FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3194569968> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3194569968 abstract "Social dilemmas are mixed-motive games. Although the players have a common interest in maintaining cooperation, each may try to obtain a larger payoff by cooperating less than the other. This phenomenon received increased attention after Press and Dyson discovered a class of strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma (extortionate strategies) that secure for themselves a payoff that is never smaller, but can be larger, than the opponent's payoff. We conducted an experiment to test whether humans adopt extortionate strategies when playing a social dilemma. Our results reveal that human subjects do try to extort a larger payoff from their opponents. However, they are only successful when extortionate strategies are part of a Nash equilibrium. In settings where extortionate strategies do not appear in any Nash equilibrium, attempts at extortion only result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our subjects recognized the different incentives implied by the two settings, and they were ready to extort the opponent when allowed to do so. This suggests that deviations from mutually cooperative equilibria, which are usually attributed to players' impatience, coordination problems, or lack of information, can instead be driven by subjects trying to reach more favorable outcomes." @default.
• W3194569968 created "2021-08-30" @default.
• W3194569968 creator A5001838081 @default.
• W3194569968 creator A5045063225 @default.
• W3194569968 creator A5072361154 @default.
• W3194569968 date "2021-08-19" @default.
• W3194569968 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W3194569968 title "Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas" @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1495882109 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1554995057 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1966753272 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1976450472 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1976528791 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1979025384 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1979505449 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1984093548 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W1995790672 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2001126868 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2007759681 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2021825464 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2026348124 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2027398667 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2053845340 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2056816934 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2062663664 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2071469669 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2084268447 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2085560336 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2087875287 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2096363434 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2099803346 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2100635887 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2108913511 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2122934142 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2127808790 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2145440265 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2149140511 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2149961401 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2158267197 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2159913367 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2163189802 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2167030552 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2168678454 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2336178900 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2487793673 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2556210643 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2795724966 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2914700230 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W2983757799 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W3093151155 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W3122867100 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W3123134806 @default.
• W3194569968 cites W3123995444 @default.
• W3194569968 doi "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96061-9" @default.
• W3194569968 hasPubMedCentralId "https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/8377025" @default.
• W3194569968 hasPubMedId "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34413364" @default.
• W3194569968 hasPublicationYear "2021" @default.
• W3194569968 type Work @default.
• W3194569968 sameAs 3194569968 @default.
• W3194569968 citedByCount "2" @default.
• W3194569968 countsByYear W31945699682022 @default.
• W3194569968 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3194569968 hasAuthorship W3194569968A5001838081 @default.
• W3194569968 hasAuthorship W3194569968A5045063225 @default.
• W3194569968 hasAuthorship W3194569968A5072361154 @default.
• W3194569968 hasBestOaLocation W31945699681 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C113494165 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C141824439 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C154945302 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C177142836 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C187206662 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C202556891 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C22171661 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C22349654 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C2524010 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C2777212361 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C2778496695 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C2779066997 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C32407928 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C38652104 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C41065033 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C46814582 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C47993264 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConcept C90659851 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C113494165 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C141824439 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C144237770 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C154945302 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C15744967 @default.
• W3194569968 hasConceptScore W3194569968C162324750 @default.

• next