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• W569012967 abstract "Abstract: This article analyzes two decades of contestation over Ukraine's constitutional provisions regulating executive-legislative relations using insights from the theories of interstate bargaining. It demonstrates how changes in the power balance between elite actors and the variation in the length of their time horizons affect the probability of them reaching an agreement. The article explains the reasons for elite acquiescence to the building of a powerful presidency in Ukraine in the 1990s, a successful shift to a semi-presidential system in 2004, repeated failures to amend the semi-presidential system, and an abrupt return to a super-presidential model in 2010. Constitutional provisions regulating the distribution of political power have been at the center of elite struggles for most of Ukraine's independence. As a result, for just over twenty years executive-legislative balance and the division of power within the executive went through multiple transformations. Power domains of key institutional actors involved in constitutional bargaining went through substantive revision at least four times (1995; 1996; 2006; 2010), while in at least three instances elite groups came close to an agreement on further change, but ultimately failed to reach it. In addition, there have been numerous minor shifts in the power distribution between the president, prime minister and parliament achieved through mere legislative changes. From a comparative perspective, however, Ukraine's constitutional volatility is hardly surprising. As Elkins and his collaborators show, an average constitution hardly survives for more than two decades. Such volatility is particularly common in countries with frequent regime shifts between authoritarianism and democracy. (1) In addition, the period of early statehood may similarly be accompanied by high constitutional instability, as in, for example, Mexico for most of the nineteenth century. Given the weakness of structural constraints and the promise of additional gains, political actors in new states or nascent regimes are likely to get involved in a never-ending process of rule making and rule revision without ever reaching a state of stability. (2) If contestation over constitutional rules is so pervasive, what explains the few instances when it succeeds and how do these cases differ from those that fail? Existing theories of constitution-making pay scant attention to explaining variation in the outcomes of political struggles for constitutional adoption and change. Power-distributional theories assume that actors with power advantage would succeed in imposing their preferred design. By contrast, strictly functionalist approaches would expect failure to result from coordination problems that hinder collective pursuit of a mutually beneficial solution. These assumptions, however, ignore the frequent reality of ambiguous power distribution or actors' conscious rejection of solutions to the coordination dilemma. Another account points to uncertain payoffs and hidden information as obstacles to successful completion of a bargain. (3) Still, as Ukraine's case shows, actors may reach an agreement without even coming close to overcoming these obstacles. This article develops and tests a new theoretical framework to account for the different success rate of attempts to adopt or change constitutions. It takes a rationalist view of a constitution as a formalized elite bargain over the future distribution of gains. (4) The article applies insights from game-theoretical literature on interstate bargaining to the analysis of interaction between domestic actors. Building on recent experimental findings, it employs two variables time horizon and bargaining power--to account for actors' ability to make a constitutional deal. The article looks at the effects of these variables on the outcomes of eight phases of constitutional politics in Ukraine. It distinguishes between an actor initiating a constitutional proposal and an actor with a veto power over it. …" @default.
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• W569012967 date "2013-03-22" @default.
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• W569012967 title "If Tomorrow Comes: Power Balance and Time Horizons in Ukraine's Constitutional Politics" @default.
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