FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W606016812> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W606016812 startingPage "631" @default.
• W606016812 abstract "I. IN THE WAKE OF CORPORATE SCANDAL The irrational exuberance1 of the late 1990s, marked by frenzied stock trading and risky investment strategies,2 fueled aggressive accounting practices that exaggerated real achievements and camouflaged setbacks.3 During that time, investors accepted business practices that measured performance by revenue, rather than earnings or cash, and by the number of eyeballs hitting Internet sites.4 According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, greed swept through our nation, we were not prepared to address it.5 The result was accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom and other organizations, in which directors failed to ask questions of management to determine whether the stock was rising solely as a result of smoke and mirrors.6 In 2002, Congress responded to these scandals with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which modified governance, reporting and disclosure rules for public companies.7 Beyond the federal legislative response, these corporate scandals occasioned a new judicial and regulatory focus on directors' good faith performance of their corporate responsibilities. This trend has been evident in recent state and federal court decisions addressing directors' fiduciary duty of good faith and the business judgment rule.8 Most notably, in the 2003 decision In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, a Delaware chancery court declined to apply the business judgment rule in a derivative action where the court found that the company's directors failed to exercise any judgment in their decision making.9 According to one commentator, the court's decision raised concerns among many corporate directors about their own personal liability when making decisions on behalf of their corporations, and serves as a warning to corporate directors that state courts are now willing to allow plaintiffs to prove that directors who fail to exercise due care in carrying out their fiduciary duties should be liable to the shareholders of the corporation, even without the suggestion of self-dealing.10 The Disney case seems to have been well-received by the Delaware Supreme Court,11 suggesting that this approach will influence other jurisdictions.12 In the regulatory context, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently displayed a willingness to pursue cases against outside directors who [are] reckless in their oversight of management and asleep at the switch . . . .13 Specifically, in SEC v. Adley, the SEC brought its first charges ever against an outside director who allowed securities fraud to occur under his watch.14 The Adley action may signal a new regulatory emphasis on directors' good faith performance of their duties and, as a result, directors may face increased liability exposure. Corporate directors' concern for the continued viability of the business judgment rule15 underscores the importance of understanding the current status of the law. Part II of this Note surveys the development of directors' fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule in Delaware and details the SEC's initiative targeting directors. Part III gauges the extent to which recent case law and regulatory action signal a change in the application of the business judgment rule or signal expanded regulatory liability for directors. Part IV provides practical guidance to corporate practitioners, who may counsel outside directors, about procedural failures that may expose directors to liability and steps those directors can take to minimize their exposure. Part V considers the policy implications of stricter directorial liability and offers suggestions for courts and the SEC to proceed in this area. II. BACKGROUND ON DIRECTORS' LIABILITY: CASE LAW AND REGULATORY ACTION A. Delaware's Business Judgment Rule In the Disney case, the central issue was whether to apply the business judgment rule to the board of directors.16 Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision, corporate directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that their action was in the best interests of the corporation. …" @default.
• W606016812 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W606016812 creator A5014022979 @default.
• W606016812 date "2005-03-01" @default.
• W606016812 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W606016812 title "How to Be Good: The Emphasis on Corporate Director's Good Faith in the Post-Enron Era" @default.
• W606016812 hasPublicationYear "2005" @default.
• W606016812 type Work @default.
• W606016812 sameAs 606016812 @default.
• W606016812 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W606016812 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W606016812 hasAuthorship W606016812A5014022979 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C195487862 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C25253098 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C2776697845 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C2777639076 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C2779103253 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C2779589421 @default.
• W606016812 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C10138342 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C120757647 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C121955636 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C144133560 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C162324750 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C17744445 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C195487862 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C199539241 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C25253098 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C2776697845 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C2777639076 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C2779103253 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C2779589421 @default.
• W606016812 hasConceptScore W606016812C39389867 @default.
• W606016812 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W606016812 hasLocation W6060168121 @default.
• W606016812 hasOpenAccess W606016812 @default.
• W606016812 hasPrimaryLocation W6060168121 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W1480968260 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W1526074248 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W1542643040 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W1603662478 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2144684576 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2165918184 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2258681103 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2273375929 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2338437924 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2518780257 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2562785076 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2585686669 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2595072399 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2607230825 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2798054450 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W2966019796 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W3123452083 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W3124283794 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W3180774393 @default.
• W606016812 hasRelatedWork W438396646 @default.
• W606016812 hasVolume "58" @default.
• W606016812 isParatext "false" @default.
• W606016812 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W606016812 magId "606016812" @default.
• W606016812 workType "article" @default.