FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W4379745571> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W4379745571 abstract "This study investigates how green purchasing in local governments varies as a function of the organization's internal commitment, operationalized by the stage of institutionalization of green public procurement (GPP), and external pressures from various stakeholder groups. GPP, a value-based innovation justified on the grounds of intergenerational equity, is an important tool governments can use to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. Survey data from 210 U.S. local governments reveal that while both external and internal factors are strong predictors of buying green, internal commitment matters relatively more. We also find that earlier stages of GPP institutionalization are more conducive to external influence, albeit the effect differs among stakeholders. Local governments tend to be more likely to buy green when nudged by nonprofits and interest groups, and less so when offered financial incentives by the federal government. Acest studiu analizează modul în care achizițiile verzi realizate în cadrul administrațiilor locale variază în funcție de angajamentul intern al organizației, măsurat prin etapele instituționalizării achizițiilor publice verzi (APV), și de presiunile externe exercitate de diverse grupuri de părți interesate. APV, o inovație bazată pe valori, justificată prin echitatea intergenerațională, reprezintă o strategie importantă pe care guvernele o pot utiliza pentru a atenua efectele adverse ale schimbărilor climatice. Datele unui sondaj realizat în rândul a 210 administrații locale din SUA relevă faptul că în timp ce atât factorii externi, cât și cei interni sunt indicatori-cheie ai achizițiilor verzi, angajamentul intern are o importanță sporită. De asemenea, se constată că etapele incipiente instituționalizării APV sunt mai predispuse influenței externe, cu toate că efectul diferă în funcție de grupurile de părți interesate. Administrațiile locale sunt mai predispuse să facă achiziții verzi atunci când sunt influențate de organizații non-profit și de grupuri de interes, și mai puțin predispuse în situația în care primesc stimulente financiare de la guvernul federal. Статията изследва как купуването на еко-съобразни стоки и услуги от местната държавна администрация зависи от вътрешната мотивация на службата, измервана със степента на институционализиране на зелените oбществени поръчки (ЗОП), и външния натиск от различни заинтересовани страни. Kaтo ценностно-мотивирана иновация, обоснована на идеята за равен достъп до природните ресурси от бъдещите поколения, ЗОП е важен инструмент, който публичната администрация може да използва, за да намали отрицателните ефекти, свързани с изменението на климата. Анализът на данни от допитване до 210 местни административни органи в САЩ показва, че купуването на зелени стоки и услуги се обуславя и от външни, и от вътрешни фактори, но все пак вътрешната мотивация има относително по-голямо значение. Установяваме също така, че по-ранните етапи на институционализиране на ЗОП са по-благоприятни за външни влияния, като силата на тези влияния зависи от произхода им. Местните власти са по-склонни да купуват зелени стоки и услуги, когато са повлияни от организации с нестопанска цел и групи по интереси, и по-малко в резултат на финансови стимули от страна на федералното правителство. Governments increasingly innovate and change the way they do business (Clausen et al., 2020; Osborne & Brown, 2011). Public procurement has long been used as a tool to reduce government inefficiency by outsourcing goods and services to third parties. Yet, the traditional goal of creating quasi-markets for public goods has begun to give way to values different than efficiency. Green public procurement (GPP) is a value-based innovation aiming to improve the intertemporal allocation of shared resources, such as the environment, and thus enhance intergenerational equity. Defined as “purchasing which reduces environmental impacts across product or service life cycles” (Rainville, 2017, p. 1029), GPP is part of sustainable public procurement (SPP) that uses purchasing to further social equity and mitigate climate change (Brammer & Walker, 2011; Hafsa et al., 2022). Other SPP examples include quotas for small businesses and those owned by women and minorities, ‘buy local’ requirements, and using socially responsible supply chains. Led initially by scientists and advocacy groups, the calls to reduce ecological neglect have recently amplified (Bosso & Guber, 2005; Song et al., 2019). Governments, nonprofits, and businesses have been under pressure to commit to sustainable production and purchasing. Given the long-standing state and federal inaction on climate change in the United States, local governments have taken the lead in sustainability initiatives (Dimand & Cheng, 2022; Krause, 2011). With about $1.72 trillion spent on goods and services yearly (Stritch et al., 2020), the local level can steer the market toward more sustainable products and services (Georghiou et al., 2014). Yet, the drivers of buying green in local government remain less understood (Dimand, 2022; Terman & Smith, 2018). Prior research has provided valuable insights into how external, organizational, individual, and innovation-specific factors affect the adoption of new practices and processes (Clausen et al., 2020; de Vries et al., 2016; Fernandez & Wise, 2010; Walker, 2014). Yet, we know little about the relative importance of each and how they interplay. Our study takes upon this task by first testing which matters more—the pressures from external stakeholders or the organization's internal commitment and, second, whether the effect of external pressures is conditional on the internal processes. We posit that value-based innovations such as GPP are likely to enter administrative practice quicker than market-oriented innovations, for example, because they spread