FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W756396970> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W756396970 startingPage "39" @default.
• W756396970 abstract "THE POSSIBILITY OF Iran acquiring nuclear weapons leads some experts to suggest that such a development may be containable. They argue that a stable balance of deterrence can be achieved with Iran, akin to the nuclear equilibrium between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. I will argue that this is an erroneous proposition, as the levels of instability and risk involved in nuclear armament in the Middle East are incalculably higher. My view is based, among other considerations, on the working assumption that a nuclear Iran will lead to the development of a nuclear capability by other regional players, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Certain models from game theory are important here. These models were part of the basis on which U.S. strategy during the Cold War was conceived and formulated, and for the concepts developed by Robert McNamara, the Rand Corporation, and others. (1) These models have a unique status in the realm of strategy because, in the nuclear field, there is hardly any empirical experience capable of providing a better source of knowledge than such models. (2) The analysis of nuclear strategy on which I will focus refers to the of the Cold War, from the mid-I960s to the mid-I980s. The formative idea of this core era was mutual nuclear deterrence based on second-strike retaliation capability. Both sides benefited from enormous nuclear redundancy, so that even if one side was to initiate a nuclear attack, the other side would still possess sufficient residual nuclear capability to completely destroy the initiating side with a retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the nuclear destruction of both sides was assured (Mutually Assured Destruction, or mad), and nuclear weapons became the resource not to be used. The period preceding this core era was characterized by learning and adapting to the new weapons' strategic rationale, which gave rise to the massive retaliation strategy of the I950s, eventually abandoned as impractical, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to the development of agreed rules for the nuclear game. After the core era the Reagan administration attempted to replace the nuclear deterrence paradigm with the concept of prevailing in a nuclear war, e.g., making use of the SDI project. Even during the core era there were some notions deviating from mad, such as the use of tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear strikes against military assets only (counterforce), gradual nuclear escalation, or nuclear demonstration attack, but these did not become the central principle of nuclear strategy. A poor man's MAD? THE MAD CONCEPT depends on the survivability of nuclear capability, which enables a second-strike retaliation even after sustaining the initiator's nuclear strike. Such survivability is achieved in two ways. The first is numerical superfluity. Indeed, during the core era the superpowers maintained thousands of nuclear warheads. The second way is highly survivable launch platforms, such as deep-water nuclear submarines able to loiter under the polar icecap, a fleet of bombers continuously airborne around the globe, and silo-based or mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles. These means ensured two basic conditions: Intelligence would not be able to locate all platforms at any given moment, and even if a platform was located it could prove difficult to destroy. The U.S. and the Soviet Union learned that there were additional conditions to be met in order to support a second strike, first among them that the two sides must be geographically removed from each other. The Cuban crisis was partially due to the fact that positioning of missiles in such proximity to the U.S. could shorten early warning time and limit U.S. retaliation (at least in respect of command and control and retaliation from the continental U.S.). The second condition was identification of attack. In the case of superpowers, only massive launching of thousands of weapons could potentially destroy nuclear capability. …" @default.
• W756396970 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W756396970 creator A5001907326 @default.
• W756396970 date "2011-10-01" @default.
• W756396970 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
• W756396970 title "Can Iran Be Deterred" @default.
• W756396970 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
• W756396970 type Work @default.
• W756396970 sameAs 756396970 @default.
• W756396970 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W756396970 countsByYear W7563969702013 @default.
• W756396970 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W756396970 hasAuthorship W756396970A5001907326 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C11982227 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C155202549 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C194110935 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C2780188227 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C545171759 @default.
• W756396970 hasConcept C60643870 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C11982227 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C155202549 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C162324750 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C17744445 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C190253527 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C194110935 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C199539241 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C2780188227 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C545171759 @default.
• W756396970 hasConceptScore W756396970C60643870 @default.
• W756396970 hasIssue "169" @default.
• W756396970 hasLocation W7563969701 @default.
• W756396970 hasOpenAccess W756396970 @default.
• W756396970 hasPrimaryLocation W7563969701 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W1602338940 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W1972395090 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W1996367212 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2001342167 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2013931597 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2016293912 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2037571295 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2085950731 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2181334556 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2290164897 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2326126378 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2340551585 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2482618252 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2504204502 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2506138986 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W295120064 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2968289397 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W2996198768 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W66287479 @default.
• W756396970 hasRelatedWork W3087506001 @default.
• W756396970 isParatext "false" @default.
• W756396970 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W756396970 magId "756396970" @default.
• W756396970 workType "article" @default.