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• W329992197 abstract "THE POWER OF THE United States looks very different in the aftermath of September 11. Since the attacks, the earth's major nations -- ranging from the NATO countries to Russia to China to Japan -- and so many others have put aside their differences with the United States. The U.S. and Russia may even emerge, at least for a time, almost as allies and not just against terrorism. There is talk of agreements on nuclear downsizing and missile defense, all but unimaginable before the attacks. So in the face of a new kind of threat, new international alignments may be emerging. Perhaps the world will be reborn. But if a truly new order is to endure, the United States must take a hard look at one of the most discussed and least understood sources of international antagonism towards it, a source that is part myth and part deceptive reality: the idea that the United States is the dominating global nation, powerful to a degree and to an extent never before seen. In particular we must come to grips with the differing forms of U.S. power, how these differing forms are shaping the international landscape and how they shape the response of others to us. Voices around the world have decried and denounced America's overwhelming presence on the global scene. The question is, why the discomfort? Why the criticism? After all, in its foreign policy the United States is a state. It deploys its material to preserve the present constellation of nation-states within their current boundaries. It does not attempt to coerce favorable trade deals or tribute from others. It has supported and encouraged the move towards nation-neutral, rule-based mechanisms for governing international economic relations, in other words a system that restricts the sway of its own material might. And indeed, in relative terms the United States is a less imposing force today than in the early Cold War years, when in contrast to now Washington took considerable interest in the internal affairs and international posture of even its closest allies. Yet, although the hand of what is called is lighter, perhaps even nonexistent, today, the voices against that hegemony are louder. What are these critics and antagonists thinking? Is it simply that, as one scholar of international relations, William Wohlforth, has put it, [e]lites will not stop resenting overweening U.S. capabilities? Perhaps those global elites know or sense something that Americans by and large miss. Although America's active, material is smaller than it was half a century ago, America also commands a remarkable passive, immaterial -- what some have dubbed soft power but might more accurately be called cultural power. This form of American has never been greater or expanding more rapidly. And while in active, material ways, the U.S. is a status quo nation, in these passive and immaterial ways it is a highly disruptive, even revolutionary, global force. Hegemon? HOW? WHY? The answers have, perhaps, not been fully sorted through. Instead, from global leaders, scholars, journalists, and activists have come disquiet, disapproval, and denunciation about something generically known as American power. This theme of the unprecedented dominance of the United States on the world stage has been among the enduring topics of international discourse since the collapse of the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine has famously termed the United States the world's hyperpower and has called for turning Europe into what he characterizes as a necessary counterweight to America's global dominance. But he has hardly been the only one to embrace -- happily or unhappily -- the notion of America's untouchable global sway. On the happy side have been mainly Americans. Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed the U.S. the international order's single indispensable nation, a benign equivalent of Vedrine's formulation. …" @default.
• W329992197 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W329992197 date "2001-12-01" @default.
• W329992197 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W329992197 title "Hegemony of the Heart: American Cultural Power and Its Enemies" @default.
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