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• W841630498 abstract "In late 2013, a breach of the cashier system at a major retailer exposed information on 40 million debit and credit cards. That fraudsters can use the payment card numbers harvested in this breach to cre- ate fraudulent payments underscores one of many security weaknesses that can lead to payment fraud. The direct cost of fraud on Automated Clearinghouse (ACH), debit card, and credit card payments reached $6.1 billion in 2012. Investments and ongoing expenses for prevent- ing, detecting, monitoring, and responding to payment fraud add siderably to direct costs. Fraud and security weaknesses in payments can have an indirect cost as well if they cause concerned consumers and businesses to choose less efficient forms of payment. More broadly, the public's loss of confidence in payments has had significant nega- tive economic consequences in the past. A constant stream of news re- ports on data breaches, phishing attacks, spoofed websites, payment card skimmers, fraudulent ATM withdrawals, computer malware, and infiltrated retail point-of-sale systems should concern policymakers be- cause it indicates weak payment security and undermines confidence in payments.Payment participants-end-users who make payments, financial institutions and nonbanks that provide payment services, and networks and service providers that process payments-all have considerable in- centive to secure payments and deter fraud. They value the convenience of non-cash payments and wish to avoid the inconvenience and losses of payment fraud. Under ideal conditions, these incentives would pro- vide a level of payment security that best benefits society. Incentives do not work well, however, when accurate information about security solutions is unavailable, when the consequences of security failures spill over to innocent parties, or when effective security requires difficult coordination of many disparate parties.Consequently, public and private institutions have evolved a con- trol to ensure payment security and deter fraud. The control structure takes a variety of forms, such as setting rules that allocate losses resulting from payment fraud, regulating and supervising the ac- tivities of some payment participants, designing operational procedures that embed security protocols, and coordinating security efforts. Poli- cymakers must assess how well a payment system manages fraud risks given constantly changing threats and complex interdependencies that can cause misaligned incentives. A proper assessment is crucial because improvements to payment security are costly and often in fixed infra- structure that is hard to change.This article examines the problem of controlling payment fraud risk. The first section reviews methods of payment fraud, the levels and trends in the use of these methods, and the resulting losses. At various points, the section studies recent data breaches to illustrate how data useful to payment fraud is exposed and how a virtual fraud factory translates exposed data into payment fraud. The second section discusses how incentives influence payment security, describes the structures that networks and government have established to secure payments and trol payment fraud, and reviews insights from recent research on defense strategies for computer networks. The third section presents examples of changes that would strengthen payment security and deter fraud.The article finds the protection of sensitive data used to commit payment fraud is inadequate and payment participants should make immediate effort to improve data security. Medium-term priorities should target emerging weaknesses in check payment processing and card payment authorization. In the long term, policymakers and indus- try leaders should seek to strengthen the control structure over payment security by making security standards more effective and creating ap- propriate incentives to protect payments.I. THE PROBLEM OF PAYMENT FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATESFraudsters use a variety of methods leading to substantial direct losses to payment participants. …" @default.
• W841630498 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W841630498 date "2014-06-22" @default.
• W841630498 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W841630498 title "Controlling Security Risk and Fraud in Payment Systems" @default.
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