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W4311504634 abstract "The start of 2022 presented unique challenges for Australia, after an end to 2021 very much muted by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated state lockdowns, most of which started to ease around late-November of that year. Gabriele Abbondanza and Thomas Wilkins, writing about the final half of 2021, talked about these key issues faced by Australia during this period, including the continuance of COVID-19, our relationship (or lack thereof) with China, climate change, our Pacific relationships, and the announcement of AUKUS.1 All of these still remain relevant and important issues, with many intensifying in the first six months of this year. But what we also have seen are new issues emerge that challenge national security and notions of a global order, as well as changes to the domestic political outlook. As 2022 began, we saw an Australia that started very much to re-enter the world stage, with international borders re-opening, and COVID-19 taking much less of a foreign policy focus. Issues such as climate change began once again to dominate, with flooding across much of Australia, and then an unprecedently hot European spring into summer. The Morrison Government's standing globally and at home on issues of climate change, following a rather disappointing COP26 summit in Glasgow, remained a significant issue for Australia. The war between Russia and Ukraine, something long predicted in intelligence circles, also started during this period. The first conflict on the European continent in over 20 years, and one involving one of the world's nuclear powers, has proved bloody, relentless, and not lacking for brutality, at least on the part of the Russians. The conflict in Ukraine has exposed the over-reliance on many European states on Russian gas, but also the willingness, or not, of Western states to lend aid to a state being unlawfully invaded. The conflict, at time of writing, is ongoing, but in the first half of the year the Ukrainian armed forces, as well as the Ukrainian people, have proved remarkably resilient. Leading into an election on May 21, there were also a large number of domestic and foreign policy developments and issues that came under the scrutiny of the campaign period. An election is always an interesting time to analyse and discuss not only the current trajectory of Australian foreign and strategic policy, but also its future possibilities. Both of the major parties, as well as many of the minor ones, released detailed plans for how they saw the future of Australia, and what the key strategic issues would be over the next term in parliament. The agreement between China and Solomon Islands received particular focus and attention by the media and political insiders, almost to the point of overbalance, but other things, such as the Australian Labor Party's (ALP) push for a First Nations foreign policy, also deserve equal attention. To paraphrase the late Terry Pratchett, the worst curse one can utter is, “may you live in interesting times”, and this most surely applies to the first half of 2022.2 To sum up all the issues in Australian foreign policy for the period of January to June 2022 is no easy task. Some key themes and issues do emerge however, as well as some interesting areas for the future. Australia's borders with the world had largely opened by January 2022. The signing of the AUKUS pact with the United States and the United Kingdom put Australia into a new security landscape, despite plunging relations with France to lows never before seen.3 Australia was re-integrating into the global economy by allowing people and goods much more freedom into and out of the country, despite the looming supply-chain issues evident during the first half of the year.4 On climate change, Australia remained as isolated as it was during the depths of 2021.5 The COP26 conference, held in Glasgow in November 2021, had massive effects and influence on international climate change discussions and debates, especially from the Morrison Government, and how the LNP approached the international community leading into 2022. The government's performance at the COP conference was criticised not just domestically in Australia, but internationally as well. In the lead up to, and following the conference, Australia's commitment to strong climate action, as well as commitments to emissions reduction, were largely panned by experts and our allies in the international community. The United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union all had at the time much more ambitious and so-called ‘serious’ policies for dealing with the issue of climate change. Even during 2021, such comments became points of tension between Australia and the international community, with the UK High Commissioner to Australia, Vicki Treadell, saying that climate change was her nation's “number one foreign policy priority”.6 These comments, and signals from Australia's international partners continued well into 2022, with the United States working for much of this year on large-scale climate legislation.7 Meanwhile in Australia, a commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050 necessitated hard and tough negotiations within the Coalition Government. It was also a hard sell to the international community, given these domestic political issues. It was a feature of much sustained criticism towards Australia, including from partners in the Pacific.8 There are some within the Australian political community who see the issue of climate change as one mainly of domestic, rather than global significance. It is a topic framed in the language of the Australian ‘energy policy wars’ that have beleaguered governments going back to John Howard in 2007. Arguably, many Prime Ministers since Howard have been brought down due to issues around climate change, and it has affected nearly every level of our politics. Yet it is not merely a domestic issue, but a global one. Pacific leaders, rightly, see