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• W50231840 abstract "THE NOTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS and self-consciousness are typically modern. The equivalent in classical philosophers is, in some sense, the notion of self-knowledge. The semantic difference between these terms is that consciousness connotes more of a psychological state, while self-knowledge has a wider meaning and is related more to knowing the truth about one's being. My aim in this paper is to facilitate a bridge between the modern account of consciousness, which is mainly epistemological, psychological, and more recently neuro-psychological, and the ontological approach to the same subject in Aristotle and Aquinas. (1) The classical ontological approach to self-knowledge is not incompatible with modern discoveries in neuroscience and cognitive sciences touching on consciousness, nor even with certain correlative phenomenological accounts in the philosophy of mind, provided a materialistic or an idealistic interpretation is avoided, though I shall not consider this issue in this paper. (2) Here, I argue that self-consciousness in Aristotle and Aquinas is fundamentally viewed as a strong form of being, which means self-possession in an ontological I do not intend to analyze the precise historical or exegetical problems of their writings, rather unwrap the theoretical problem. In this regard, I freely introduce my own insight and comparisons when I think it may be illuminating in the current philosophical inquiry. I begin by looking at consciousness at the level of both the sensitive and intellectual cognitive operations in Aristotle (I) and Aquinas (II). A greater ontological notion of self-consciousness can be seen in Aquinas in the context of the different degrees of being and living (III). Along the same lines, I consider the relation between immateriality and self-consciousness (IV). Then, I treat the anthropological meaning of self-consciousness and love of self in the context of friendship, understood as shared self-consciousness and conscious coexistence (V), and finish with the presentation of some conclusions (VI). I Perceiving and understanding one's own actions in Aristotle. According to the Greek philosopher, the senses of sight, hearing, and so forth, deal with the sensible objects of the external world, though the operations themselves of seeing, hearing, smelling, and so forth, can simultaneously be felt or perceived (Aristotle uses the term aisthesis) by the sentient subject through a capacity called sense. (3) In other words, some sensations refer to external objects, such as things illuminated, or sounds produced in the environment, but another kind of sensitive (nonintellectual) operation refers back to the operations themselves performed by the different external senses: to perceive or feel the acts of seeing, hearing, and the others. (4) This perception of the sensory operations could be called sensitive consciousness (Sihvola calls it perceptual consciousness). (5) We read in Aristotle: Now every sense has both a special function of its own and something shared with the rest. The special function, e.g., of the visual sense is seeing, that of the auditory, hearing, and similarly with the rest; but there is also a common faculty associated with them all, whereby one is conscious that one sees and hears (for it is not by sight that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging that sweet is different from white not by taste, nor by sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs ... (6) In current philosophical and scientific literature there is not any special distinction between sensitive and intellectual knowledge, perhaps because there is no clear distinction between the senses and the intellect. If we accept Aristotle's postulated common sense with its function of making possible the perception of sensitive intentional operations, then perceiving that one sees or hears is different from understanding that one sees or hears. …" @default.
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• W50231840 date "2013-05-01" @default.
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• W50231840 title "The Ontological Account of Self-Consicousness in Aristotle and Aquinas" @default.
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