FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

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• W3295846 abstract "Security competitions are strong motivations for students to find novel security solutions. In this technical report we propose a mechanism for optimally allocating resources through the ten services of the competition 2011 international Capture The Flag (iCTF) in order to maximize the total number of points at the end of the competition. Our proposed mechanism is interpreted as a convex optimization problem. Two different optimization approaches are being considered, the first one considers that the data of the competition is known a priori and the second one uses a moving horizon scheme to make predictions of when to attack by using the history of existing data. We simulate the behavior of our proposed optimization schemes and compare them with what the teams actually did during the actual competition. 1 Background and Overview The iCTF [2] is a distributed wide-area security exercise whose goal is to test the security skills of the participants. The iCTF contest is organized by Prof. Giovanni Vigna of the Department of Computer Science at UCSB and is held once a year. The Capture the Flag contest is a multi-site, multi-team hacking contest in which a number of teams compete independently against each other. In traditional editions of the iCTF (2003-2007), the goal of each team was to maintain a set of services such that they remain available and uncompromised throughout the contest phase. Each team also has to attempt to compromise the other teams’ services. Since all the teams received an identical copy of the virtual host containing the vulnerable services, each team has to find the vulnerabilities in their copy of the hosts and possible fix the vulnerabilities without disrupting the services. At the same time, the teams have to leverage their knowledge about the vulnerabilities they found to compromise the servers run by other teams. Compromising a service allows a team to bypass the service’s security mechanisms and to “capture the flag” associated with the service. During the 2008-2010 iCTFs, new competition designs have been introduced. More precisely, in 2008 they created a separate virtual network for each team. The goal was to attack a terrorist network and defuse a bomb after compromising a number of hosts. In 2009, the participants had to compromise the browsers of a large group of simulated users, steal their money, and create a botnet. In 2010, the participants had to attack the rogue nation Litya, ruled by the evil Lisvoy Bironulesk. A new design forced the team to attack the services supporting Litya’s infrastructure only at specific times, when certain activities were in progress. In addition, an intrusion detection system would temporarily firewall out the teams whose attacks were detected. In the last iCTF the teams were responsible for defending themselves against a digital onslaught, more description of this competition is provided below. Our goal is to describe the 2011 iCTF competition from the perspective of one team playing against the rest of the world. K. G. Vamvoudakis, and J. P. Hespanha are with the Center for Control, Dynamical-systems and Computation (CCDC), University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9560 USA e-mail: kyriakos@ece.ucsb.edu, hespanha@ece.ucsb.edu. This material is based upon work supported in part by ARO MURI Grant number W911NF0910553. 1 1.1 Basic setup The game is played in rounds (each takes about 2min). At each round teams take offensive and defensive actions. These actions lead to the team collecting “points’.’ At the end of a fixed amount of time, the team that collected more points wins. One challenge with the formulation “one-against-world” is that in the 2011 iCTF game, winning was not just about maximizing points. Winning was about getting more points than each of the opponents (individually). In the “one-against-world” the opponents lose their individuality and so it is not easy to keep track if one opponent is collecting points faster than we are. One may need to resort to some “mean-field games” setup. Each team hosts a server that runs 10 services each with its own (unknown) vulnerabilities. Each service i, i P t1, 2, . . . , 10u of each hosting team j (this index is not really used in our formulation since we model what the “optimal” team will do) is characterized by three time-varying quantities for @k P t1, 2, . . . , 248u (the actual data was @k P t3, 4, . . . , 44, 50, . . . , 255u, and has 248 ticks because the server was down from 45 49, we mapped everything to write k P t1, 2, . . . , 248u): • the cut C i k , which is the percentage of money that goes to team j when money is laundered through service i (same values for every team), • the payoff P i k , which is the percentage of money that will be transformed into points for the team that launders the money (same value for every team); P i k 0.9e T icksActive 10 • the risk R i k , which is the probability of losing all the money R i k 0.9e No.OfActiveStates 2 At the beginning of each round k , the team is informed of the values of C i k , P i k , R i k for every i, and k . 1.2 Actions available to every team A team (we) has the following actions in the actual competition: 1. Defensive actions: Activate/deactivate own services. In the iCTF game a team could also fix the vulnerability of a service. We assume here that we have fixed all vulnerabilities that we knew how to fix. We also assume that there is no tipping since that is an action that is specific against a particular opponent. 2. Money laundering: Select (a) team to attack jk (mute decision within the “one-against-world” formulation); (b) service i to compromise, which implicitly determines the payoff P i k , the risk R i k , and the cut C i k (these quantities are specified at each round and take values 0 100%); (c) amount on money to launder uk . This action results in a number of points given by Xk # P i kp1 C i kqDkuk w.p. 1 mintOk , 1u 0 w.p. mintOk , 1u" @default.
• W3295846 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W3295846 date "2012-01-01" @default.
• W3295846 modified "2023-10-16" @default.
• W3295846 title "Optimal Attacks for the iCTF game" @default.
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