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• W4256144632 abstract "No AccessJul 2016GovernanceAuthors/Editors: World BankWorld BankSearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0771-8_ch1AboutView ChaptersFull TextPDF (0.4 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract: Describes government failures in the provision of public goods needed for economic development, including malfeasance and mismanagement within public bureaucracies and by political leaders. According to the Control of Corruption indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, the vast majority of poor people live in countries with persistently low indicators of the control of corruption. Case studies suggest that systemic and persistent corruption has its roots in the actions of powerful leaders to deliberately weaken internal institutions of control within government, including weak management practices that condone frequent absenteeism among public sector workers; nepotism in the recruitment and career advancement of public sector workers; and crony capitalism, whereby politically connected firms receive privileged treatment by public regulators. Ideological beliefs and distributive conflict among citizens can lead to the selection of leaders who further polarize people and nurture ideological constituencies rather than exert effort to find common ground to address shared problems and pursue appropriate policy reform. BibliographyAiyar, Yamini and Soumya Kapoor Mehta. 2015. “Spectators or Participants? Effects of Social Audits in Andhra Pradesh.” Economic and Political Weekly 50 (7): 66–71. Google ScholarAlesina, Alberto and Paola Giuliano. 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Google Scholar Previous chapterNext chapter FiguresreferencesRecommendeddetailsCited byMillennial Pivot: Sustainability-Purposed Performance Zoning Guidelines in Urban Commercial DevelopmentSSRN Electronic Journal View Published: July 2016ISBN: 978-1-4648-0771-8e-ISBN: 978-1-4648-0774-9 Copyright & Permissions Related CountriesEgypt, Arab Rep.IndiaIndonesiaMalawiPakistanPeruTunisiaUgandaUnited StatesRelated TopicsCommunities & Human SettlementsGovernanceLaw and DevelopmentSocial Development KeywordsACCOUNTABILITYCASE STUDYCIVIL SERVICECOMMUNITY INVOLVEMENTCORRUPTIONGOOD GOVERNANCEINSTITUTIONAL CHANGEINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIESNEPOTISMPOLICY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATIONPOLICYMAKERSPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPUBLIC GOOD APPROACHPUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEESTRANSPARENCY PDF DownloadLoading ..." @default.
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