Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W751913789> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 73 of
73
with 100 items per page.
- W751913789 abstract "In the first paper I study the incentives for electoral registration in a system in which registration is costly. I argue that, if some more powerful agents in the society can condition the voting behavior of part of the electorate, then more easily controlled voters are also more likely to be registered. This allows the powerful agents to have a large impact on election results, as the share of actual votes controlled is increased through strategic registration. I show with the help of a theoretical model that reducing the control on votes (for instance with the adoption of a secret ballot) only partially reduces the bias in registration, as scarcely motivated voters will be always easy to control. I test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958. The second paper, coauthored with my colleague Petros Sekeris, investi- gates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity. We analyze how land inequality across landlords influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group constituted by landless individuals. We show that conflict intensity is non-monotonic in land inequality. In particular, the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels. Moreover, under certain condition we show that a Pareto improving transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord exists. Finally, the third paper also coauthored with Petros Sekeris, explores the existence of deterrence equilibria in a general equilibrium model of “guns and butter” production. In this class of model two agents choose how to allocate their initial endowment between the production of consumables and weapons in the first period of the game and whether to engage in war in the second period. The standard result in the literature is that war is the only equilibrium of the game. We show that, if fighting entails sufficiently low destruction, indeed war is the unique equilibrium of the game. If, however, conflict generates sufficiently large damages, agents start to adopt an alternative strategy: they arm to deter their opponent from war. As a consequence, only mixed strategy equilibria survive, in which players randomize over their deterrence and war strategies. In this latter case, peace occurs with positive probability." @default.
- W751913789 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W751913789 creator A5063646430 @default.
- W751913789 date "2009-01-01" @default.
- W751913789 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
- W751913789 title "Essays on Political Economy and Conflict Theory" @default.
- W751913789 hasPublicationYear "2009" @default.
- W751913789 type Work @default.
- W751913789 sameAs 751913789 @default.
- W751913789 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W751913789 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W751913789 hasAuthorship W751913789A5063646430 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C134306372 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C137635306 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C21547014 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C2775924081 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C2777094542 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C45555294 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C520049643 @default.
- W751913789 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C100001284 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C134306372 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C137635306 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C138921699 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C162324750 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C175444787 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C17744445 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C187736073 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C199539241 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C21547014 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C2775924081 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C2777094542 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C29122968 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C33923547 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C45555294 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C520049643 @default.
- W751913789 hasConceptScore W751913789C94625758 @default.
- W751913789 hasLocation W7519137891 @default.
- W751913789 hasOpenAccess W751913789 @default.
- W751913789 hasPrimaryLocation W7519137891 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W1512064862 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W1554391705 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W1634178410 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2063037795 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2096322730 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2117528868 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2170024933 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2524111803 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2530931173 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2948548430 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2978330097 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3104582636 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3121133208 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3121701192 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3147797180 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3201555827 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W3207979301 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W907726592 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2189114619 @default.
- W751913789 hasRelatedWork W2614006014 @default.
- W751913789 isParatext "false" @default.
- W751913789 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W751913789 magId "751913789" @default.
- W751913789 workType "article" @default.