through individual and organizational value systems. In this sense, some green purchasing might occur before formal GPP adoption. This study focuses on local government procurement practice and considers GPP adoption a stage in the institutionalization process that might or might not affect daily purchasing routines. Specifically, GPP institutionalization, as we term the organization's internal commitment to environment-friendly purchasing, unfolds in four stages—green predisposition, familiarity with GPP, adoption of GPP policy, and inclusion of GPP in strategic planning. Among the external pressures, we account for the influences of four main stakeholders, each of whom has unique mechanisms at their disposal to shape procurement practice at the local level—the federal government, community residents, interest groups, and nonprofit organizations. Data from 210 local governments across the United States reveal that external and internal factors are strong predictors of buying green, yet internal commitment matters relatively more. We also find that the early stages of institutionalization—those before GPP formal adoption—are more conducive to external influences, albeit the effect varies by stakeholder. This article makes a trifold contribution. First, we draw on GPP to develop the concept of value-based innovation as opposed to market-oriented traditional procurement. We conceptualize GPP as a policy on the grounds of intergenerational equity and explain how such value-based innovations might organically permeate administrative practice. Second, we theorize the stages of GPP institutionalization and discuss why stakeholders might be more influential at the early stages that are dominated by administrative rather than political actors. Third, the analysis reveals how public organizations respond to external pressures to innovate and which stakeholders take priority. While the study focuses on U.S. local governments, it provides useful references for other countries considering sustainable procurement. Our findings underscore the importance of creating a procurement culture that shifts the focus from securing the lowest bidder to ensuring sustainable acquisitions that minimize environmental footprint. Scholars have used various terms to denote the government process of acquiring goods and services from third parties, including purchasing, outsourcing, and contracting out. The public sector mainly refers to it as procurement1—one of the most important economic activities of governments (Thai, 2001; Trammell et al., 2020). Traditionally considered purely transactional, public procurement nowadays pursues larger goals pertaining to sustainability and social welfare (Alkadry et al., 2019; Georghiou et al., 2014; Grandia & Meehan, 2017). GPP is defined as purchasing that seeks to reduce environmental harm. Specifically, it is “the approach by which public authorities integrate environmental criteria into all stages of their procurement process, thus encouraging the spread of environmental technologies and the development of environmentally sound products, by seeking and choosing outcomes and solutions that have the least possible impact on the environment throughout their whole life cycle” (Bouwer et al., 2005, p. 16). Innovations are new products, processes, or practices that an organization uses for the first time (Aiken & Hage, 1971; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Krause, 2011; Rogers, 1995; Walker, 2006, 2014). Innovations do not need to be new ideas altogether like inventions (Berry & Berry, 2018). GPP is an organizational innovation that transforms the purchasing process from “brown” and “gray” into environmentally friendly. The New Public Management movement of the 1980s resurfaced public procurement as a tool to improve the inefficiency of government supply by injecting market mechanisms into the production and delivery of public goods and services (Kettl, 2005). Efficiency was premised on creating quasi-markets and introducing competition among suppliers. Competitive bids for governmental contracts are just one example. Yet, public procurement has recently shifted from a tool to increase efficiency to one that enhances sustainability. Along with social equity policies that set aside contracts for small businesses and firms owned by women and minorities, GPP aims to improve equity by considering the rights of generations coming after us. While supplier diversity programs provide preferential treatment to specific disadvantaged groups and do so contemporaneously, GPP is justified on the grounds of intergenerational equity. Specifically, buying green can improve intergenerational equity in two ways. First, common pool resources, such as clean air or the wilderness, might be overconsumed unless policies are in place to ensure their preservation (Kemkes et al., 2010; Weimer & Vining, 2017). Given that markets are often myopic and might not adequately account for the preferences of future generations, GPP is a policy that improves the intertemporal allocation of shared resources (Smith, 2014). Second, the pricing of brown products in the market might not account for the cost of pollution or other externalities resulting in their undervaluation (Solow, 1974; Westin, 1992). Yet, these costs will be borne by future generations and governments, who will likely face even larger negative externalities from continuous ecological decay. In this sense, green products and services might come at a price premium in the short run but might be less costly in the long run. Engaging in GPP and paying the full cost of environmental impact throughout the whole life cycle of a product or service frees the next generations from paying bills they did not incur. Along with a range of pressing policy issues that involve fairness and equity between generations like social security, health care, and national deficit (Frederickson, 1994; Kotlikoff & Raffelhueschen, 1999; Smith, 2014), accounting for the long-term