FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W4366809725> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W4366809725 endingPage "88" @default.
• W4366809725 startingPage "81" @default.
• W4366809725 abstract "_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2501REVIEWS.251 : 2005-09-14 19:58 eviews THE LOGIC OF SINN N G Bertrand Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. Hamilton, , Canada   @. Kevin C. Klement. Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference. London and New York: Routledge, . Pp. xiii, . .. his is, I think, the best book on Frege I have ever read. It has a narrow Tfocus, dealing only with Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, but it covers it exceptionally thoroughly, adding considerably to our knowledge of what might have seemed to be an overworked topic and throwing, in the process, a flood of light on a number of other Fregean topics. Klement’s book exemplifies what used to be the hallmark virtues of analytic philosophy—rigour, clarity, and attention to detail—and shows that, even on topics that have been deluged in ink, they pay off. Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung has been widely hailed as his most important contribution to the philosophy of language, and, indeed, one of the greatest contributions to philosophy of language ever. Despite partial anticipations , notably in Mill’s distinction between connotation and denotation, Frege was the first modern philosopher to maintain that the distinction holds for all linguistic expressions and the first to distinguish sense from the psychological associations of the expression (which Frege labelled its “tone”). Despite Frege’s systematic elaboration of propositional and predicate logic, he never attempted a similarly rigorous semantic theory. Nonetheless, his remarks on the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction suggest that he would have regarded it as a feasible project. He can indeed be thought to have set the stage for such a theory, without actually supplying one. That Frege himself did not attempt a formal semantics based on the Sinn/ Bedeutung distinction hardly constitutes dereliction of duty, but, as work on formal semantics burgeoned during the twentieth century, it becomes more surprising that the project attracted so little attention, especially since the Sinn/  J. S. Mill. A System of Logic (), Bk. , Chap. . russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  - _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2501REVIEWS.251 : 2005-09-14 19:58  Reviews Bedeutung distinction retains wide intuitive appeal. At least one problem with the project was pointed out by Russell in a letter to Frege of  September : since Frege admits Gedanken as the Sinne of complete sentences, an analogue of the propositional paradox which Russell presents in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics (PoM, §) should arise in the logic of Sinn. Frege, in the absence of a formal proof, refused to admit that this was so— and, of course, in the absence of an explicit logic for Sinn, a formal proof was not forthcoming. Though he did not intend to be historically faithful to Frege, Alonzo Church took up the project of creating a viable logic of sense and reference in the s, and it remained very much his project for the next  years. Church presented three different systems, which he called Alternatives , , and , with progressively more relaxed identity criteria for senses. On Alternative , which he favoured on account of its appropriateness for modal logic, two sentences , A and B, had the same sense if A ≡ B was a thesis of the logic. This system had little relevance for Frege, since it was part of Frege’s intention to use the notion of Sinn to capture what he called the “cognitive value” (Erkenntniswert ) of an expression; plainly A ≡ B may be a thesis even though A and B differ in cognitive value. Alternatives  and  attempt to capture a much stronger notion that Church calls synonymous isomorphism. They differ in that in Alternative  synonymous isomorphism is preserved under λ-conversion, while in Alternative  it is not; that is, in Alternative  “(λx Fx)a” and “Fa” are synonymously isomorphic while in Alternative  they are not. Unfortunately, Church developed his theories within simple type theory, the theory which Russell had found himself forced to abandon on account of the propositional paradox he had presented to Frege in September . It did not take long before Myhill proved a close relative of this paradox, usually now known as..." @default.
• W4366809725 created "2023-04-25" @default.
• W4366809725 creator A5057289415 @default.
• W4366809725 date "2005-06-01" @default.
• W4366809725 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W4366809725 title "The Logic of SINN" @default.
• W4366809725 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/rss.2005.0013" @default.
• W4366809725 hasPublicationYear "2005" @default.
• W4366809725 type Work @default.
• W4366809725 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W4366809725 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W4366809725 hasAuthorship W4366809725A5057289415 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C101874905 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C123556308 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C139997677 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C149106765 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C182744844 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C101874905 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C111472728 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C123556308 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C138885662 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C139997677 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C149106765 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C182744844 @default.
• W4366809725 hasConceptScore W4366809725C41895202 @default.
• W4366809725 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W4366809725 hasLocation W43668097251 @default.
• W4366809725 hasOpenAccess W4366809725 @default.
• W4366809725 hasPrimaryLocation W43668097251 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2013210170 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2051157668 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2070051673 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2320519290 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2344930250 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2594235377 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W2945780302 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W3209062011 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W4251158189 @default.
• W4366809725 hasRelatedWork W65178584 @default.
• W4366809725 hasVolume "25" @default.
• W4366809725 isParatext "false" @default.
• W4366809725 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W4366809725 workType "article" @default.