer's argument that under the N-PLC, Grasso's compensation was unreasonable. The appeals court's decision may hinder the state's attempt to get Grasso to return a great portion of his pay as chairman of the New York Stock Exchange for eight years (Thomas 2007). Due to the recent corporate scandals, abuses in executive compensation have received intense public scrutiny. Bernard J. Ebbers, former WorldCom CEO, received $400 million in loans from company funds with the help of two board members. As a matter of fact, $50 million of these loans was wired to Ebbers without notification to the full board. Therefore, the board, instead of representing the interests of shareholders, helped enrich Ebbers. Also, without the board's supervision, Ebbers paid $238 million in “retention” grants to executives and employees that he favored in 2000. Furthermore, the board granted stock options that were worth hundreds of millions of dollars to Ebbers and other top executives (Breeden 2003). Due to the abuses in executive compensation, reform efforts have been undertaken by Congress, the SEC, the exchanges, shareholder activists, institutional investors, pension funds, and business and professional organizations. All these reform efforts attempt to curb executive opportunism with monitoring and incentive alignment, the two control mechanisms of agency theory. For example, greater executive monitoring can be achieved with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's provisions such as the CEO and CFO of a company have to certify the accuracy of all periodic financial reports and they must repay bonuses and profit when financial statements are restated due to fraud (Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). Greater executive monitoring can also be achieved with the SEC approved NYSE and NASDAQ rules, such as listed companies on these exchanges are required to have a majority of independent directors, and each of the three committees—audit, nominating, and compensation—is required to have all independent directors. Furthermore, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and various parties such as the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Blue Ribbon Commission, and the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise advocate transparency and public disclosure, which aid the monitoring efforts. These parties also advocate incentive alignment by linking performance to a significant portion of executive compensation, and they consider that some equity incentives can be used (CalPERS 2004; Cooley Godward LLP 2004). New rules for executive and director compensation disclosure adopted by the SEC on July 26, 2006 represent the most recent regulatory efforts to monitor executive compensation. With the new regulations, the public gets to find out companies’ policies and practices with respect to executive compensation, and stock option grants’ decision-making process. The changes to the existing disclosure rules involve, for example, the following: The adoption of the compensation discussion and analysis section that has to be certified by the CEO and CFO. The new stock option awards’ grant date fair value, the change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation, and total compensation have to be disclosed in the summary compensation table. Improved disclosure of equity compensation such as performance-based and restricted stock awards. A narrative disclosure section pertaining to postemployment payments such as severance packages, retirement benefits, and deferred compensation plans (Equilar 2006). I applaud the SEC's recently adopted new regulations for executive and director compensation disclosure. As all components of executive compensation such as salary, stock options, severance pay, retirement benefits, and deferred compensation are disclosed, and a compensation discussion and analysis section has to be provided, investors can discern whether the executive compensation packages are justified or outrageously excessive. If the latter, there would be public outcry, vote no campaigns on the part of shareholder activists, or even shareholder lawsuits. Activists undertake vote no campaigns to persuade fellow shareholders via communications to express to the board their discontent by withholding their vote from one or more directors. In order to protect their reputation, board members would make a conscionable effort to rein in executive compensation. I also applaud the SEC's new rules on options disclosure. They require the disclosure of the grant date and the grant date fair value of option awards. Also, if the option exercise price is less than the grant date closing market price, this information has to be disclosed. In the event that the option grant date differs from the board decision date with respect to option awards, this information has to be revealed (Equilar 2006). These new rules would help curb the practice of secretive options backdating. Options backdating without disclosure has been the corporate scandal of 2006. Backdating involves the designation of a date, with low stock prices, prior to the board decision date to be the grant date. As most option grants set the exercise price as the grant date stock price, the designation of a date with low stock prices to be the grant date enables executives to exercise their options at lower stock prices. With options backdating, executives increase their stock option compensation, which is not linked to performance. Nearly 140 companies are under investigation by the SEC and/or the Department of Justice (DOJ). The options backdating scandal has led to executive departures, restatement of financial statements, and the charges against earnings amounting to billions of dollars (Forelle 2007). From the perspective of a shareholder, I am in support of “Say on Pay” or “Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act” (H.R. 1257), which was approved by the House of Representatives on April 20, 2007. This bill requires public companies to include in their annual proxies shareholders’ nonbinding advisory vote on executive compensation. It gives shareholders intense monitoring over executive compensation with the purpose of linking pay to performance. As the shareholder vote is not legally binding, it does not undermine the board's authority. However, it exercises pressure on the board to disapprove unjustifiable executive pay packages. If compensation committees did not heed these votes, there would be vote no campaigns to remove committee members. As reported by CNNMoney.com, “say on pay” proposals have been 2007's hottest issue on company proxy ballots. Although these proposals have failed in many public companies, they have sent a strong message to corporate executives with the support they have received. Aflac, a disability insurer, has already voluntarily offered shareholders a “say on pay” nonbinding vote on executive compensation to be effective in 2009. Some other companies may follow Aflac's move. Meanwhile, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees together with over a dozen U.S. companies such as American International Group, Colgate-Palmolive, and Pfizer are included in a group to examine the “say on pay” issue (“Investors Split” 2007). I am in agreement with the Aspen Principles developed by the Council of Institutional Investors and the Business Roundtable. The Aspen Principles are guidelines that aim to end corporations’ obsession with short-term results and to focus instead on long-term performance. They require companies to stop providing analysts quarterly earnings guidance and to stop making comments on analysts’ earnings estimates. Executive compensation should be linked to companies’ long-term performance. Various companies, prominent individuals, pension groups, and labor organizations are expected to support the Aspen Principles (Burns 2007). Corporations have undertaken reforms in executive compensation in compliance with legislations, regulations, and recommendations of experts from the business, government, and academic sectors. For illustrative purposes, this paper discusses the abuses and reforms in executive compensation at two companies: Bristol-Myers Squibb and Walt Disney. In 2001, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. laid off over 2,000 employees, and its stock price decreased by around 25%. However, the top five executives were each awarded with cash bonuses in the average amount of $520,000. This together with the 2003 restatement of earnings due to accounting problems starting in 2002 led to an overhaul of the company's executive compensation program. In 2002, most senior executives did not receive increases in salary or bonuses. Bristol-Myers Squibb's compensation committee with the advice of Mercer Human Resource Consulting instituted a clawback provision which would impose financial penalties on those executives whose actions caused harm to the interests of the company. The committee scaled back the use of stock options, and it touted the use of “‘performance share’ awards tied to earnings, sales and shareholder returns” (Spors 2004). In 1995, Michael Eisner, Chairman and CEO of Walt Disney Company, hired Michael Ovitz, a former talent agent, as the president of the company. In December 1996, Ovitz was fired after 15 months with a severance package that amounted to $139 million, $38 million in cash and $101 million in stock options. The excessive package led to a January 1997 shareholders’ derivative lawsuit against Disney. As an explanation, “a derivative lawsuit is one filed by shareholders, acting on behalf of a company, that seeks redress against directors and officers” (Gunther 2003, p. 176). The lawsuit was first dismissed by the Court of Chancery, Delaware's lower court. However, Delaware's Supreme Court indicated that the complaint raised troubling issues such as excessive compensation and a questionable decision-making process on the part of the board. The lawsuit was refiled in January of 2002, and Delaware judge William B. Chandler III in May of 2003 issued a ruling that indicates that the suit could proceed to trial. The judge pointed out that the shareholders had complained that Disney directors did not do their job in good fa" @default.
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