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- W3203488968 abstract "This thesis consists of three essays on strategic communication. It deals with the motivations behind experts’ incentives to transmit information to decision-makers. Large organizations, such as governments and global corporations, rely on expertise associated with multiple areas of knowledge. The necessary information is thus provided by many individuals or subunits who, in turn, may be interested in influencing decisions. Chapter 1 studies the interaction between a decision-maker who needs to take action on correlated issues, and experts who can communicate through costless, non-verifiable messages. Credible communication depends on how information relevant to one decision affects other decisions. The paper shows that a specialized expert can be trusted more than an expert whose knowledge extends to multiple areas. Even if the latter advises on a single discipline, information from other areas of knowledge may favour his interests, increasing his incentives to be dishonest. Chapter 2 expands this framework by introducing the strategic allocation of authority and the acquisition of information. The correlation between decisions affects the extent of the informational gains from delegation in three significant ways. First, there is a commitment value of delegation: giving up control over a controversial decision can motivate experts to transmit information relevant to less controversial decisions. Secondly, delegation hampers incentives to acquire information because it restricts the expected ‘marginal return’ of being informed. Lastly, restricting an expert’s access to information he is not expected to communicate enhances his credibility because it reduces incentives to be dishonest. Chapter 3 studies in more depth the relationship between authority and information acquisition. It focuses on how much costly information a biased expert acquires. It shows that experts with intermediate bias acquire more information under centralization than delegation when costs are sufficiently high. In such cases, the principal prefers to retain decision-making authority." @default.
- W3203488968 created "2021-10-11" @default.
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- W3203488968 date "2020-10-01" @default.
- W3203488968 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
- W3203488968 title "Essays on strategic communication" @default.
- W3203488968 hasPublicationYear "2020" @default.
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