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• W335330607 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION There is now a good body of experience with from regulation to competition in the U.S. and abroad. Critics and advocates alike would admit that regulatory reform in industries such as airlines, telecommunications, and trucking has been costly and difficult.1 These groups generally diverge when deciding whether regulatory reform is worth it. Although there is a debate about how swiftly the from regulation to competition should occur, all agree that between governmental regulation and the promised land of competition, there is a transition phase. The electricity industry in the U.S. is-and may remain for quite a while-in such a phase. Transition is inevitable and important. Transition in the regulatory reform of the U.S. electricity industry is not a single event. Rather, it is a series of many individual and sometimes disparate events. These events involve different participants, decision-makers, and levels of coordination. To complicate things even more, these events make up a process that has proceeded in fits and starts and where the problems that apply at any given time vary significantly. Transitional delays and problems can arise from several sources. In the U.S. electricity industry good candidates are, for example: (1) the selection of inadequate policy tools such as the failure to mandate structural unbundling of generation and transmission; (2) political requirements to pay off the opposition through the time consuming recovery of stranded costs; (3) decentralized decision-making that has left the all important transmission siting decision to the vagaries of individual state policies; and (4) unanticipated gaming of the system that has created bad publicity and fewer benefits from reform. But what happens in determines not only whether there will be a promised land, but also the nature of its terrain. Regulatory or antitrust policy that may be suitable during one phase may be unsuitable in another. This can lead to errors unless policy objectives and implementation are carefully related to the phase.2 There are reasons to doubt that this is happening consistently in the process of regulatory reform in the U.S. electricity industry. One reason is that the appropriate roles of regulation and antitrust in the phase are unclear. This paper explores the problem. First, we look carefully at the discrete phases of regulation and competition. Then, we elaborate on the basic tasks of the phase. These tasks include: legal and economic policy initiatives that have been part of the to competition; defining the appropriate roles of antitrust and regulation; and identifying key transitional policy issues such as merger review, market design and monitoring, and information collection and dissemination. II. BACKGROUND At the outset of any regulatory reform initiative, advocates and opponents naturally cast their arguments in terms of the beginning and the with relatively little attention to the middle. After all, until a critical mass of relevant stakeholders is sold on the (or, conversely, no regulatory reform in the first place), there is no point in even talking about the transition. Nothing emphasizes this more than the retrenchment in state-level restructuring following the California electricity price spikes in 2000-2001. In California, the end was far from what was envisioned at the outset. It is probably safe to say that the problems in California were uniquely related to the transitional phase of restructuring, a phase that was unexpected and unplanned. This disconnect, effectively delayed implementation of retail access in at least a few states. As of early 2002, eight of the twenty-four states with enabling legislation or regulatory orders to implement retail access had suspended or delayed such implementation.3 Ex ante information and expectations regarding the regulation, transition, and competition phases of restructuring vary significantly from case to case. …" @default.
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• W335330607 date "2003-01-01" @default.
• W335330607 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W335330607 title "Electricity in Transition: Implications for Regulation and Antitrust" @default.
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