FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W62867725> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W62867725 abstract "Executive SummaryNowhere is the efficacy of economic inducements and sanctions more hotly contested than on the Korean peninsula. Assessments are sharply divided. Critics of engagement argue that positive inducements are fraught with moral hazard and the risk of blackmail, encouraging the very behavior they are designed to forestall. Proponents regard it as a strategy that has never consistently been put to the test.This study makes three main points. The has to do with domestic politics in North Korea, including both its capacity to absorb pressure and its interest in engagement. The extraordinary repressiveness of the regime clearly calls into question the utility of broad commercial sanctions against North Korea, assuming they could even be coordinated. There is some evidence that financial sanctions had an economic effect in both 2006 and again after 2009; by early 2011, the country was experiencing a steadily worsening food crisis and had pressed foreign capitals, the World Food Program, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for assistance. Nonetheless, sanctions did not deter the regime from testing missiles and two nuclear devices, sinking the Cheonan, or shelling Yeonpyeong Island.Evidence of North Korean intent to engage is elusive, but consistent with an interpretation that North Korean motivations varied over time. When the Bush administration came to office, North Korea was in a relatively reformist phase; this opening was almost completely missed by the Bush administration, which was preoccupied with intelligence on the country's highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. Over time, however, the mixed results of the reforms and the worsening external environment led to clear shifts in economic policy that are suggestive of deeper political changes in the regime. Particularly after 2005, and culminating with the disastrous currency reform of 2009, the regime's military first politics had taken a much harder form.From August 2008, Kim Jong-il's likely stroke and the onset of the succession process frustrated prospects for engagement. These domestic political events coincided with a further hardening of the regime around core bases of support, a preoccupation with showing resolve, and a declining willingness to make tradeoffs. In combination, these domestic political shifts help explain the particularly unwelcoming stance North Korea took toward the incoming Obama administration, a stance that deeply colored Washington's reaction to the missile and nuclear tests of 2009.A second finding is that the efforts of the Bush administration to pressure North Korea were consistently undermined by severe coordination problems. South Korea pursued a strategy of relatively unconditional engagement through 2007, and even Japan sought normalization until its policy was hijacked by domestic sensitivities over the earlier abductions of Japanese by North Koreans. But China's role was clearly pivotal. China has been consistent in its rhetorical commitment to denuclearization. Beijing has played a key role in brokering the talks, offered crucial inducements to keep the talks going, and even signaled its displeasure through support of multilateral statements and sanctions, particularly in 2009. Nevertheless, it has been consistently unwilling to use its vast economic influence to force a reckoning. To the contrary, North Korea's foreign economic relations have become more rather than less dependent on China, compounding the diplomatic difficulties of bringing pressure to bear on the country.This conclusion gains force through a consideration of the North Korean response to pressure and sanctions. There is little evidence that ratcheting up pressure worked; to the contrary, it generated escalatory responses and poisoned negotiations. To the extent that it did work, it did so through a diplomatic process that spelled out for North Korea the benefits of complying with its international obligations, as well as the costs of not doing so. …" @default.
• W62867725 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W62867725 creator A5009887796 @default.
• W62867725 creator A5051644288 @default.
• W62867725 date "2011-05-17" @default.
• W62867725 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W62867725 title "Engaging North Korea: The Role of Economic Statecraft" @default.
• W62867725 cites W12549810 @default.
• W62867725 cites W1489804782 @default.
• W62867725 cites W1506737528 @default.
• W62867725 cites W1568687946 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2002306188 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2006001409 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2022956736 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2030178668 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2030231583 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2030256327 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2046109816 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2060886834 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2092922363 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2110083460 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2147846104 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2153696314 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2160315489 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2211153160 @default.
• W62867725 cites W248034935 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2552566981 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2617152211 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2617567003 @default.
• W62867725 cites W2800935304 @default.
• W62867725 cites W303393025 @default.
• W62867725 cites W304148946 @default.
• W62867725 cites W3122573513 @default.
• W62867725 cites W3140401997 @default.
• W62867725 cites W3145828643 @default.
• W62867725 cites W576002031 @default.
• W62867725 cites W613614613 @default.
• W62867725 cites W646197113 @default.
• W62867725 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
• W62867725 type Work @default.
• W62867725 sameAs 62867725 @default.
• W62867725 citedByCount "5" @default.
• W62867725 countsByYear W628677252012 @default.
• W62867725 countsByYear W628677252014 @default.
• W62867725 countsByYear W628677252015 @default.
• W62867725 crossrefType "book" @default.
• W62867725 hasAuthorship W62867725A5009887796 @default.
• W62867725 hasAuthorship W62867725A5051644288 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C2778069335 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C2779084495 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C2780765947 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C47768531 @default.
• W62867725 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C138921699 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C162324750 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C17744445 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C199539241 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C2778069335 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C2779084495 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C2780765947 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C47768531 @default.
• W62867725 hasConceptScore W62867725C94625758 @default.
• W62867725 hasLocation W628677251 @default.
• W62867725 hasOpenAccess W62867725 @default.
• W62867725 hasPrimaryLocation W628677251 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W1571776614 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W1607030371 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W1942676552 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W1946988197 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W1983481038 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2020928216 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2046656544 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2072246129 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2082957953 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2084562298 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2195367428 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2314974618 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2315776413 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W233779586 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2418241933 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2586836237 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W45270938 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W565711136 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W633301198 @default.
• W62867725 hasRelatedWork W2596632653 @default.
• W62867725 isParatext "false" @default.
• W62867725 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W62867725 magId "62867725" @default.
• W62867725 workType "book" @default.