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• W3203241669 abstract "Although price-fixing agreements remain per se illegal in the United States, courts have undermined the per se rule against price fixing by making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that such an agreement exists using the plus-factor approach for establishing agreements with circumstantial evidence. In particular, American courts have a difficult time interpreting the significance of price-fixing activity in markets outside of the United States and its relevance to alleged domestic conspiracies to fix price. Judges too often discount or disregard the probative value of evidence showing that defendants fixed prices in foreign markets in determining whether those same defendants have fixed prices in the American market. Most courts that have considered the issue have held that defendants’ price-fixing conduct in a foreign market is not probative of price fixing in the United States. These courts have advanced two major reasons for so holding. First, some courts have held that price fixing in a foreign market is not a plus factor for establishing a U.S. conspiracy unless the plaintiffs can prove that the specific activities engaged in by the defendants violated applicable foreign law. Second, most courts assert that there is no connection between defendants’ proven foreign price fixing and alleged price fixing in the American market.This Article examines the relationship between foreign and domestic price-fixing activity and shows how expanding a price-fixing cartel from foreign markets into the United States benefits the cartel by reducing the risk of arbitrage, stabilizing the cartel, and also concealing the conspiracy from global antitrust authorities. The Article then takes the insights from the empirical and theoretical cartel literature and applies them to antitrust doctrine in order to demonstrate why defendants’ overseas price-fixing arrangements constitute a plus factor for proving the existence of an agreement in litigation claiming that the same defendants fixed prices in the American market. The Article then exposes the mistakes that courts make when concluding that defendants’ foreign price fixing is legally irrelevant to domestic antitrust claims. First, courts are incorrect to assert that foreign price fixing can only be a plus factor if it violates foreign law. Legality is not part of the plus-factor analysis and inquiries into foreign laws unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Second, when courts hold that there is no connection between foreign and domestic price fixing, their opinions display an unfamiliarity with how cartels – especially international cartels – actually operate. The Article concludes by encouraging courts to better understand how international price-fixing cartels operate. Defendants’ price fixing in foreign markets is generally relevant to claims that parallel pricing in the American market by these same defendants results from collusion. The foreign activity is not proof positive, but it is probative. And courts should treat it as such, rather than disregarding it." @default.
• W3203241669 created "2021-10-11" @default.
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• W3203241669 date "2017-01-01" @default.
• W3203241669 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W3203241669 title "Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies" @default.
• W3203241669 hasPublicationYear "2017" @default.
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