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• W319675786 abstract "ABSTRACT Recent contributions to the contract negotiations literature suggest that ultimate contract success is determined by whether the settlement fosters a positive relationship between the parties. Given the adversarial nature of the conventional negotiation process, obtaining an optimal outcome may be difficult. An alternative to the adversarial process is found in the work of Rawls who argues that a just outcome is most likely obtained when individuals choose from behind a veil of ignorance, a situation in which participants negotiate without knowing their future position. The purpose of this research is to test the value of negotiation from behind a veil of ignorance. Students from Industrial Relations classes conducted mock labor negotiations that determined a significant portion of their grade. Veil of ignorance contracts (students received either management or labor terms) are compared to conventional adversarial negotiations. Main conclusions include a propensity for veil of ignorance negotiations to yield generous pay and health benefits but fewer vacation days as compared to conventional contracts. Students from the veil of ignorance groups emphasized fairness as a learning outcome, while students engaged in conventional negotiations emphasized the realism of the process. INTRODUCTION The success of contract negotiations between labor and management extends beyond the signing of a contract. As observed by Holly, Jennings, and Wolters, criterion for measuring the success of a contract is whether the settlement contributes to a positive relationship between the two parties that fosters its effective implementation on a day-to-day basis (Holly, Jennings, and Wolters, 2001). However, the adversarial nature of negotiations makes obtaining an optimal solution sometimes difficult. Salary and benefit negotiations are generally distributive in nature, yielding a win-lose situation (Walton & McKersie 1965). In the case of wages, for example, side's gain comes at the expense of the other side. Labor's salary gains come as a result of increased labor costs for management. When issues are distributive, negotiators perceive their interests to be in opposition and behave in a more individualistic rather than in a cooperative manner (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992); sometimes leading to negotiation breakdowns and/or difficulties in successfully implementing a contract once it is signed. Promoting mutually beneficial negotiations in situations where outcomes are perceived to be win-loose offers significant challenges for both management and labor. Empirical research suggests that trust fosters cooperative negotiations in which negotiators seek to maximize the positive outcomes for both sides through candid discussions of preferences (Pruitt et al. 1983; Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). In fact, Friedman (1992, p. 435) observed that trust is one factor that is consistently most important in producing mutual benefit bargaining. Trust supports cooperative negotiators who, according to O'Connor and Carnevale (1997, p.), develop insights necessary to identify tradeoffs and to craft mutually beneficial outcomes. These insights may challenge a fixed pie assumption characteristic of distributive negotiations leading to new opportunities for joint gain. Labor, for example, may be willing to trade salary increases for job security or other benefits that would be less costly for management. Reaching this place of trust may be difficult even for seasoned negotiators. An alternative to adversarial negotiations is to determine outcomes based upon impartial preferences. Vickrey (1945 and 1960) and Harsanyi (1953 and 1955) both argue that social welfare is maximized when choices are made with an equal probability of being placed in the position of any member of society. Perhaps the best-known work regarding outcomes based upon impartial preferences is John Rawls', A Theory of Justice (1971). …" @default.
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• W319675786 date "2003-01-01" @default.
• W319675786 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W319675786 title "MOCK LABOR RELATIONS AND A GROUP RAWLSIAN EXPERIMENT" @default.
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