the threat of climate change as an existential crisis for their nations. It is not just an issue for environmental preservation, but a national security and domestic stability issue. The issue of climate change also affects Australia's global standing and relations with allies, especially regional neighbours. Australia was seen to be ignoring the climate threat faced by nations in the Global South, and of watering down real action on climate change where such action conflicted with Australia's reliance on fossil fuels, not just for domestic energy use, but also as a trade and export market.9 Taking climate change seriously as an issue of global policy is almost a litmus test for many nations. And yet, leading into 2022, Australia was seen as a non-serious player on climate discussions, beholden to conservative politicians and business interests unwilling to shift the status quo towards renewable energy. In the March 2022 budget, the last delivered by the Morrison Government, 0.3 per cent of total expenditure for the period 2021–2024 was directed to climate change initiatives, dropping to 0.2 per cent for the period 2024–2026.10 Politically, as the federal election period began, climate change became a key theme of the campaign, as the main parties, as well as a series of well-funded independents, campaigned on whether the Morrison Government's commitments were strong enough. There is one other major event, or rather, series of events, which also factor into this. Between February and April 2022, catastrophic floods occurred across much of eastern Australia, due largely to the second consecutive La Niña summer in the region. Such events are undoubtedly affected and exacerbated by climate change, and are likely to only get more intense.11 The death toll reached at least twenty-two people, with billions of dollars in damage and repairs needed. Some towns will remain without road access until well into 2023. Major cities including Brisbane became temporarily inundated, with river levels rising to those not seen in over a decade. These floods came just two years after the devastating bushfires in 2019-20 that left nearly 500 dead, AU$80 billion in damage, and close to 4.5 per cent of the Australian landmass, or over 13 per cent of the east coast, burnt during one summer.12 All of this paints a picture of a country where, according to the Australia State of the Environment Report 2021, “climate change is already having – and will continue to have for the foreseeable future – an impact on extreme events”.13 Australians, and the global international community, can see the effects that a changing climate is having here in this country; on the landscape, the people, and animals, but also on Australia's society and economy. It is not an issue which is confined to the long-term future, but rather one that has present-day impact. To quote again from the Australia State of the Environment Report 2021, “Droughts and periods of extreme fire weather are expected to become more common, as are more intense rainfall events”.14 The climate crisis, as it is being felt in this moment, is a current domestic and international national security crisis for Australia to deal with, and is going to be on the foreign policy agenda for many more years to come. In the midst of this tough international environment, and the environmental catastrophes plaguing much of the country, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) handed down their 2022 report.15 The messages in this report were rather bleak for Australia, while also outlining areas of opportunity in managing this global security and environmental issue and collaborating with international partners. Australia has seen warming already by 1.4°C over the last 110 years, and the overall situation has deteriorated since the last report by the IPCC in 2014.16 Our heat and rainfall extremes have increased, as have fire conditions and ocean acidity, and this is only going to worsen as warming reaches 2°C and beyond, which is all but inevitable without serious action.17 Climate change has already begun to affect Australian ecological and agricultural environments, with the frequency of overall drought conditions increasing.18 Such conditions are likely to have outsized impact on Australia's agricultural production and exports. Farm production and profits in some regions has fallen by up to 100 per cent in the last twenty years, according to the Australian Department of Agriculture, with this expected to worsen over time.19 The long term implications are that we as a country are going to have to expend more focus and resources on managing climate change, and the effects of it. It is already an extremely important national security and foreign policy issue, which the IPCC report and the State of the Environment Report indicate will only becoming increasingly significant in the years and decades to come. We have already seen the ADF deployed to handle climate-related issues, including the 2019-20 summer bushfires, the 2022 floods, and also to nations overseas, with the Department of Defence keenly aware of the issues and risks climate changes poses to Australia.20 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update highlights the threats climate change poses to human security, as well as to the broader stability of our region.21 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Climate Change Action Strategy 2020–2025 also highlights the risks climate change poses, not just to national and regional security, but also the way Australian development assistance is conducted, the level of assistance many of our neighbours will need to face the climate crisis and extreme weather events, as well as relations with the region.22 These are not idle issues facing Australia in the years ahead, but acute foreign policy and security issues that Australia faces now. How Australia approaches the issue, whether through obfuscation and delay, or through collaboration and forward-thinking with our allies and neighbours, will help determine