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• W3204756878 abstract "No AccessAug 2021Subnational Governments in South Asia: Balancing the Fiscal Risks of Government Decentralization with the ReturnsAuthors/Editors: Martin MeleckyMartin MeleckySearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1667-3_ch4AboutView ChaptersFull TextPDF (1.9 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract: Investigates subnational fiscal risks and contingent liabilities in South Asia, a region, where many countries already have a high risk of debt distress, by examining the institutional frameworks across South Asia and relating them to the likelihood of exposure to subnational fiscal risks. Central governments in most South Asian countries delegate extremely limited authority to subnational governments to borrow—thus minimizing subnational fiscal risks but also potentially foregoing the benefits of decentralized decision making. A lack of transparency in subnational public debt statistics and guarantees reduces policy makers’ accountability and exposes the country to substantial fiscal risks. India’s experience proves illustrative for the rest of the region, especially for countries such as Pakistan, where provincial borrowing has expanded, and for Maldives and Nepal, which have started to decentralize fiscal policy. Improved transparency and fiscal rules, the disciplining role of markets, and better intergovernmental frameworks could achieve better subnational fiscal outcomes in the region. ReferencesBaicker, K 2005. “Extensive or Intensive Generosity? The Price and Income Effects of Federal Grants.” Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (2): 371–84. CrossrefGoogle ScholarBayoumi, T, M Goldstein, and G Woglom. 1995. “Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27 (4): 1046–59. 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Google Scholar Previous chapter FiguresreferencesRecommendeddetails View Published: August 2021ISBN: 978-1-4648-1667-3e-ISBN: 978-1-4648-1668-0 Copyright & Permissions Related RegionsSouth AsiaRelated CountriesIndiaMaldivesNepalPakistanRelated TopicsFinance and Financial Sector Development KeywordsCASE STUDYPUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPSRISK MANAGEMENTPUBLIC DEBTCAPITAL FLOWSBANK FAILUREFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL MARKET REFORMSTATE-OWNED BANKSBUDGETS AND BUDGETINGACCESS TO FINANCESUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYTRANSPARENCY PDF DownloadLoading ..." @default.
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