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• W883951502 abstract "ABSTRACT-Voters increasingly view their consumer activities, not their campaign contributions, as the most meaningful way to participate in politics. In 2014, after it became public that Mozilla's CEO, Brendan Eich, had made a controversial political donation in a state ballot proposition, consumer pressure led to his resignation. Eich's downfall and the politicization of retail markets means that business leaders are unlikely to respond to McCutcheon v. FEC by embracing transparency with their campaign donations, and also suggests that campaign finance deregulation is causing that the Supreme Court has failed to anticipate. This Essay explores what economic reprisal means for business leaders-a significant segment of the so-called donor class-when consumers vote at the cash register.INTRODUCTIONIn the Supreme Court's most recent campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC, a bare majority of the Court struck down aggregate contribution limits for individuals.1 Whereas an individual's total campaign contributions in a given two-year federal election cycle were previously limited to $123,200, individuals now give as much as $3.6 million.2 McCutcheon has been praised for pushing campaign cash away from shadow nonprofits and into the sunshine of disclosure because it clears the way for donors to give large amounts to an unlimited number of candidates-a type of spending that is subject to disclosure obligations, unlike donations to 501(c) nonprofit groups.3 According to this line of thinking, deregulation not only increases the total amount of speech in the marketplace of ideas, but also tends to increase transparent speech. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality in McCutcheon, conveyed this idea when he wrote that aggregate limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away from entities subject to disclosure.4 Indeed, Professors Samuel Issacharoffand Pamela S. Karlan made just this contention sixteen years ago.5Though the phrase hydraulic effects appears nowhere in McCutcheon's plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinions, the case should be understood as endorsing a particular view of how political money is like water. As Professors Issacharoffand Karlan famously put it: [E]very reform effort to constrain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with power to hold onto it,6 and [t]he price of apparent containment be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere.7 In other words, regulations that limit or reduce certain types of electionrelated spending simply channel the money in other directions.Unfortunately, the deregulate and disclose approach of the Roberts Court is unlikely to solve the hydraulics problem that frustrates courts and law professors. Wealthy Americans are unlikely to respond to McCutcheon as the Chief Justice leads us to believe, by directing a greater proportion of their cash away from shadow and into the sunlight of candidate contributions.An important piece of evidence emerged within days of the McCutcheon opinion. On April 3, 2014, Brendan Eich resigned after only two weeks as CEO of Mozilla, after public controversy developed over the fact that, six years earlier, he gave $1000 to support Proposition 8 in California, which banned same-sex marriage.8 Mr. Eich now stands as the first CEO in America to have been forced out of his job because of a publicly disclosed campaign contribution.9 The story of Brendan Eich teaches that campaign donations by corporate CEOs (and, importantly, those aspiring to be CEOs) will be scrutinized by customers, employees, business partners, and shareholders, even many years after they are made, and that publicly disclosed donations ruin a donor's future employment prospects as chief executive.10 For this reason, CEOs and aspiring CEOs should rationally prefer to give in secret, and the premise of the Chief Justice-that allowing the wealthy to greatly increase the amount they can give directly to candidates will cause them to rechannel their funds away from shadow organizations toward transparent, disclosing organizations-is likely wrong. …" @default.
• W883951502 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W883951502 creator A5027574289 @default.
• W883951502 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W883951502 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W883951502 title "THE CEO AND THE HYDRAULICS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEREGULATION[dagger]" @default.
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