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• W335560106 abstract "From the standpoint of both allies and competitors of the United States, there are three very different types of responses to the RMA. Three variant strategies might well emerge--power denial, power assertion and affirmation, and power sharing. For Third World states seeking to undercut American and allied power, selective use of the RMA to draw upon new technologies to disrupt power projection is core strategy. We might call this strategy the power denial strategy. For regional powers not allied with the United States and that aspire to significant role in global politics, there is the possibility of comprehensive incorporation of technologies in building robust regional power projection forces. This may be used for power denial or more ambitious agenda may be attempted--power assertion and affirmation but within regional plus setting. The clearest case of this is China. The third response is that of regional powers allied with the United States. Here the relationship with the United States ensures the need to deal directly with American adaptations but to seek to define some autonomy of action vis-a-vis the United States. This strategy might be identified as power sharing with the United States in shaping the new global order. This assessment examines two key European allied approaches--those of France and Germany--to the RMA. It is the third strategy that therefore predominates in the analysis. Coming to terms with the United States by Germany and France is key part of the dynamics of change associated with the RMA. In this section, we provide baseline from which to assess the attempt by regional allies to deal with the United States and its approach to the RMA. To do so, we will use the analysis produced by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) in the 1997 Strategic Assessment of the force structure options for the United States in the next 10 years. (1) The INSS report argues that defense budget constraints will lead inevitably to downsizing of forces. The question is how restructured forces will be shaped in relationship to new technological options. How radical will the process of restructuring be in relationship to new technologies? Should the United States pursue cautious strategy of change, robust strategy of change, or something in between? The first strategy is called a recapitalized the second is referred to as an accelerated RMA and the third is spectrum Budget constraints and the changing nature of U.S. global presence provide the broad context within which redesign of the U.S. military will unfold. But it is to the technological factor the report turns to make basic judgments about force structure changes. According to the report, new technology has already presaged new operations and force-structure changes: Technological improvements in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggest the United States could dramatically improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which it can use military force. Three areas of military capability are of particular note: * Intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) * Advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence processing (C41) * Precision force, or weapons that increase the capacity to apply destructive power with greater range, speed, accuracy, and precision. Everyone agrees that systems embodying these capabilities will enable U.S. troops to be more efficient in using military force. There is, however, contending view. Those who see the emerging technologies as offering more profound changes tend to argue that for the United States to take full advantage of the technological improvements, it will be necessary to alter the existing structure and organization of the force. This group favors accelerating both the introduction of the technologies and making the structural, organizational, operational, and doctrinal changes that would take advantage of the technology as rapidly as possible. …" @default.
• W335560106 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W335560106 date "1999-04-01" @default.
• W335560106 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W335560106 title "The American Approach to the RMA: A Baseline" @default.
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