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• W436625601 abstract "INTRODUCTION The evasion of antitrust liability for anticompetitive conduct in the intrabrand market is a frequent occurrence, which receives little to no attention from courts. (1) Within many intrabrand markets, anticompetitive and monopolistic conduct is a real threat, if not already a reality, and deserves more attention from the courts than it currently receives. To illustrate the problem, imagine two companies (X and Y) that wish to provide distribution/dealership services for a group of manufacturers of distinct, but similar, products. Imagine, for example, that X and Y both want to open car dealerships in the same geographic area and BMW, Mercedes, and Lexus would all like to have their cars sold by either X or Y. (2) Because the car companies just want their inventory sold, they do not care which one sells their cars. Now let us assume that X has more bargaining power than Y from having leased potential car lots in locations that are more attractive and accessible and can thereby promise the car companies a superior presence in the local luxury automobile market. This sway is enough for X to convince the manufacturers to enter into exclusive distributorship agreements whereby the manufacturer agrees with X that it will not allow competing dealers to sell its products where other dealers might compete with X, (3) which of course includes Y. Due to X's business acumen and excellent locations, X is able to convince all three of the manufacturers to agree to exclusive distributorships. (4) For the duration of each agreement, Y, or any other competitor who wishes to enter this market, will be unable to procure cars to sell from that particular manufacturer. The more exclusive agreements a firm like X is able to secure, the less variety of luxury cars other would-be dealers will have, thus drawing customers away from them and toward X. Eventually, new dealers seeking to enter the luxury car market will find it nearly impossible to contract with one of these manufacturers to sell their cars due to X's exclusive distributorships. Additionally, if the majority of the luxury automobile manufacturers deal exclusively with X, entrants into the luxury dealership business will find themselves with only a few, less popular brands, hardly worth selling. Downstream customers will also lose out-decreased competition among the dealerships due to the exclusive arrangements will manifest itself in higher sticker prices and monopolistic premiums. So, can Y bring a claim under section 1 (5) or 2 (6) of the Sherman Act for anticompetitive dealing or monopolization against X? Although it technically could under the current antitrust regime, Y's chances of surviving a motion to dismiss or summary judgment would be small. (7) As a result, firms in the intrabrand market that are the victims of collusion among competing distributors and their suppliers have little hope of vindicating their right to participate in a competitive market. Thus, ironically, the very laws created to foster competition and punish unreasonable restraints of trade offer the very loopholes through which intrabrand distributors are legally pushed out of the market because, according to the courts, it serves a greater, pro-competitive good of increased interbrand competition and efficiency. This Note's analysis is particularly germane in two oft-occurring circumstances. It applies in markets with few distributors and many manufacturers. It also applies, with much overlap, to any market where a distributor is offering an indispensable service to its supplier, and based on its recognition of its own necessity, the distributor insists on exclusive vertical nonprice agreements. These agreements prevent the supplier from allowing other distributors to carry its goods or provide its services--effectively driving the distributor's competitors out of the market. For example, this same issue has arisen in the ticket vending market (involving companies such as Ticketmaster) as well as in the movie theater business, both of which will be discussed below. …" @default.
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• W436625601 date "2009-01-01" @default.
• W436625601 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W436625601 title "Giving Teeth to Sherman Act Enforcement in the Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts off Their Interbrand Addiction Post-Sylvania" @default.
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