FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W607680641> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W607680641 abstract "[Introduction]. The ongoing Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 2003) must re-shape Giscard d’Estaing’s draft into a Constitutional Treaty that can be signed and subsequently ratified by all 25 members of the enlarged European Union. Things are not going well. The most obvious sticking point concerns the reform of voting rules in the EU’s key decisionmaking body, the Council of Ministers. Here is the problem. As it turns out, the voting scheme that Giscard d’Estaing’s Praesidium put into the draft Constitutional Treaty is not politically acceptable to all EU members (it concentrates power in the hands of the four largest EU members at the expense of Spain, Poland and many small members). Indeed, Giscard’s system is so impolitic that any draft Constitutional Treaty that contains it will almost certainly fail to garner the necessary unanimous support. Yet, if the ongoing IGC does not find an alternative to Giscard’s system, the EU will face decision-making paralysis because the fallback position is the blotched voting system from the Nice Treaty. Hence the dilemma: papering over problems with Giscard’s unpopular voting rules puts the whole draft Constitutional Treaty at risk, but failing to agree an alternative voting scheme risks decision-making paralysis. In this policy brief, we summarise the findings of our research that uses the quantitative tools of voting game theory to show: Why Giscard’s scheme is politically unacceptable to many nations; How various modified voting rules may solve the dilemma. Specifically we identify two possible solutions to the dilemma. First, changing Giscard’s double-majority thresholds from 60% of population and 50% of membership to 60% and 60% respectively would go a very long way to reducing the concentration of power in the hands of the four largest nations (‘Big-four’), yet still maintain the EU’s ability to act; a ratio of 50%-50% would also work. Second, if the IGC decides to stay with the Nice Treaty’s triplemajority voting system, modestly lowering two of the three majority thresholds would maintain efficiency without further shifting power to big nations. Before turning to possible solutions, the first task is to show that the Nice voting reforms will not work, and, in the process, to show why Spain and Poland are so attached to the Nice system." @default.
• W607680641 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W607680641 creator A5056076141 @default.
• W607680641 creator A5074481124 @default.
• W607680641 date "2003-11-01" @default.
• W607680641 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W607680641 title "The Draft Constitutional Treaty’s Voting Reform Dilemma. CEPS Policy Brief No. 44, November 2003 (With Postscript of 7 December 2003)" @default.
• W607680641 hasPublicationYear "2003" @default.
• W607680641 type Work @default.
• W607680641 sameAs 607680641 @default.
• W607680641 citedByCount "9" @default.
• W607680641 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W607680641 hasAuthorship W607680641A5056076141 @default.
• W607680641 hasAuthorship W607680641A5074481124 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C117763746 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C155202549 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C2778496695 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C2779010840 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C2910001868 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C520049643 @default.
• W607680641 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C111472728 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C117763746 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C138885662 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C155202549 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C162324750 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C17744445 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C190253527 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C199539241 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C2778496695 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C2779010840 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C2910001868 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C520049643 @default.
• W607680641 hasConceptScore W607680641C94625758 @default.
• W607680641 hasLocation W6076806411 @default.
• W607680641 hasOpenAccess W607680641 @default.
• W607680641 hasPrimaryLocation W6076806411 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W1488302768 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W1497432260 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W1574634931 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W1962156849 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2028426425 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2092353562 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2101416890 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2122893598 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2141648666 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2272649108 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2290956875 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2429344862 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W270731741 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2807879775 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2988209852 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W3154453392 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W769715516 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W76994138 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W80209521 @default.
• W607680641 hasRelatedWork W2401641423 @default.
• W607680641 isParatext "false" @default.
• W607680641 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W607680641 magId "607680641" @default.
• W607680641 workType "article" @default.