effects of government purchasing choices is a step in the right direction. Such a shift from market-efficient to value-laden purchasing also entails moving from tangible monetary benefits to less tangible ones that further the good of all. The benefits from increased competition among contractors are more easily captured through low prices and cost savings. By contrast, the benefits from green purchasing are rather diffused and hard to monetize because they come in the form of positive global externality beyond any local jurisdiction. While efficiency remains a goal of public procurement, the emphasis on environmental sustainability and intergenerational equity makes GPP a value-based policy that contrasts with the traditional market orientation of procurement systems. Prior scholarship has extensively debated the difference between individual and public values, what constitutes public value, and how to create it (Bozeman, 2007; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Moore, 1995). Whereas individual values are complex cognitive and emotive pillars that guide human behavior, public values are collective judgments that form the basis of public policies (Nabatchi, 2012). Public values also guide the conduct of government officials in pursuing organizational and societal goals. Public value creation, on the other hand, refers to what the government creates for the common good. Protecting the environment can transpire simultaneously as an individual value shared by elected and appointed officials, a public value reflected in organizational policies, and a public value creation by delivering collective benefits globally and ensuring access to a clean environment for the generations coming after us. Moreover, the movement to reduce environmental neglect has gained momentum as public support for government action has increased (McCright et al., 2013). The reasons range from cultural and generational to “just the right thing to do.” Both political and bureaucratic actors could spearhead value-based innovations such as GPP. While elected officials mainly pursue sustainability initiatives for credit claiming before the electorate, for some, they coincide with their sincere policy preferences. Faced with prolonged state and federal inaction on climate issues, many progressive mayors joined local climate protection agreements (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). Public administrators, on the other hand, might support GPP based on professional norms (Lubell et al., 2009) as well as individual preferences. Prior research has also linked the pursuit of sustainable initiatives to bureaucratic incentives for career advancement (Deslatte & Swann, 2016; Teodoro, 2009). Another explanation of why bureaucratic actors could advance sustainable purchasing comes from the recent literature expanding representation beyond electoral representation to include unelected civil servants and other actors (Rehfeld, 2009). As public representatives, procurement officials seek to advance the common good as they and their constituents understand it, albeit without the pressure of electoral sanctions. For Rehfeld (2009, p. 223), administrators act this way “because they believe that is simply the right thing to do.” As green purchasing is motivated by equity rather than efficiency considerations (as is traditional public procurement) or profit (as is most private sector innovation), it might spread through various channels. Scholars have depicted policy diffusion as occurring bottom-up, with antismoking laws being an example (Shipan & Volden, 2006), top-down as in curbside recycling programs (Feiock & West, 1993), or horizontally like state lottery adoption (Berry & Berry, 2018). Given the broad public support for protecting the environment, GPP could spread bottom-up (starting from within individual organizations), top-down (through incentives by the federal government), and horizontally (propelled by government contractors or local communities). de Vries et al. (2016) identify four antecedents of innovation: environmental (external), organizational (internal), innovation-specific, and individual (innovator-specific). We focus on the first two categories. Specifically, we examine the relative importance of each and their interplay. Institutionalization occurs when a new policy becomes routine in an organization. The process prompts organizational learning and requires structural and operational changes. Crossan et al. (1999) depict the innovation learning process as evolving in four stages—intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. Similarly, we conceptualize GPP institutionalization as passing through four stages—green predisposition, familiarity with GPP, adoption of GPP policy, and inclusion of GPP in strategic planning. Crossan et al. (1999, p. 525) define the first stage, intuiting, as “the preconscious recognition of the pattern and/or possibilities in a personal stream of experience.” In the procurement context, at this stage, managers use intuition to decide if a product is needed and how to fulfill the need. While the literature on contracting has long focused on the classic “make or buy” decision (Brown et al., 2013; Brunjes, 2020), GPP adds a new layer to both alternatives. While it enforces green requirements for the buy decision, it also transforms the decision because it no longer involves just making a product in-house but either making new green products or reusing, recycling, and repurposing existing products the entity already owns. When environmentally conscious public managers cut down on procurement, their decisions should positively impact the environment. For example, a public entity may use a computer as a fax machine instead of purchasing new hardware (Bolton, 2008). Thus, in the classic makes or buy context, managers with green predisposition would likely opt for the make option, which can be even greener than the buy option in two ways. First, if deciding on making a