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• W5489580 abstract "Growing evidence indicates that weak or misaligned incentives facing providers pose a significant barrier to service delivery in many developing countries. To address weak supply-side incentives, performance pay and related approaches explicitly linking provider pay and performance have become increasingly common in public service delivery. Despite the growing prominence of these approaches, however, many conceptual issues surrounding the use of performance pay in this context remain unexplored. A fundamental one is the role of performance pay for managers in the organizations commonly tasked with delivering public services. Although a large literature examines performance pay for managers in private firms, much less is known about the use of performance pay for their counterparts in public service organizations. Improving public service delivery may nonetheless depend heavily on aligning the incentives of managers with social objectives.Drawing on a large-scale field experiment involving 300 primary schools in rural China, this dissertation explores how performance incentives for school administrators affect their implementation of new, school-based nutrition programs targeting anemia. School-based nutrition programs are an important function of schools, particularly in settings with less developed public health infrastructures. Weak incentives for schools to effectively implement these programs are compounded as these programs compete with more traditional functions for finite school resources. I report the results of this field experiment which was designed to test three main issues concerning the use of performance incentives for school administrators in this context.First, I study the effect of offering administrators performance pay contracts tied to reductions in school-level anemia prevalence. As part of the experiment, a subset of schools were randomly allocated to receive one of two levels of performance incentives for reductions in student anemia or to a no-incentive comparison group. I find that large incentives led to meaningful reductions while smaller incentives (10% of the size) were ineffective in reducing anemia. Further, I find that an important channel through which large incentives impacted student nutrition was by motivating administrators to engage households and influence feeding at home. I discuss the implications of this finding for the design of performance incentives tied to jointly produced outcomes.Second, I study the impact of providing administrators with more resources to implement a nutrition program and how this interacts with performance incentives. To test this, schools were orthogonally assigned to two levels of block grants within each level of performance incentives. I find that, absent explicit anemia-based incentives, increasing the size of block grants under the control of administrators led to sizable reductions in anemia prevalence but were nearly twice as costly as performance incentives. This impact was not purely the result of additional inputs; larger block…" @default.
• W5489580 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W5489580 creator A5087085172 @default.
• W5489580 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W5489580 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W5489580 title "Managerial Incentives in Public Service Delivery: Evidence from School-based Nutrition Programs in Rural China" @default.
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• W5489580 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
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