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- W5155583 abstract "Game theory is rampant in economics. Having long ago invaded industrial organization (the sub-field of economics that studies firms and their product markets), game-theoretic modeling is now commonplace in international, labor, macro, and financial economics, and is gathering steam even in development economics and economic history. Nor is economics alone: accounting, law, marketing, political science, and even sociology are beginning similar experiences. Why is this? Broadly speaking, two views are possible: fads and fundamentals. While I believe that fads are partly to blame for the current enthusiasm for game theory, I also believe that fundamentals are an important part of the story. Simply put, many economists use game theory because it allows them to study the implications of rationality, self-interest, and equilibrium when the theory of perfect competition does not apply—such as where markets are imperfectly competitive, or where markets are only peripherally relevant (such as in the relationship between a regulator and a firm or a boss and a worker). By my armchair citation count, repeated games have been applied more broadly than any other game-theoretic model—not only in economics but also in other social sciences and management fields. I believe this is because repeated games capture the following fact of life: when people interact over time, threats and promises concerning future behavior may influence current behavior. I do not mean to imply that this logic is surprising or rare. To the contrary, I think it is simple and ubiquitous. In this note I present the simplest possible formalization of this logic. I first describe a one-shot interaction between two parties (which works out badly) and then analyze an ongoing relationship in which such interactions occur repeatedly (and work out well because of the parties’ concerns for their reputations). The ongoingrelationship model shows how repeated games allow economists to analyze some aspects" @default.
- W5155583 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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- W5155583 date "1997-01-01" @default.
- W5155583 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
- W5155583 title "Lecture Note 2 Relational Contracts 1" @default.
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