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• W46744820 abstract "Are waivers of rights in loan workouts worth the paper and ink? A secured lender faced with a defaulted loan may perceive itself caught between restructuring a loan for a borrower who may nevertheless file for bankruptcy, opting for foreclosure rather than a workout, so that is all the more likely. This perception is valid because a lender who reworks a loan can be placed in the position of bidding against itself if the borrower then files for bankruptcy--seeking further concessions from the lender's already diminished rights under the restructured loan documents. Even without this concern, the lender typically does not want to provide a defaulting borrower with two bites at the apple. The lender may be willing to rework the loan once and give the borrower one more chance to perform, but not if the borrower will still have the ability to delay the lender's enforcement rights through in the event of default under the reworked loan. Recognizing this dilemma, many lenders have attempted to make their workout documents bankruptcy proof by including language purporting to limit, or even extinguish, the borrower's rights in a subsequent case. These provisions range from the more usual waivers of the automatic stay, to stipulations regarding treatment of the lender's claim under a Chapter 11 recognition plan, to agreements which prohibit the borrower from filing in the first place. Other provisions are intended to deter a filing without directly impacting the process. An example is a springing under which an individual not personally liable under the loan automatically becomes liable in the event of a subsequent filing. The great enforceability debate The ultimate test of such clauses is their enforceability in court. If a hotly negotiated waiver provision--no matter how favorable to the lender--is nevertheless unenforceable, why include it? The experienced negotiator would prefer to parlay bargaining leverage into other more favorable terms for the lender rather than demanding waiver clauses that may be of no consequence in a court of law. Understandably, most lenders would like to expect tangible, predictable benefits from negotiated anti-bankruptcy provisions. Unfortunately, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Supreme Court provide clear answers on the enforceability of bargained-for waivers of rights, and divergent interpretations of the constitutional power given to Congress to establish uniform laws have increased the prevailing confusion. Indeed, such weighty considerations have taken analysis of otherwise mundane contract issues into the more esoteric areas of federalism, public policy, and social philosophy. Those reading the constitutional language argue that, by enabling Congress to establish uniform laws, the intent was to guaranty an inalienable constitutional right to relief--meaning that waivers would almost never be enforced. Others urge that this part of the Constitution should be construed narrowly and literally--requiring only that national laws, whatever they may provide, are to be applied with an even hand throughout the country. Practical pointers on waivers Despite the uncertainty generated by the clash of such philosophical thought in the analysis of this issue, some practical guidelines are available regarding the enforceability of waivers of rights: * Most judges--who, in the great majority of cases, will be the only judges to decide the issue--will have a healthy skepticism of contractual provisions attempting to limit or deter rights. The lender will likely have the burden of persuading the judge that an provision should be enforced in a particular case. * A total prohibition against the borrower filing is not likely to be enforceable. …" @default.
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• W46744820 title "A Rock and a Hard Place: Are Waivers of Bankruptcy Rights in Loan Workouts Worth the Paper and Ink?" @default.
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