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• W4233754349 abstract "FOCAL POINTS IN COLLECTIVE FREE IMPROVISATION CLÉMENT CANONNE OLLECTIVE FREE IMPROVISATION (herein abbreviated as CFI), while not a recent phenomenon in music (free jazz’s first experiments date from the late 1950s), remains under-studied. The extant literature either deals with political aspects (Carles and Comolli 2000) or tries to analyze the resulting music, using musicological tools (Jost 1994) or new concepts drawn from the complexity sciences (Borgo 2005). My research on CFI focuses on a cognitive approach, in order to understand the process of collective improvisation:1 how a group of improvisers who do not know each other and are not using a common referent2 (Pressing 1988) can answer the challenge of making music together. This paper deals mainly with non-idiomatic improvisation3 and with cases of “pure” improvisation, where musicians have never played together before, such as in Derek Bailey’s Company Weeks (Bailey 1993). In that perspective, I think we can consider CFI under the generic class of coordination problems. C Focal Points in Collective Free Improvisation 41 Of course, I cannot deal with every aspect of the question in the limited space of this paper. My aim is to report on two experiments that may illustrate the relevance of the concept of focal points (Schelling 1960) to a finer understanding of how the improvisers can actually achieve musical coordination. COORDINATION AND FOCAL POINTS Coordination is one of the classic problems of Game Theory (see Gauthier 1975, or Janseen 2001): it is not to be confused with cooperation problems, like the famous prisoner’s dilemma, where the classical demands of rationality produce a sub-optimal solution for both players.4 In a coordination game, the problem is that there are too many equilibria,5 and the players don’t know which one to choose. Indeed, there are several sets of mutually consistent decisions that produce an appreciated outcome for all players. The problem then is for the players—without communication—to select strategies that all belong to the same set. Let’s take a simple example: suppose you are on the phone with a friend and the communication is suddenly cut off; suppose also the phone is free for both of you, no matter who makes the call. Now you have two possibilities: either you call back your friend, or you wait for him to call. Of course, your friend has the exact same possibilities. This simple game of coordination has two equilibria: you are making the call and your friend is waiting, or your friend is making the call and you are waiting. But if both of you are calling, or both of you are waiting , the communication will not start again, which neither of you wants. As simple as this problem may appear, it is one of the most debated in Game Theory. Why is that? Simply because there is nothing in the classical conception of rationality that can tell which equilibria to choose. According to Game Theory, the best thing to do is to randomize between solutions and let chance decide. But in real life, people are doing much better than chance; more often than not, communications are indeed continued! In this particular case, people use conventions in order to choose one equilibrium over the other: for example, the original caller calls back; or the younger; or the same one who called back in a previous, similar situation . . . (note that sometimes these conventions can be contradictory). Conventions, which regulate social conducts in these situations, are the best-known way to solve coordination problems, because they give agents expectations about others’ choices (see Lewis 1969).6 But what 42 Perspectives of New Music are people supposed to do when such conventions are not available (or when there are too many, divergent conventions)? The economist Thomas Schelling (1960) ran a series of informal experiments which show that, in a large variety of new coordination situations, subjects can actually converge on the same solution: such a solution is tagged a “focal point.” But Schelling himself is rather confused when it comes to giving a precise definition of a focal point (see Sugden and Zamarron 2006): sometimes the focal point is said to be a “meeting of..." @default.
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• W4233754349 date "2013-01-01" @default.
• W4233754349 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W4233754349 title "Focal Points in Collective Free Improvisation" @default.
• W4233754349 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/pnm.2013.0010" @default.
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