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• W826677161 abstract "Since its origins the philosophical investigation concentrates on some issues, such as, for example, has the mind got a linguistic nature, or is it possible to think even without recurring to a specific language? If the mind works using a specific language, what is the role played by this language in the evolution of the mind? What is, in other words, the relationship that links the mind together with its meaning? As seems obvious, if the mind uses many languages (on the basis of sensations, images, concepts, etc.), are all these languages translatable into each other at the level of communication and mental representation? Is it possible, in other words, that all these languages are generated from a single universal grammar from which particular grammars are generated through the setting of specific parameters? Finally, as the language of mind is often correlated with the body, the last question is the following: how is it possible to outline the working relationship existing between mind, on the one hand, and brain and body, on the other? This work focuses on the development that these issues have reached in the current philosophy of mind and language, as well as in cognitive sciences. In particular, in the early chapters it is shown that for decades the dominant view was that the mind possesses a linguistic/syntactic nature and, therefore, through the development of abstract devices (such as, for example, the generative grammars of Chomsky and the Turing Machines) it could finally be possible to arrive to an explanatory model of the knowledge in general. Actually, as we outlined in chapter three, the results obtained in the framework of computational linguistics have quickly shown that the syntax alone is sufficient to explain many of the phenomena that characterize the thought and its intentional being (negation of the syntactocentric view). These mental states are the result of the individual variability due inexorably to the subjective experience and to the environment in which this experience took place. An environment which has no limits and which is possible to describe in advance in terms of effective procedures. Similarly, the sensory signals of the brain aren’t discrete symbols, manipulated by means of formal syntactic rules. They are instead analogical, ambiguous and their number is infinite. According to these considerations, also the extensional assumptions of the formal semantics are correct, namely, the objects of the world do not belong to determinate categories, there are not essential descriptions of the things. On the contrary, the mind constructs the perceptual reality by selecting the information it receives from the sensory systems, in combination with mental processes typically subjective and context-related, such as mental models and emotions. Recent decades, are, therefore, signed by the passage from a set theoretic construct of meaning to some models of meaning based on prototypes. Thanks to these developments, the traditional conception of mental representation has failed and a new concept has evolved: the representations may consist of the establishment of perceptual and motor procedures, the same procedures that allow us, when executed, to recognize objects and interact with them. There isn’t, in other words, a construction of a symbolic representation, but a representation based on sensory patterns, in turn consisting of categories that are theoretical but pragmatic, and that arise from the dynamics of the environment and the adaptive ability of that organism to refer to other states or to other organisms. As shown in the fifth chapter, these characteristics has recently been implemented in some modular models of mind based on neural networks, such as, for example, the P.G. Schyns’model (1991), CALM (Murre JMJ, Phaf, RH, & Wolters, G. (1992)), or the A.Greco, A.Cangelosi, S. Harnard’s model (1998). Actually, as shown in the last chapter, much work still needs to be done so that the current models of cognition based on nonlinear dynamic systems could become able to offer an adequate explanation of what is the ultimate reality of perception, a perception which is characterized by recondite forms of continuous emergence, and by its ability to go beyond the surface aspects of things to their fregean Sinn.In other words, if we assume that the brain functions in the sense of perceiving, classifying, etc., in a connec-tionist way, it does so at a level of sophistication and complexity far superior to that of the Boolean neural networks we are familiar with. Hopfield’s model, for example, allows propositional classification by means of attractors-concepts. What it lacks, however, is only any intensional dimension, but even a precise polyadic dimension.Depth information inserts itself on recurrent cycles of a self-organising activity characterised by the formation and the continuous compositio of multi-level attractors.The cognitive processes as characterized by the procedures of self-organization are based, therefore, on the gradual building of an I-subject conceived as a progressively wrought work of abstraction, unification, and emergence. The role of the brain is above all to offer itself as a self-organising measuring device,as a self-organising, biological measure space. This device articulates progressivelythrough a manifold of processing stages characterised by patterns of continuous interactionand integration.Finally, to delineate an appropriate formal model of cognition One must add new rules to the model-system from outside, but make it as an autopoietic model-system able to interact with the dynamics that it tries to describe in order to outline the birth of new patterns of integration able to guide, in a mediate way, a “creative” development of the deep basis which subtends such dynamics. (Carsetti, 2004)." @default.
• W826677161 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W826677161 creator A5004898139 @default.
• W826677161 date "2009-09-04" @default.
• W826677161 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W826677161 title "Linguistica cartesiana, teoria computazionale della mente e modelli neurali" @default.
• W826677161 hasPublicationYear "2009" @default.
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