not only the fate of the planet and our environment, but also the national security and foreign policy interests of Australia. Innovation and adaptation are two of the key areas identified by the IPCC as priorities for tackling the climate crisis. One of the others is international co-operation. If Australia continues to treat what is happening as ‘business as usual’, then not only will we likely suffer from the consequences of increased droughts, fires, floods, and sea-level rise, but also likely suffer some level of isolation from the international community. Australia needs to work openly and collaboratively, not dismissively and in isolation on these issues, and focus on strengthening our ties and support with our neighbours and allies around the globe. The new Albanese Labor Government has recognised this as a key area of foreign policy focus, as well as a key issue for the government in the years ahead. In the months after taking office, they affirmed their commitment to a more ambitious emissions reductions target, submitting to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of 43 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, on 2005 levels, by 2030.23 The government also restored the Australian Climate Change Authority, and committed to legislation to enshrine such goals, which eventually passed both houses of parliament.24 These moves have been well received by our partners, especially in the Pacific, where leaders at the Pacific Islands Forum in July “welcomed and fully supported Australia's renewed commitment to the Forum's climate change priorities”.25 Discussions around the Forum also featured comments heavily praising the new direction Australia was taking with Pacific states, as well as the greater sense of co-operation and friendship with Australia.26 This is a marked difference from the Morrison years, and is represents a real positive shift for Australia. Pacific states remain some of our closest regional partners, and improved relationships with them is likely to have benefits beyond discussions of climate action, into areas of security, trade, and diplomacy. On 24 February 2022, Russian forces began an invasion of Ukraine, supposedly to demilitarise and “denazify” the country; thus protecting Russian-speaking peoples from “bullying and genocide”.27 The invasion commenced with airstrikes across large sections of Ukrainian territory, especially in the capital Kyiv. Simultaneous ground invasions occurred across three main fronts; from the north through neighbouring Belarus, from the south from Russian-annexed Crimea, and from the east through the separatist-occupied Donbas region.28 The advances made by Russian troops were initially extremely swift, and airstrikes mainly centred on military targets. Most Western governments believed that the Russian plan was to “decapitate” the elected Ukrainian government, and install their own, hoping to have captured Kyiv within ninety-six hours.29 At the time this seemed like a very likely outcome; within three days, Russia had seized large parts of Ukrainian territory, and had continued its advance into many others.30 However, Ukrainian resistance was vastly underestimated, as not only the Ukrainian military, but ordinary Ukrainian civilians took up the cause of national defence. Large numbers of Ukranians, though, also began a mass-exodus of the country, with more than 500,000 people fleeing the violence within the first week, most of these towards Poland and other neighbouring European nations. By 1 July, the war was in an entirely different place; Russian advances in the north had been turned back, Kyiv remained standing, and Russian gains were confined to the south and east, in areas bordering already seized regions of Crimea and the Donbas.31 The Ukrainian military had held together surprisingly well, had managed to push back Russian forces in many key places, and had made significant strikes against top Russian generals.32 This is not to say that the war is in any way close to conclusion, but what the initial six months showed is that the strengths of the Russian military, and its ability to conduct an invasion of this sort, have been weakened in the public and academic eye, and a large rethink of not only such strategic approaches, but of the use of force by powerful states more broadly, is needed.33 This war, designed to be in some ways a show of force against Ukraine's move westward away from Russia, largely failed on many fronts. Ukraine itself is closer than ever to NATO, has been accepted to apply to join the EU, and has received support and aid from multiple nations around the globe.34 Other nations in Europe, including Sweden and Finland, have moved forward with applications for NATO membership, further strengthening that alliance.35 Meanwhile Russia has become increasingly isolated, both politically and economically, with its citizens also facing harsh penalties from the international community, while the war continues to drag on, very much against Russian favour. Russia's relationship with the West, in particular Europe, is in tatters, with mutual sanctions and retaliation occurring on both sides, and issues of human rights violations and war crimes being raised daily. More than 5 million Ukrainian people have fled the country to seek refuge in Europe as of July 2022, upending that continent's dynamics concerning refugees.36 Much of this changed dynamic has to do with the resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, but also of the Ukrainian people. This war is one of a new breed of modern military conflict, one where global media influence is almost equally as important as military success. And we have seen these from the Ukrainian side in volume: social media and influence campaigns designed to garner support online, civilians removing street signs to delay Russian advances, people throwing Molotov cocktails at tank units, looting of Russian equipment, and the underground networks sabotaging Russian intelligence and online communications.37 This kind