new product in-house, managers can seek to create a product that can be reused or recycled later. Second, the make option might not involve an actual new product at all, because managers can resort to reusing or repurposing old products they have at their disposal. Overall, the initial stage of institutionalization is characterized by low regulation and high discretion by procurement professionals. The second stage, interpreting, refers to “explaining, through words and/or actions, of an insight or idea to one's self and others” (Crossan et al., 1999, p. 525). It entails analyzing the applicability of new ideas and their effect on organizational structure and operation. At this stage, the organization assesses the potential impact of GPP and the extent of change it requires. To judge the relevance of GPP to their entity, managers should be familiar with it. The next stage of organizational learning, integrating, pertains to “the process of developing a shared understanding among individuals, and the taking of coordinated action through mutual adjustment” (Crossan et al., 1999, p. 525). At this level, organizations formally adopt new ideas. In the case of GPP, local legislative bodies pass the green requirements as an ordinance. Yet, the adopted policy can remain an empty shell if not implemented. The last phase, institutionalizing, refers to embedding innovation into organizational systems and structures (Crossan et al., 1999). The GPP institutionalization is complete when green purchasing becomes part of the organization's performance measurement system. “What gets measured gets done” is a popular saying among public managers. The policy formalization in the strategic plan marks the end of the process. As each stage of the institutionalization process implies a higher level of organizational learning, we expect governments to practice more green purchasing as they move up. The higher the stage, the more committed the organization is. The commitment should pick up at the policy adoption stage because the organization formally ends its older routines and further intensify when green requirements enter its strategic plan. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1.Agencies at higher stages of GPP institutionalization are more likely to buy green. This theoretical expectation, however, might not hold in practice. Policies are often adopted for symbolic reasons, with no intention to be used. Moreover, implementation can fail for multiple reasons—political, financial, or technical—even if the decision-makers intend to follow through. The assumption that implementation comes after policy adoption may not hold, either. Enacted policies often catch up with already established practices. In a sense, implementation can precede adoption. Local entities could utilize sustainable purchasing without a formal policy in place. One such example is the city of Orlando, which has a long history of buying green before officially passing a green/sustainable purchasing policy in April 2020 (City of Orlando, 2020). The environment in which organizations operate may either enable or hinder innovation. Per contingency theory, it is a contingency that affects organizational behavior. Public entities adapt to the environment and adjust their behavior when it changes (Donaldson, 2001; Walker, 2014). Local governments interact with multiple constituencies with varying needs and demands. In the case of a value-based innovation such as GPP, these include residents as users of goods and services, higher-level governments as sources of funding, and businesses and nonprofit organizations as suppliers of those goods and services on behalf of governments (Behravesh et al., 2022; Roman, 2017). In a democracy, policies should reflect public preferences. Therefore, local governments will be more likely to pursue sustainable procurement if it is consistent with the priorities of their constituents. Extant studies show that self-identity with environmental values drives the preference for buying green, especially among younger and educated residents (Alkadry et al., 2019; Terman & Smith, 2018). More knowledgeable and affluent individuals place greater value on environmental protection (Portney & Berry, 2010; Wang et al., 2012) and might demand that their local government engage in more sustainable purchasing. Alternatively, the pressure can come from above. The federal government could induce a change in the lower levels by either leading by example or providing financial incentives through various grant-in-aid programs, such as competitive or formula-based grants. Funding may come with strings attached, laborious applications, and can be limited in size and scope. Some grants require states or local entities to match a portion of the federal contribution to qualify.2 Interest groups and nonprofit organizations are essential stakeholders in public procurement because they produce goods or deliver services for which the government foots the bill (e.g., Cooper, 1980; Van Slyke, 2007). Agencies need to secure support from businesses, nonprofits, and interest groups before enacting organizational change (Roman, 2017). Prior research shows that the private and nonprofit sectors influence local government's resource allocation and policy priorities (Liu et al., 2021). Through buyer–supplier partnerships, the parties exchange knowledge and build trust over time. Studies on private sector innovation contend that firms combining in-house production with outsourcing develop more innovative products in the marketplace (Hitt, 2011; Rothaermel et al., 2006). Firms learn from exchanges with vendors and use that knowledge to improve their internal management (Hitt, 2011). Similarly, besides goods and services, governments acquire knowledge from their private and nonprofit counterparts and reciprocate by catering to their demands. While industry groups have traditionally opposed green initiatives as potentially costly, the private sector has increasingly