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• W4310496939 abstract "On June 29, 2022, the Transcarpathian branch of the Ukrainian public broadcasting station Suspilne Uzhhorod decided to post a short compilation of the main news of that day in Hungarian on its Telegram channel. It gathered an unusually high amount of attention in the comments section, not to specific news but to the Hungarian language of the post. Most commentators reacted negatively and wrote in Ukrainian that “it’s a betrayal.” Notably, user Vladik wrote, “. . . they [Suspilne Uzhhorod] support crazy Orbán.” More importantly, in explaining his position he wrote, “There is one big fact known to everybody, Magyars always wanted to occupy us, and to take our region [Transcarpathia].”1 An hour after the post, Suspilne Uzhhorod informed its readers it would no longer publish news in Hungarian after its audience’s harsh reaction.2 This episode demonstrates not only Ukrainian prejudices against Hungarians but also the tension inherent in attempts to build communication between Ukrainians and Hungarians by publishing news in Hungarian. In Ukrainian media, Hungary is often understood either as an enemy planning to attack or, on the contrary, a neighbor open to further dialogue.Before the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian-Hungarian relationships consisted of small-scale scandals about the Ukrainian language law, the protection of minority rights, and less intense accusations that Hungary was blocking Ukraine from joining NATO. Hungary’s main interest was protecting the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, while Ukraine saw itself as a nation-state with a titular Ukrainian nationality, implementing nationalizing policies that would promote the Ukrainian language in education and the public sphere. Although the main target of such policies was the Russian-speaking population, national minorities like Hungarians and Romanians became a target too. This situation exemplifies a classic conflictual relationship between a nationalizing nation-state (Ukraine), a national minority (Hungarians in Ukraine), and an external homeland (Hungary).3 This triangle has shaped the Ukrainian view of Hungary and Hungarians at least since the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013–14, after which Ukraine started a new round of reforms.In 2018, when Ukraine adopted a new language law that limited instruction in non-Ukrainian languages at schools and universities, Hungary condemned it. Such a reaction led to an open conflict between Kyiv and Budapest. The Ukrainian state news agency, Ukrinform, published a short article charging the Hungarian government with using the Hungarian minority in Ukraine as a political weapon to pressure Ukraine. One might see Hungary not as an anti-Ukrainian force per se but rather as a state seeking more influence. More importantly, this text ends with Ukraine and Hungary agreeing to negotiate amendments to the 2018 law that could satisfy both sides.4 Today, Hungary is viewed as a problematic neighbor with whom Ukraine can talk.Minority rights was not the only conflictual point between the two states. Ukrainian media suspected Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán of having pro-Russian sympathies. This mistrust became even more pronounced after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. Hungary refused to allow transit of Western military aid to Ukraine, and Orbán even called Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, “enemies” in his speech after the 2022 elections. Afterward, Ukrinform published an opinion by Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Serhiichuk explaining the peculiar Hungarian position on the Russo-Ukrainian war. He goes deep into history, claiming that medieval Hungarian tribes came from the territory of Russia and still shared spiritual bonds with Russians. Furthermore, he claims, “Indeed, not only economic factors [Hungarian dependency on Russian gas] played a key role [in Hungary’s pro-Russian position], but also a historical mentality and, as a result, natural solidarity, which comes from the common origins of the two brother nations, Hungarians and Russians.”5 Unlike the 2018 article, Ukrinform published this piece as an opinion column; in the text, Hungary is painted as a perennial enemy, no longer just a problematic neighbor with whom one may have minor conflicts sometimes.However, the Ukrainian public sphere is not monolithic, and various media have other takes on Hungary. Usually, Transcarpathian local media are more sympathetic toward the Hungarian minority and, often, toward Hungary itself. The regional media Infopost openly claims its main task is to build bridges between Ukraine and its national minorities. One way to do this is by publishing news and analytical texts about the minorities and neighboring states in various languages, including neighboring national languages: Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, and Romanian, as well as German, Czech, English, and Ukrainian. Infopost’s promo video claims the outlet is building a Ukrainian political nation based on the idea of multiculturalism that includes all its national minorities.6 Such an approach could be considered an attempt to redefine Brubaker’s triangular relationship—to produce productive dialogue between Ukrainians and Hungarians.Nevertheless, explicit anti-Ukrainian statements by Hungarian officials present a challenge in creating a positive image of Hungary that would inspire Ukrainian dialogue with its neighbor. There are two ways Infopost fights this negative image of Hungary. First, it distinguishes the pro-Russian Orbán government from a neutral or friendly Hungarian society. For example, Infopost published polls showing that the number of Hungarians sympathetic toward Putin and Russia has significantly decreased since the start of the war.7 Although this did not correspond to the election results in Hungary, it challenges the view that Hungary is fundamentally pro-Russian and may indicate solidarity between some Hungarians and Ukrainians.The second way Infopost fights Hungary’s stereotypical negative image is by presenting the Hungarian government not as pro-Russian, but as opportunistic. For example, the founder of Infopost, Dmytro Tuzhanskyi, published a piece explaining why Hungary didn’t block Ukraine’s EU candidacy. The article proposes that the Hungarian government opportunistically tries to balance the interests of the EU and Russia and, more importantly, does not wish to have Russia border Hungary.8 Overall, it is close to the image of Hungary from the period of the language-law conflict when Hungary was a problematic neighbor, not an enemy.In sum, Hungary has a predominantly negative image in the Ukrainian media and is portrayed either as an annoying neighbor or a hostile enemy. At the same time, Transcarpathian media outlets, like Infopost, go against the grain and try to build a dialogue between Ukrainians and Hungarians, deconstructing such stereotypical images. Their work may inspire Ukrainian public media, like Suspilne Uzhhorod, to publish news in Hungarian once more." @default.
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• W4310496939 date "2022-12-01" @default.
• W4310496939 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W4310496939 title "Creating Enemies and Building Bridges: Representations of Hungary in the Ukrainian Media" @default.
• W4310496939 doi "https://doi.org/10.5325/hungarianstud.49.2.0212" @default.
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