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• W89905734 abstract "ABSTRACT Our investigation of executive succession at major U.S. commercial banks identified differences between natural and forced successions. Investors responded more favorably to succession events when the new executive was hired from outside of the institution in forced successions. Similarly, forced successions were also viewed as wealth creating activities by the financial market. Notwithstanding the regulatory environment in which banks operate, the findings in this study are similar to those reported for non-banking firms. INTRODUCTION The replacement of the top executives of a firm is a significant corporate event that has economic implications for investors. Several studies have examined executive succession in industrial firms, with focus on the cause and consequences of the appointment of a new chief executive officer (CEO). Kesner and Sebora (1994) provide a comprehensive review of the executive succession literature. The evidence presented in this body of research suggests that the cause of a succession partly determine the new successor and the effect of the succession on the firm. Therefore, whether the successor is hired from within the firm or from outside becomes an interesting question. Some qualities of the human capital critical to the successful operation of a firm are unique to the banking industry, because of the legal and regulatory environment in which banks operate. Regulation is a stated reason for omitting banking firms in earlier studies. Consequently, commercial banks are a fitting group of firms to investigate the implication of inside versus outside succession of top executives. This focus on banks is a fundamental difference from earlier studies that have examined industrial firms. The top executives of a banking firm, unlike their counterparts in industrial firms, must also be responsive to the concerns of government banking regulators. Therefore, a working knowledge of bank regulations has to be an integral component of the qualification of bank executives, if they are to be effective managers. To complicate matters more for bank executives, regulators also have a stakeholder interest in the safe and sound operation of these institutions. Notwithstanding these differences when compared to industrial firms, our evidence suggest that the implication of executive successions are quite similar. Investors in commercial banks also view executive succession as important events in determining the future prospect of banks. This was most pronounced at banks where the executives were forcibly removed from office. The evidence also suggests that the origin of the successor is of interest to both investors and bank regulators, particularly when the prior executive is forced from office. Managers occupy the pivotal position between the claimants of a firm. Rosen (1992) suggests that managers' decisions have the greatest impact on the firm because of the multiplicative effect that their decisions generate down through the lower levels of the organization. Consequently, changes of personnel occupying executive positions should affect the firm in ways that have significant economic consequences. However, most of the published articles on executive succession appear in the management and behavioral science literature. They focus on the origin of successors (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Davidson, Worrell, & Cheng, 1990;, and Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996)), and on socio-political factors (Zajac & Westphal, 1996, Cannella & Lubatkin; 1993; Weirsema, 1982; and Kesner & Dalton, 1994)) that affect the succession process. Still other studies such as Denis and Denis (1995), Kesner and Dalton (1994), Zajac (1990), and Reinganum (1985) have examined the relationship between succession and firm performance using both accounting and market measures. In this study, we use market determined returns to measure performance, as the use of accounting performance measures, especially as they relate to managerial discretion, is widely criticized in the literature by scholars including, Healy (1985), Murphy (1985), DeAngelo (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Hubbard and Palia (1995). …" @default.
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• W89905734 date "2007-01-01" @default.
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• W89905734 title "Inside versus outside Successions in the Banking Industry" @default.
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