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• W860193877 abstract "China has proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initiating a key turning point in the international finance system. Unfortunately, its design at present is quite problematic, for several reasons: it limits participation by Western countries, effectively locking in China as the undisputed leader; the lack of a Board of Directors in residence; the potential for a conflict of interest if the AIIB will fund projects within China; the potential of China to use AIIB for political purposes; the relationship the AIIB will have with already-existing international financial institutions; and the potential for a weakening of “best practices” in order to compete against the other international finance institutions. For these reasons, it was the right decision for Japan not to join as a charter member in order to negotiate the MOU; nevertheless, Japan should maintain the option of joining the AIIB in order to have leverage over the architecture of the AIIB. 1 The original article written in Japanese was published in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, column of Keizai Kyoshitsu, on April 30, 2015. At the time of the IMF and World Bank Spring meeting in Washington in April, there was much media attention over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China. Both the IMF and the World Bank have publicly welcomed the AIIB as a sign of increase in funding for infrastructure needs in Asia, but hope that the AIIB will cooperate well with these existing international institutions. Thus far, there is no apparent opposition to the AIIB, which is in stark contrast with 18 years ago, when Japan’s proposal for an “Asia Monetary Fund” at the IMF and World Bank Fall meeting fell through due to criticism from both the United States and China. -------------------------China’s push for the AIIB originated from China’s frustration toward the existing international financial institutions, such as the IMF or the World Bank, that favor the West through voting rights distribution and head post appointments, as well as the ADB, which holds Japan as the largest shareholder and has traditionally maintained Japanese presidents. It could be a part of China’s national strategic plan to raise its stature in the international financial system to match its status as the number two country in the world by GDP. Regarding the necessity of the AIIB, China has reasoned that the ADB and the World Bank alone cannot provide for the growing infrastructure needs in Asia; it has also pointed to the IMF’s new quota reform, which has not been ratified due to opposition from Congress in the United States. This second point, especially, plays on the United States’ weakness. When the AIIB was first proposed in October 2013, China was prepared to do the following: establish its headquarters in Beijing; appoint a Chinese president; secure capital up to 100 billion dollars; and establish China as 50% holder of AIIB shares. The initial consensus, mostly expressed by the developed countries, was that the AIIB would be “a bank of China, by China and for China,” and would not be accepted as an international financial institution. Since then, China has continuously modified the core architecture of the AIIB, such as lowering its own shareholder percentage, and has attempted in various ways to call for nations to join the AIIB. Even then, the participating members were limited to developing and emerging countries – until this February. Nearly half a month before the deadline at the end of March to become charter members of the AIIB, the United Kingdom suddenly announced it would join the AIIB and entered into negotiations. Germany, France, Italy, Australia, and Korea quickly followed suit, announcing their participation in the new investment bank. The charter members thus took shape with Japan, the United States, and Canada as the only major players to be excluded. Ultimately, over 50 countries are participating in the negotiation process to become founding members of the AIIB, providing an impetus toward the charter signing in June and the subsequent initiation of the bank by year-end. As shown in the chart below, membership of the AIIB shows little difference from the ADB. Comparison of ADB and AIIB members Members of ADB, but not in AIIB Not members of ADB, but in AIIB Japan, United States, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Afghanistan, Armenia, Bhutan, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan*, Timor, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Brazil, Egypt, Iceland, Malta, Poland, South Africa *Taiwan is showing a desire to join AIIB, but China is denying their status The announcements of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy that they would join the AIIB came as a surprise to both the Japanese and United States governments. The fact that the United States was unable to stop the formation of the AIIB, not to mention prevent the British from joining the bank, points to a diminishing level of economic and diplomatic influence on the part of the United States. It could be said that the international finance system has reached a major turning point. There is some opinion that Japan has been left behind in this scheme, or that Japan not joining the AIIB is a defeat on the grounds of diplomacy. However, Japan should not join the AIIB when there are crucial concerns about the governance and transparency in its management. The choices Japan had in March were to urge governance reform as a condition for Japan’s joining the AIIB either from the inside or from the outside. The latter option was chosen, but the strategy has remained the same. Some believe that if Japan does not join the AIIB, Japanese corporations may face disadvantages when bidding for AIIB-funded projects. On this issue, the ideal would be for corporations of non-AIIB members to have an equal opportunity for funding. The reality is that even with the ADB’s bidding process, the chances of Japanese corporations being selected are quite low. -------------------------There are three major problems with China’s plan for the AIIB governance structure. The first problem is that China will be by far the leading shareholder in the bank. It has already been determined that the ratio of quota (voting shares) held by regional members to non-regional members will be constant at 3 to 1, thus limiting the" @default.
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• W860193877 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W860193877 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W860193877 title "The Future of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Concerns for Transparency and Governance" @default.
• W860193877 doi "https://doi.org/10.7916/d8ws8sfd" @default.
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