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• W4378975129 abstract "For many people, consciousness is the biggest mystery of the universe; the hard problem of how subjective experience can arise has been the source of philosophical speculation for centuries and psychological research for decades. Even setting aside esoteric concepts such as the soul or panpsychism, there are many conflicting views on the issue. Within neuroscience, two main schools of thought prevail: globalism and localism. However, neither perspective adequately explains the current experimental evidence, and in In Consciousness We Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience, Hakwan Lau makes the case for a synthesis. The two schools of thought have their origins in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, which attempted to identify “the minimally sufficient conditions for a subjective experience to occur” by locating the areas of the brain in which activity corresponds to conscious awareness of a stimulus. Localists emphasise the role of the V1 area of the visual cortex in conscious visual perception, citing the phenomenon of blindsight, whereby people with damage to the V1 area can respond accurately to visual stimuli without conscious awareness of the stimuli. However, other research has shown evidence of conscious visual perception in people without a V1 area, which might imply that the V1 has only a supporting role in consciousness. Globalists propose that subjective experiences arise when information is broadcast to many regions of the brain, with an emphasis on the prefrontal and parietal cortices, and argue that consciousness has a central role in cognition. However, activation in the prefrontal and parietal cortices during conscious experience is not as widespread as once thought. Globalists struggle to account for blindsight, because it requires cognitive processing without conscious awareness, and for the apparent sensory richness of the world, because most sensory detail should have been filtered out before the point at which they believe conscious awareness occurs. However, whether a particular experiment favours the local or global view is often strongly affected by issues of experimental design. A particular instance of neural activity might be due to conscious perception of a stimulus but it might also signify post-perceptual cognition or attempts to report the experience to the experimenters. Similarly, improvements in task performance might correlate with conscious perception of a stimulus owing to differences in internal signal strength rather than conscious awareness itself. Questions regarding which confounders are addressed, and how well, could easily sway the interpretation of an experimental result in favour of a global or a local paradigm. Lau is pragmatic about such experimental biases, and argues that a perfectly balanced experiment is probably impossible, but as long as there is broad awareness in the research community of a given confounder, it can be accounted for as evidence accumulates. However, more nuanced confounders might go largely unconsidered, and this systemic bias could potentially skew the whole body of research in favour of one school of thought over the other. Lau takes the position that neither class of theory is wholly right and that a compromise centrist theory is necessary. His model, perceptual reality monitoring theory, proposes that a mechanism (which he refers to as a discriminator, possibly based in the prefrontal cortex) distinguishes between true perceptions, neural noise, fantasy, and memory. According to Lau, conscious perception of an object occurs when early sensory activity represents the object and a discriminator agrees that this is true; this model solves the issue of sensory richness, because higher-order functions can access the richer, lower-level perceptions by referencing the first-order representation. He argues that his model can explain the subjective “what-it-is-like-ness” of experiencing, for example the redness of the colour red (distinct from the colours yellow or blue, or from a sound or smell), simply through the structure of the internal representations in the brain. Lau acknowledges that many readers will find this account too mechanistic, and prefer to search for an alternative theory of consciousness, based on some deeper underlying principle. However, he argues that attempts to find a fundamental explanation tend to rely on untested assumptions and make substantial errors with regard to neuroscience. In the end, he is almost apologetic, acknowledging that “little of [his model] is original, and some readers will no doubt remain unconvinced”. Nonetheless, a functional account like Lau's bypasses many of the problems of the esoteric theories, as well as addressing the flaws in the global and local models. In Consciousness We Trust is a book with several purposes. In some ways, it is a call to arms, demanding higher standards of critical thinking and evidence in the study of consciousness, and a greater attention to the nuances of experimental design. Its second aim is to argue that neither the local theorists nor the global theorists are likely to be proven correct: each theory has flaws that are unlikely to be fixed, and as such neuroscientists should try to develop a centrist theory that combines the best elements of both. While the centrist perceptual reality monitoring theory might leave many feeling like something is still missing, it represents an important synthesis of the best available knowledge, and challenges those who study consciousness to pursue their research with renewed critical rigour and move beyond the existing paradigms." @default.
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• W4378975129 date "2023-08-01" @default.
• W4378975129 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W4378975129 title "Thinking, both global and local" @default.
• W4378975129 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/s1474-4422(23)00207-7" @default.
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