of behaviour by civilians is of course nothing new, but it shows the new kinds of conflict being driven by advances in mass media, and increasingly asymmetric tactics on the part of larger powers.38 As Russia and other authoritarian states increasingly flex their military might in their regions, and yes, return the world to a potentially more multipolar one, conflicts between states will not be confined to military fields of war. Civilian involvement and the presence of digital media is only going to further blur the boundaries of war, and drastically affect how states conduct themselves in terms of foreign policy. Some of this from the Russian side we have already seen and likely remember well from the 2016 US Presidential election.39 Ukraine has also been a master of such tactics during the war, and is definitely winning in the court of public opinion, if not also on the field of battle. What this represents though, including for countries in the Asia-Pacific, is a greater awareness that wars are no longer fought and won by strength of force (although arguably Russian force strength was significantly over-estimated), but are also fought between and with civilians, in the media, and by likeminded ally states.40 As we move to an area of potentially more aggressive authoritarian powers, not just Russia but China and other states, and as many states experience slides towards authoritarianism, recognising, understanding, and likely combatting these strategies is going to be vital for effective conduct of foreign policy. Russia has also not been shy to leverage its position in global energy markets to not only harm Ukraine, but also all of the states globally supporting them; cutting off gas supplies, terminating supply lines and contracts, and as we saw in the second half of this year, leveraging OPEC.41 A Chinese state potentially emboldened by Russian behaviour poses risks not only to Australian security, and foreign policy, but also the economy, and the impact for Australia could be catastrophic. Our economy is closely linked with Chinese industry, and our critical undersea infrastructure is also heavily at risk.42 Energy, transport, and infrastructure has long been within the grounds of military engagement, but the integration of such systems across continents puts other countries at risk. Cyber-attacks, attacks on energy supplies, and other such tactics are hallmarks of the Russian military and pose dangers not just to the people of Ukraine, but Europe more broadly. In a world where such tactics are becoming more normalised, the risks posed to Australia in regional conflicts closer to home are crystallised. For Australia, we have been involved in the support of Ukraine, sending military supplies and financial aid, welcoming refugees, and also enacting sanctions against the Russian regime, including the first issued under our “Magnitsky-style” legislation enacted at the end of 2021.43 We have also felt the effects, direct and indirect. Our joining with Western states in support of Ukraine and against Russia, the strengthening of our ties with the United States and Europe, the impacts of the conflict on supply chains and economies, and the global food, oil, and gas shortages have had large effects on Australia, particularly regarding inflation and the wider economy.44 There is also the very nature of the international system itself which has been affected. The global liberal world order, on “life support” for many years, and not helped by the tenure of US President Donald Trump, has been given a shot of adrenaline by the war in Ukraine.45 The global rules-based system, recently derided as “fragile” and having “outlived its purpose” has shown its strengths in the multinational response to the war in Ukraine.46 States, including Australia, have undertaken concerted and deliberate efforts to assist Ukraine and its people, as well as isolate Russia. Yet the questions remains: how does Australia address these growing issues going forward, ensuring stability domestically, as well as internationally? A new government potentially changes the picture on Australian commitment to global international systems, and our relationship with our allies. The Reserve Bank has also begun to tighten economic conditions, with its first interest rate rise in May in over a decade.47 Not all of these are a result of the war in Ukraine; COVID-19 and other global pressures played a part. But they are all part of the global and domestic landscape that Australia must now respond to. There is also the affect this conflict has had on Australia's security outlook and military strategy. Might Russian aggression in Ukraine, a region it sees as a breakaway from its sphere of influence, prompt or encourage Chinese aggression over Taiwan, or the South China Sea, potentially dragging us into a regional conflict with China, or at the least with China and the United States? We may have also overestimated the ability of China to conduct this kind of warfare; in Ukraine, many analyses appear to have overestimated the ability of the Russian military.48 Of course, the situation in Taiwan is not completely comparable with that in Ukraine, but these questions must be at the forefront of Australian policymakers' minds going forward. Is Australia willing to commit, and take risks for the future of the liberal, rules-based international order, or do we make a slide towards isolationism? After nearly a decade in government, Prime Minister Scott Morrison led the Liberal-National Coalition to the 21 May election suffering in the polls, beset by a number of scandals, and generally regarded as unlikely to win.49 Climate change, cost of living, and government accountability were among the top issues identified by voters before the election, all of which featured heavily during the campaign, especially the latter issue, with the government and the Prime Minister attacked from a number of sides over mismanagement of everything from emergency response management to COVID-19 and ministerial standards and