FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W5670626> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W5670626 abstract "The recent global financial crisis has added fuel to the heated debate on whether boards of directors in general and audit committees in particular are effective in curtailing aggressive financial reporting practices and maintaining a transparent audit process. Specifically, UK regulators raised widespread concerns about the criteria of revenue recognition and the role of external auditors during and after the crisis, and re-emphasize the crucial role that audit committees could play in ameliorating financial reporting quality and safeguarding the quality of external audit. Despite this intense emphasis on the financial reporting and external audit oversight roles of internal governance mechanisms, there is still no empirical evidence confirming the effectiveness of these roles after the financial crisis. As such, this thesis contributes to the literature by using a sample of FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock of Exchange during the period between 2008 and 2010 to address two main empirical questions in two investigations. The first empirical investigation deals with the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on financial reporting quality. Two measures are employed to serve as surrogates for financial reporting quality. The first measure, which contributes to the uniqueness of this study, is discretionary revenues used to address misleading revenue recognition concerns by UK regulators, and discretionary accruals employed to account for the possibility of firms shifting from one earnings management method to another. The results reveal significant associations between a number of governance characteristics and discretionary revenues, but not discretionary accruals. This suggests that in response to UK intense regulatory scrutiny over the criteria of revenue recognition, firms’ revenue recognition process was subject to increased monitoring by boards in general and audit committees in particular, leading to better quality financial reporting. The second empirical investigation of this thesis examines the association between audit committee and board characteristics on the one hand and audit fees and non-audit fees on the other. The findings reveal that audit fees are positively related to governance mechanisms indicating that the oversight roles of audit committees and boards have positive impact on enhancing audit quality through demanding wider audit scope from external auditors. However, non-audit fees are also found to be positively related to audit committee meetings and board size, suggesting that the committee and the board support the simultaneous provision of audit services and non-audit services to facilitate a beneficial knowledge spill-over between the two services which in turn results in a better audit quality. Comparing the main results with those obtained from an additional analysis of a sample of firms listed in the pre-financial crisis period between 2005 and 2007 indicates that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in enhancing financial reporting quality differs between regular and recession periods. Overall, most of the findings are consistent with the agency perspective. Those which are not consistent open avenues for future research to explore a multi-theoretical approach which takes into consideration the complexities of firms and their environmental circumstances." @default.
• W5670626 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W5670626 creator A5072820279 @default.
• W5670626 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W5670626 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W5670626 title "Financial reporting quality, auditor remuneration and corporate governance : UK evidence" @default.
• W5670626 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
• W5670626 type Work @default.
• W5670626 sameAs 5670626 @default.
• W5670626 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W5670626 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W5670626 hasAuthorship W5670626A5072820279 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C137725906 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C13896816 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C140181557 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C147007100 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C150130657 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C170856484 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C191602146 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C195487862 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C199521495 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C2778300220 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C2781426361 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W5670626 hasConcept C4577558 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C10138342 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C121955636 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C137725906 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C13896816 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C139719470 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C140181557 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C144133560 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C147007100 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C150130657 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C162324750 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C170856484 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C191602146 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C195487862 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C199521495 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C2778300220 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C2781426361 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C39389867 @default.
• W5670626 hasConceptScore W5670626C4577558 @default.
• W5670626 hasLocation W56706261 @default.
• W5670626 hasOpenAccess W5670626 @default.
• W5670626 hasPrimaryLocation W56706261 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W1573057897 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2111928732 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2120103568 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2278333713 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2417963684 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2605954091 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2611299507 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2612575973 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2760084300 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2887402192 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2963902661 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3045258762 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3122352666 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3125129796 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3154181870 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3165791685 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W3189635834 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W93598161 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W941033863 @default.
• W5670626 hasRelatedWork W2590812418 @default.
• W5670626 isParatext "false" @default.
• W5670626 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W5670626 magId "5670626" @default.
• W5670626 workType "dissertation" @default.