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- W4287322405 abstract "How cooperation evolves and manifests itself in the thermodynamic or infinite player limit of social dilemma games is a matter of intense speculation. Various analytical methods have been proposed to analyse the thermodynamic limit of social dilemmas. In a previous work [Chaos Solitons and fractals 135, 109762(2020)] involving one among us, two of those methods, Hamiltonian Dynamics(HD) and Nash equilibrium(NE) mapping were compared. The inconsistency and incorrectness of HD approach vis-a-vis NE mapping was brought to light. In this work we compare a third analytical method, i.e, Darwinian evolution(DE) with NE mapping and a numerical agent based approach. For completeness, we give results for HD approach as well. In contrast to HD which involves maximisation of payoffs of all individuals, in DE, payoff of a single player is maximised with respect to its nearest neighbour. While, HD utterly fails as compared to NE mapping, DE method gives a false positive for game magnetisation -- the net difference between the fraction of cooperators and defectors -- when payoffs obey the condition a+d=b+c, wherein a, d represent the diagonal elements and b, c the off diagonal elements in symmetric social dilemma games. When either a+d =/= b+c or, when one looks at average payoff per player, DE method fails much like the HD approach. NE mapping and numerical agent based method on the other hand agree really well for both game magnetisation as well as average payoff per player for the social dilemmas in question, i.e., Hawk-Dove game and Public goods game. This paper thus bring to light the inconsistency of the DE method vis-a-vis both NE mapping as well as a numerical agent based approach." @default.
- W4287322405 created "2022-07-25" @default.
- W4287322405 creator A5046788502 @default.
- W4287322405 creator A5083344594 @default.
- W4287322405 date "2021-02-27" @default.
- W4287322405 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
- W4287322405 title "Nash equilibrium mapping vs Hamiltonian dynamics vs Darwinian evolution for some social dilemma games in the thermodynamic limit" @default.
- W4287322405 doi "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2103.00295" @default.
- W4287322405 hasPublicationYear "2021" @default.
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