accountability.50 Such issues proved to be the Morrison Government's demise. The ALP formed government with 77 seats in the 151 seat House of Representatives, but the Liberal Party also lost half a dozen seats, as well as one Senate seat, to so-called “Teal Independents”, who campaigned almost exclusively on issues of climate change and government integrity.51 These issues were clearly ones which resonated for a lot of voters, and campaigns which focused on them as central parts of their candidate's election platforms, even when not from the ALP, had large success. However, for the first time in a very long time, foreign policy was also at the forefront of the election campaign, at least in the minds of the media and candidates, with many parties making foreign policy and national security central parts of their pitch to voters. Polling data showed that less than 1 per cent of Australians ranked this as their major issue for the campaign, so there are interesting questions about whether such foreign policy campaign issues are the exclusive interest of the media, politicians, and the academic foreign policy commentariat.52 Such groups are also almost exclusively white, upper-middle class, and male, so where we see focus on such issues it is likely not representative of the broader Australian population's concerns.53 Nonetheless, foreign policy issues and announcements did feature quite heavily in discussion and campaigning during the 2022 election. Some of these topics have been discussed here already; international climate change co-operation, the war in Ukraine, global energy markets, and our relations with the Pacific. But other issues received airtime and attention: the Quad and AUKUS, but also importantly our relationship with China, and China's relationship with our region.54 The key election takeaway for much of this foreign policy campaigning and commentary was a question that seems to have informed much of the thought in voters' minds on other key election issues: what is my life going to be like after this election, and whom do I vote for to have a better, safer, and secure future? On this front we saw two narratives presented by the major parties. The Morrison Government attempted to portray the ALP as an unsafe pair of hands on national security and foreign policy, as a party that would fail to make the tough calls in Australia's national interest, and not pursue a hardline approach with China. Meanwhile the ALP Opposition's narrative was that the government was out of touch, not only with the Australian people, but also with the international community. In this narrative, the government's stances towards the Pacific, on climate change, towards China, and on a host of other issues was inconsistent with our allies, had alienated us from sections of the international community, and were harmful to Australia in the long run.55 There were key events which emerged both before and during the campaign that became flashpoints during the election, highlighting discussion of these narratives. Several of these centred closely on our region, our security, and the potential of conflict with China. The first of these, occurring before the campaign period, related to AUKUS and the breaking of the contract with the French Naval Group, something already discussed closely by Abbondanza and Wilkins in relation to 2021.56 The disputes between the French and Australian governments, claims of lying, leaked text messages, and incompetent management of the submarine issue, all formed a chapter in the broader political narrative. Despite the bipartisanship shown by both parties in praising the AUKUS deal, and its strengthening of our ties with the United States and United Kingdom, during the late days of the campaign both sides sought to politicise the deal and the Morrison Government's handling of it. Anthony Albanese accused the government of “playing politics” with our national security by its handling of the announcement, and its handling of the relationship with France, making hay out of the government's management of the issue and its alienation of a key ally.57 The Morrison Government's response of course was that the ALP was too immature to have handled or developed such a deal, and suggested that the ALP was at risk of leaking secure information about national security if presented with advance knowledge of the deal.58 Australia's relationship, or lack thereof, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is one which heavily dominated the foreign policy campaign in 2022, as well as much of what the public did focus on when it comes to foreign policy in this election. Many likely remember the presence of large billboards promoting spurious links between the ALP and Chinese President Xi Jinping, or the hysteria whipped up around meetings between political figures and the Chinese Embassy in Canberra.59 China played an almost outsized role in the vision of Australia that both parties sought to present to the Australian people, furthered by a government that saw such a hardline approach as beneficial to their electoral chances, which as post-election analysis shows, it was not.60 Key seats held by the government with large Mandarin-speaking populations suffered large swings against them, in particular from this community. Much of this was blamed on the “us versus them” mentality of the government, especially that pushed by then-Defence Minister, now Opposition Leader, Peter Dutton.61 Comments from Mr Dutton, including that Australia should “prepare for war”, formed part of this rhetoric, and likely cost the government seats, and hardened our position overseas.62 The details of this should not hide the fact that the relationship with China, and their increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and against Taiwan, is of extreme foreign policy interes" @default.
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W4311504634 title "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022" @default.
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