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• W354298820 abstract "Introduction Four days before this paper was presented at the Oxford Round Table on Terrorism, a blast from a bomb in a terrorist's oversized backup killed five Israeli tourists, the Bulgarian bus driver, and the suicide terrorist. Another 33 were wounded in the attack at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria on July 19, 2012 (Solomon, 2012). American Intelligence officials, working with the Israelis, fingered Hezbollah in Lebanon as the culprit, acting on behalf of Iran, who allegedly retaliated for attacks upon their nuclear scientists by agents working for the Israelis (Kulish and Schmitt, 2012). Curiously, the bomber had a fake Michigan Driver's License. So Lebanese working for Iran killed Israelis in Bulgaria while Americans pursued the perpetrators. This case illustrates yet another case of transnational terrorism. Yet while such attacks persist, many of our models are designed to focus on the individual or what is happening in a single country. This paper suggests a different method of analysis: using a transnational database to analyze transnational terrorism. Using the United States as an example, the data tracks who is attacked and where, not confined to the traditional studies of people or places, which either do not fit a consistent pattern or often capture no more than the domestically- oriented cases. Such a theory about how to track transnational theory is then applied to evaluating three modern myths of terrorism offered by government officials. Literature Review Since Kenneth Waltz's book Man, the State, and War (1969) was published, political scientists studying international politics have thought about their subject from three levels of analysis: individual, state and system. This seems like a good way to break down some of the existing literature on terrorism, as well as distinguish this study from others. Individual Level of Analysis When 9/11 occurred, the immediate reaction to the suicidal nature of the attack was that it was the work of madmen (Pape, 2003). Who else would kill themselves, and so many innocents, when we weren't at war with the countries of the hijackers? The field of psychology is therefore employed to study these terrorists in an attempt to understand what makes them tick. An example is Victoroff (2005: 4-5), who combines a series of factors (environment, goals, strategy, means, organization and participation) to paint a portrait of the mind of a terrorist. His overview covers everything from the psychoanalytic to the sociological theories (oppression, relative deprivation, national culture, and social learning). The profile of the young well-educated single male is even conjured up, as well as the counter-example of the impoverished suicide bomber (Victoroff, 2005: 7). In the end, he concludes Terrorists are psychologically extremely heterogeneous. Whatever his stated goals and group of identity, every terrorist, like every person, is motivated by his own complex of psychosocial experiences and traits (Victoroff, 2005: 35). Allison Smith (2008) has another study that employs psychological and sociological theories. Her work zeroes in on group comparison with non-groups, employing theories from Freud to Social Identity Theory, and examining affiliation motive imagery and power motive imagery. Terrorist groups seem more effective at linking with their fellow members, and expressing more hostility to outside members than non-terrorist groups are able to (Smith, 2008: 59-60), and also see themselves as having more control over others (Smith, 2008: 70). A group study that instead tried to emphasize the dynamics of the organization is Cronin's (2006) study about how the terror group al-Qaeda would end. This promising work critiques the psychological approach (Cronin, 2006: 11) and traditional organization theory (Cronin, 2006: 12). She also points out that most studies are descriptive in nature, and zero in almost exclusively on leaders or root causes (Cronin, 2006: 8). …" @default.
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• W354298820 date "2012-06-22" @default.
• W354298820 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W354298820 title "The Transnational Element during the 'War on Terrorism,' 1920-2011" @default.
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