taken a stance toward using more sustainable sourcing and production. Nowadays, more firms treat sustainability as a business objective (Nidumolu et al., 2009), not just a corporate social responsibility strategy, and invest in sustainability-driven innovation (Kiron et al., 2013). Thus, businesses with investments in green technologies will likely pressure governments toward greater use of GPP (Liu et al., 2021; Smith & Terman, 2016). Public agencies often partner with nonprofit organizations as they share the same purpose of serving the public (Gazley, 2008). These partnerships are both formal and informal. Formal contracts of state and local governments with the third sector reach $100 billion annually (Boris et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2016). Informally, governments partner with nonprofits for virtually everything—to exchange expertise, share volunteers, and jointly develop programs (Gazley, 2008). Among the main areas of collaboration are social services (Van Slyke, 2007), economic development (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998), and environmental protection (Kalesnikaite & Neshkova, 2021; Krause, 2011). Given the multiple pressures public organizations endure from their external environments, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 2.Public agencies are more likely to buy green when facing higher pressures from stakeholders. Public entities, however, are infamously resistant to change and might not alter their established procurement practices under external influence. Like individuals, organizations develop habits and stick to them. Public managers might not attempt to change procurement systems because “we have always done it this way.” Organizational learning also comes at a cost—innovation is time-consuming, requires continuous adjustments and the results are not guaranteed. Many agencies might opt out because of the high transaction costs associated with a shift from traditional to green procurement. Besides, the attitudes toward GPP vary among stakeholders, with some being highly supportive and others vehemently opposing it. For example, residents might pressure the government to pursue more green purchasing, yet traditional “brown” vendors might fight it (Smith & Terman, 2016). As a result, the influences at the extremes may cancel out and produce no discernible stakeholder effect on the propensity to buy green. As argued earlier, organizational learning goes through four stages, and the commitment to new ideas increases at each step. While we know that internal processes interact with the external environment, it is not clear in what ways. Are governments more receptive to nudges from stakeholders at the early stages of organizational learning before formal policies are adopted? The stages of GPP institutionalization also differ by the type of actors involved. The initial phases are dominated by procurement professionals, who use discretion to decide between make or buy and, if the latter, which products to select. Elected officials take the front seat during the upper stages when GPP needs to pass the legislature and become a formal policy. As political market theory posits, elected officials pursue sustainability initiatives mainly for electoral gains (Lubell et al., 2009). Public procurement is a highly technical area that does not lend itself easily to political campaigning, yet buying green can be a popular selling point. To sum up, bureaucrats will likely promote GPP at the early stages of institutionalization, where they are granted vast discretion. Politicians, on the other hand, are likely to spearhead GPP adoption as they can reap benefits from that before voters. Furthermore, governments might be more open to stakeholders' influence at the early stages of organizational learning when no formal commitments have been made yet, and bureaucrats make purchasing choices based on their professional judgment. In other words, external actors might be more successful in inducing change if procurement officials still try out new ideas and gauge their impacts. Change, in turn, becomes less likely when the organization commits to GPP practices. Hypothesis 3.The influence of stakeholders toward more green purchasing depends upon the stage of GPP institutionalization, with earlier stages being more conducive to stakeholder pressures. The analysis draws on primary data collected in 2018 through a national survey of local governments in the United States, including cities/towns, counties, school districts, special authorities, and public utilities. Given the technical nature of government acquisitions, procurement officials are best situated to provide information and insights about the purchasing practices in their agencies. Thus, they are the target population of the questionnaire. The survey was disseminated by NIGP: The Institute for Public Procurement, a nonprofit organization with over 3000 state and local government members domestically and abroad (NIGP, n.d.). After pretesting, the survey was sent out to 1983 local governments. The nominal response rate was 22%, with 436 local units returning their responses. Because of missing data, the final sample for the analysis consists of 210 surveys, yielding a response rate of 11%. The comparison of responding to nonresponding entities reveals no bias between the groups.3 The dependent, main explanatory, and organizational control variables come from the survey.4 The rest of the data is gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau and Harvard Dataverse—MIT Election Data and Science Lab. Appendices A–C provide the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, operationalization, and sources of the variables included in the models. The dependent variable, Buying Green, reflects the procurement practices of local governments. It is a weighted index5 that includes 12 green procurement activities (see Table 1), identified by Bouwer et al. (2005). Environmental requirements can be introduced at each stage of the procurement process (Bolton, 2008; Dimand, 2022): (1) evaluation criteria, (2) selection criteria, and (3) technical specificati" @default.
