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• W66704640 abstract "Ways of Explaining Properties Daniel Heussen (D.Heussen@city.ac.uk) James A. Hampton (J.A.Hampton@city.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, City University, Northampton Square London, EC1V 0HB, UK Abstract From event to property explanations Most explanations are either about events (why things happen), or about properties (why objects have the enduring characteristics that they do). Explanations of events have been studied extensively in philosophy and psychology, whereas the explanations of properties have received little or no attention in the literature. The present study is an exploration of the ways in which we explain various types of properties. Ten participants provided explanations of 45 properties by completing sentences of the form: “Xs have p because…” where p is a property of the concept X. When coded into three traditional kinds of explanation (i.e. causal, purposive, categorical), nearly half of the explanations did not fit into any of these categories and were classified as “other”. Different patterns of preference for explanations emerged across the various property types for each domain. A qualitative analysis of the other kind revealed that the most frequent form of explanation involved another property of the object, as in ‘Xs have property p because they have property q”. Explanations of properties showed a homeostatic character. Simply relating two properties of a concept seems sufficient as an explanation of a property. Events are mainly explained in three distinct ways; causally, teleologically and principle-based (Keil, 2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000). Causal explanations are story-like descriptions of a causal sequence of events. The unification of Germany may be explained by a sequence of events that led to the fall of the Berlin wall and subsequent diplomatic talks between Gorbachev and Kohl resulting in the unification. Teleological explanations are most common for behavioral events. These explanations are framed in folk psychological terms like beliefs, desires and intentions, often referred to as the “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987). Behaviors of others and our own are explained by the consequences that we intend to achieve with the particular behavior. A friend’s choice to go to Peru on holiday may be explained by her newly developed interest in Inca culture, her desires to learn more about it and her beliefs that first hand experience will best achieve that. Principle-based explanations are less prevalent in everyday explanations but are rather more common in scientific explanations. Based on Hempel’s deductive-nomological model, events are explained by subsuming them under some principle or general law. The falling of an apple from a tree is explained by two facts. One is the general law, that an object with a larger mass attracts another object with the smaller mass with a force proportional to the product of their masses, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. And the other is that the earth and the apple are such objects. Thus based on event explanations we can distinguish three main kinds of explanations 1 that may apply to properties: causal, teleological and principle-based. The causal explanation makes reference to the way a property came about, whereas the teleological account would provide an explanation by reference to what the property does either for the object itself or for some agent using the object. 2 Sparrows have wings because their DNA determines the growth of wings in their ontogeny. Or sparrows have wings in order to be able to fly. Principle-base explanations may account for a property by reference to a category. One might say that sparrows have wings because they are in the Introduction An event is something that happens. A property in contrast is an enduring characteristic of an object in the world. Humans are very good at partitioning the continuous flow of time into small components with distinct beginnings and ends. This process provides structure, enables us to talk and think about these components of time as individual entities and helps reduce the complexity of our experiences (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Events usually have clear-cut temporal boundaries, with somewhat less clear spatial boundaries. It always makes sense to ask when an event occurred, but not always where. Properties, in contrast, are exemplified in objects, which are clearly defined spatially, but less so temporally. Objects have more of a where and less of a when. People think of properties as the stable characteristics of objects that can range from the very concrete (having a blade as a property of a knife), to the very abstract (being a democracy as a property of a state). These simple differences in character suggest that humans may think about and process events and properties differently. If so, it is surprising that the literature on explanations has focused almost exclusively on explanations of events and very little to no attention has been given to explanations of properties. This paper provides a first exploration into the way we explain properties of natural kind and artifact objects. For clarity of exposition, the term kind will be used for explanations and the term type for properties without implying any theoretical commitments for either explanations or properties. A more detail characterizations for each kind of explanation will be given in the method section under the coding instructions." @default.
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• W66704640 title "Ways of Explaining Properties" @default.
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