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• W623942005 abstract "ABSTRACTThe actions of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission subsequent to a financial crisis appear to follow a predictable set of steps. Each tries to position itself to gain the resources it needs to survive by couching its actions in terms of legitimacy. One outcome is a predictable dance that culminates with the annual funding process. The events surrounding the financial collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting scrutiny of the Securities and Exchange Commission are hardly unique. In fact, they appear to be the predictable result of a period of boom and bust. These predictions are based on the historical behavior of politicians in funding the Commission. This paper uses an institutional theory perspective to examine the funding patterns in the wake of the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the global financial crisis precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission are provided.JEL: M41, M48, M49KEYWORDS: SEC, Institutional Theory, RegulationINTRODUCTIONWhat experience and history teach is this-that people and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it. Hegel, (2004) Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Santayana (2011) A large Wall Street firm collapses. A post-bankruptcy investigation reveals the firm to be a house of cards. A public outcry threatens the very fabric of the accounting profession. Are these headlines from today's financial press? Hardly! The events being described occurred in the late 1930's. The collapse of the firm of McKesson, Robbins, Inc. sounds eerily familiar to those following recent financial headlines. The McKesson's collapse elicited a public outcry that placed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the accounting profession under the spotlight of a Congressional investigation. In the end, however, the SEC emerged from the affair with renewed legitimacy.Today's financial scandals have once again focused attention on SEC oversight. Congress and the public are outraged over events such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the bailouts given to many large banks. What will be the result of the public outcry? Will the SEC survive or be replaced with another watchdog? While no one knows the ultimate outcome, lessons can be learned from historical events. This paper uses an institutional theory perspective to examine the budgetary interactions between the SEC and the Congress. The end result is hypothesized to be an outcome that has the SEC positioning itself in terms of taking steps to improve itself and hence, being able to do a better job at oversight of the financial industry. At the same time, politicians will attempt to gamer favor from the voters since they have acted to protect the public from financial frauds. In short, the relationship among the parties is in reality a highly predictable set of behaviors that will allow all of the participants to demonstrate their legitimacy to their external constituents. The result will allow each party to secure future resources.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews work in the area of institutional theory, with specific applications to SEC behavior, shortly after its creation. Following the literature review, a discussion of SEC funding and how it adheres to the institutional theoretic framework is presented. The paper ends with some concluding comments about possible future behaviors on the part of both the SEC and those responsible for funding the agency.LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUNDA basic premise of institutional theory is that an organization's survival requires it to conform to social norms of acceptable behavior. It follows that the better an organization is able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its external funders, the more resources that it will secure. Tschopp, Wells and Barney (2011) state, Unlike efficiency-based theories that focus on profit maximization and the interactions between markets and governments, Institutional Theory considers a wider network of variables that influence the decision making process. …" @default.
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• W623942005 date "2015-07-01" @default.
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• W623942005 title "Same Song, Same Dance: Evidence of Patterns in Securities and Exchange Commission Funding" @default.
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