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• W4247270641 abstract "No AccessJul 2016Evidence on the Impact of Political EngagementAuthors/Editors: World BankWorld BankSearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0771-8_ch5AboutView ChaptersFull TextPDF (0.2 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract: Provides evidence from research across a variety of contexts that political engagement has profound consequences for governance, policy selection, and development outcomes, often in highly nuanced ways, through impact on the incentives of leaders. Findings suggest that political engagement through electoral institutions leads to better development outcomes, though some examples point to autocracies outperforming democracies; the key question becomes whether leaders are selected and sanctioned on the basis of performance in delivering public goods. Institutional reforms that made political engagement more inclusive of socially and economically disadvantaged groups yielded leaders more likely to reduce poverty, improve human development outcomes, and reduce social discrimination. Women in India elected for state legislative assembly seats reserved for historically disadvantaged low-caste groups spend more on health and pro-poor land reforms and less on education than women elected from unreserved constituencies. Other research reveals that when political parties and special interest groups organize to extract private rents, they support the selection of bad-quality leaders. BibliographyAcemoglu, Daron, Tarek A Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun. 2014. “The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring.” NBER Working Paper 20665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 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