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• W904392552 abstract "Elected politicians work as agents on behalf of the citizens of an economy.Once elected they are responsible for shaping the future socioeconomic pathof a country. Therefore understanding the determinants of electoral outcomesand the incentives faced by political candidates during the election periodis key in understanding the efficacy of elections in selecting the best possi-ble candidates. A functional electoral system should act as a quality filterin which low quality candidates are weeded out and the highest qualitycandidates are successful.In reality electoral systems may not select and retain the best possiblecandidates. The presence of incumbency advantage may lead to a dysfunc-tional system with deleterious effects for welfare. Incumbent candidates mayuse officeholder benefits to improve their electoral prospects. For exam-ple, incumbents typically have access to free postage, printing and greaterfundraising capabilities than challengers and may use these officeholder ben-efits to gain an unfair electoral advantage. As a result, the incumbent couldwin the election even if the challenger is of higher quality or high quality chal-lengers may decide not to contest the election in the first place. Incumbentsare also in a position to announce their policy choices before challengers. Assuch the incumbent may enjoy a first mover advantage which may enable theincumbent to implement their own personal policy agenda which may notrepresent the majority of voters.The first chapter of this dissertation empirically estimates the magnitudeof the incumbency advantage in Irish elections using a regression disconti-nuity design (RDD). Ireland provides an interesting setting for the study ofincumbency advantage as the rate of reelection of Irish politicians is one ofthe highest in the world. Moreover its electoral system of proportional repre-sentation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) creates strong incentivesfor incumbent candidates to cultivate a loyal personal following. In veryclose elections, where there is a narrow margin of victory, it is likely thatbare winners are comparable in their unobservable characteristics to barelosers. Regression discontinuity design identifies the causal effect of incum-bency by comparing the subsequent electoral outcomes of bare winners andlosers. I find that incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point increasein the probability that a candidate is successful in a subsequent election.In chapter two I study open seat and incumbent-challenger elections ina model of spatial electoral competition between two policy motivated can-didates. The candidates differ with regard to non-policy related characteris-tics which are desired by voters. These may include characteristics such ascharisma, charm and intelligence - collectively referred to as valence charac-teristics. I find that incumbent candidates benefit from being first moversand this allows them to generate favourable post-election policy outcomes.Policy divergence between candidates is typically greater in the incumbentchallenger election compared to an open seat contest. I also show that ideo-logical shirking occurs once a candidate's valence exceeds a certain thresholdas the candidate pursues her own ideology even if this is not representativeof the majority of voters.In chapter three I examine the extent to which electoral selection basedon candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of reelection ratesin the U.S. Senate. In order to attain incumbency status a candidate hasto first win an election. Therefore it is likely that incumbent candidatesare of high quality due to political selection and get reelected with a highprobability. As such high reelection rates are not definitive evidence of apoorly functioning electoral system. The counterfactual simulation in whichcandidate quality is the sole determinant of electoral success may providea simple benchmark for the reelection rate in the absence of officeholderbenefits. The simulation delivers a reelection rate which is almost identicalto the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 percent. In the later sub-sample, quality-based selection generates a reelection rate which is sevenpercentage points lower than observed. The divergence in the reelection ratesin the later sub-sample is consistent with the findings of vote-margin studiesthat indicate rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits." @default.
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• W904392552 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W904392552 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W904392552 title "Essays on the Political Economy ofElections" @default.
• W904392552 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
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