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• W810442792 abstract "Abstract: Russian and Chinese hostility toward United States creates a New Cold War, but treating two adversaries differently can make things break our way. strategists should pick bigger long-term threat, Russia or China, and treat it firmly and smaller one flexibly, avoiding rigid diplomatic and military policies that prolonged old Cold War. ********** The New Cold War will be long and deep only if current Sino-Russian entente turns into an alliance. A hostile Russia alone can & cause mischief but, compared to old Soviet Union, is weak and sufferable. Russia and China together are a much tougher challenge. The Sino-Soviet split--Nixon must be given credit for utilizing it--marked beginning of end of original Cold War. By avoiding rigid diplomatic and military policies that push Russia and China together, we can make New Cold War shorter and less dangerous. The original Cold War ended not with a nuclear bang but with an economic whimper. Starting under Brezhnev's long reign, inefficient Soviet economy fell further behind until Gorbachev, in desperation, attempted a clumsy perestroika that achieved little but inflation. Capitalism, it turns out, really is better than socialism, something any good American capitalist should know. Marxists, misled by their ideology, bet that economy would collapse, and lost. (The United States is not immune to economic collapse; we got a whiff of it in 2008.) Panicked responses did not win us Cold War--economics and patience did. After 1991, United States was marked less by triumphal strutting than by satisfied indifference. But during this little noticed by Americans and well before Crimea Crisis, a New Cold War percolated. Even under Yeltsin in 1990s, Russian foreign policy showed nationalistic hardening. In 1996, Russia, China, and three Central Asian states signed Shanghai Five agreement and turned it into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 to oppose US hegemony. SCO members occasionally practice amphibious operations, a warning to Taiwan. The SCO is not, however, a formal military alliance. Russian President Putin called 1991 Soviet breakup the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of and does not his aim to reassemble Soviet Union by incorporating near abroad into his Eurasian Economic Union, first signed in 2011 and due to begin in 2015. Putin's 2008 invasion of Georgia to South Ossetians was really Moscow's warning to Tbilisi not to join NATO. His 2014 occupation of Crimea to protect ethnic Russians (and Russian Black Sea fleet) also warned Ukraine not to join NATO, an improvised heavy-handed move that may push Kiev to do precisely that. Bad as Crimea is, it is not another 1938 Sudetenland crisis, and we should stop painting it as such. China's commonality with Russia: how to recover from weakness and humiliation. In 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed China's century of humiliation over, and term is standard today. (Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek felt same, writing daily in his diary, avenge humiliation.) Soon after Nixon took office in 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces skirmished on their Manchurian border. What was really at stake was leadership of world communist movement and an independent Chinese nuclear force. Territorial questions, ostensibly settled, still lurk in Siberia. China, for a few years after Nixon's 1972 visit, looked like a reasonable partner to balance Soviet power. Americans supposed that we had opened China and set it on path to capitalist democracy--an unrealistic thought. Deng Xaioping decreed ancient wisdom of hide your strength and bide your time, a policy that received little publicity or notice. We were living in a bit of a dream world. China still claims Taiwan and could seize it. The 1999 accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy building in Belgrade---used as a communications relay by Serbian military for fighting in Bosnia--demonstrated China-US hostility. …" @default.
• W810442792 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W810442792 date "2014-03-22" @default.
• W810442792 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W810442792 title "The New Cold War" @default.
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