• W4379745571 created "2023-06-08" @default.
• W4379745571 creator A5009182702 @default.
• W4379745571 creator A5028216832 @default.
• W4379745571 date "2023-06-06" @default.
• W4379745571 modified "2023-10-01" @default.
• W4379745571 title "Buying green in U.S. local government: Internal commitment and responsiveness to external pressures" @default.
• W4379745571 cites W1480603200 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W1916420145 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W1992877833 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W1993446711 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2011574289 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2019834961 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2023850062 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2030537285 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2031671118 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2036641819 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2038491445 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2041478216 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2044569800 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2052275726 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2052432121 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2053001484 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2065724376 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2070516710 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2091363715 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2096907912 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2097549324 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2098442768 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2101482755 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2102897933 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2104094186 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2110506551 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2119264747 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2122642665 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2131585122 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2140493602 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2153812302 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2154643717 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2156282042 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2187883273 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2334482566 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2537407746 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2560172181 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2604410470 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2771306599 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2902180200 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2912792051 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2944111781 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2955811142 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2963623633 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2964011655 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W2980581624 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3081317421 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3111960444 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3124699141 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3125482424 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3145673480 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3170250763 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W3202353039 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W366728794 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4235638487 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4240214105 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4242526068 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4243205843 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4249310872 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4281769067 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4296119704 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4307714597 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4320019975 @default.
• W4379745571 cites W4376849634 @default.
• W4379745571 doi "https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12944" @default.
• W4379745571 hasPublicationYear "2023" @default.
• W4379745571 type Work @default.
• W4379745571 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W4379745571 countsByYear W43797455712023 @default.
• W4379745571 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W4379745571 hasAuthorship W4379745571A5009182702 @default.
• W4379745571 hasAuthorship W4379745571A5028216832 @default.
• W4379745571 hasBestOaLocation W43797455711 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C2778719706 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C3116431 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C138885662 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C144133560 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C17744445 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C2778137410 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C2778719706 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C3116431 @default.
• W4379745571 hasConceptScore W4379745571C41895202 @default.
• W4379745571 hasLocation W43797455711 @default.
• W4379745571 hasOpenAccess W4379745571 @default.
• W4379745571 hasPrimaryLocation W43797455711 @default.
• W4379745571 hasRelatedWork W1599594309 @default.
• W4379745571 hasRelatedWork W1897742356 @default.
• W4379745571 hasRelatedWork W2100021851 @default.

• next