FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W76974421> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W76974421 abstract "In the following three essays, I explore how organized political interests behave, interact with each other, and affect public policies. As special interest groups in the United States have proliferated both in number and size over the past several decades, policymakers have responded with a mixture of public consternation and private acceptance. American voters overwhelmingly disapprove of the activities of special interest groups, but observers have been unable to articulate convincingly the effects of these activities on legislative practices and social welfare. I fill in this gap.In my first essay, I consider the effects in Congress of competition between interest groups over public policy. I model the interactions of rival interest groups and legislators as a dual form of competition over both the substance of legislation -- that is, the legislative agenda -- and legislators' votes on legislation. This is, at it's heart, a model of congressional committee behavior. The unique prediction of this model is that interest groups may intentionally spend money to have legislation introduced that is known to have no prospect of being passed. Such interest groups are motivated by the inability to shape policy in a more favorable direction and the desire to protect a sufficiently palatable status quo. This result is attractive in light of the fact that roughly 90% of legislation fails passage. I then go on to provide empirical evidence in support of this prediction using an original, large and highly detailed dataset consisting of all pieces of legislation introduced into Congress over a twenty year period. I estimate that interest groups attempt to suppress roughly 56% of legislation that is introduced in the House of Representatives and 69% of legislation that is introduced into the Senate. Furthermore, I provide evidence that groups may suppress legislation by obfuscating the linguistic content of bills.In my second essay, I consider the effects of competition within interest groups on the direction of redistributive policies. Individuals and firms form interest groups as a means of pooling resources and overcoming free riding in order to shape favorable public policies. However, the objectives of interest groups and their constituents do not perfectly align. In particular, interest groups tend to be more farsighted than their constituents. This asymmetry of objectives generates an agency problem that may manifest itself in the persistence of inefficient public policies. That is, interest groups may be directed by their relatively shortsighted constitutents to oppose efficient policy reforms. In the long run, this agency problem is exacerbated by the responses of interest groups to free riding. I provide suggestive econometric evidence from the United States in support of this argument.In my third essay, I consider the implications of the very function of an interest groups: providing a means to aggregate the preferences of a motivated but potentially heterogeneous constituency. I begin by noting a very strong empirical regularity in lobbying activity in the United States. In nearly every industry, the distribution of lobbying expenditures follows a power law. This regularity is not predicted by standard models of interest group behavior. Instead, I provide a heuristic explanation for the empirical finding. If interest group expenditure decisions are made in response to periodic signals and are determined by a constituency that continuously updates its preferences according to a simple heuristic, then we should expect to see the distribution of lobbying expenditures follow a power law. I provide additional simulation evidence in support of this claim." @default.
• W76974421 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W76974421 creator A5030554133 @default.
• W76974421 date "2010-01-01" @default.
• W76974421 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W76974421 title "Essays in special interest politics" @default.
• W76974421 cites W1517374528 @default.
• W76974421 cites W1520386898 @default.
• W76974421 cites W1550902027 @default.
• W76974421 cites W1608361905 @default.
• W76974421 cites W1967390364 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2005194216 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2010050173 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2013897184 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2046692734 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2065275063 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2079626840 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2095211471 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2137441478 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2150988783 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2164540423 @default.
• W76974421 cites W2256924078 @default.
• W76974421 cites W3121605569 @default.
• W76974421 cites W3122875491 @default.
• W76974421 cites W3168149230 @default.
• W76974421 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
• W76974421 type Work @default.
• W76974421 sameAs 76974421 @default.
• W76974421 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W76974421 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W76974421 hasAuthorship W76974421A5030554133 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C12516257 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C18903297 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C2776475305 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C2776748549 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C2777351106 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C83009810 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C91306197 @default.
• W76974421 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C100001284 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C12516257 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C162324750 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C17744445 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C18903297 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C190253527 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C199539241 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C2776475305 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C2776748549 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C2777351106 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C83009810 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C86803240 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C91306197 @default.
• W76974421 hasConceptScore W76974421C94625758 @default.
• W76974421 hasLocation W769744211 @default.
• W76974421 hasOpenAccess W76974421 @default.
• W76974421 hasPrimaryLocation W769744211 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W1492979190 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W1543650365 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W1575743338 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W1972299831 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2001135780 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2038891097 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2067591184 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2080554424 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2099275544 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2164272201 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2184156918 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2255875945 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2264085479 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2964405783 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2972804561 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W3016886992 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W3123623881 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W3124617496 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W73270409 @default.
• W76974421 hasRelatedWork W2108038631 @default.
• W76974421 isParatext "false" @default.
• W76974421 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W76974421 magId "76974421" @default.
• W76974421 workType "article" @default.