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• W928219276 abstract "At two o'clock in the morning of the day that Boris fired his cabinet (23 March 1998), an investor at a large venture capital fund received a telephone call from Wall Street, asking whether she wanted to retain the standing purchase order for significant capital investments in Russia. After the cobwebs cleared from her sleepy mind, and she'd had a few seconds to think about it, she replied: Yeltsin fired his entire cabinet? Double the order! When I questioned her several weeks later, the investor explained that Russia is turning a corner economically, that attractive long-term investment opportunities are increasing, that growing sums of exported Russian capital are being reinvested in Russia, that central and local authorities are becoming more receptive to negotiating reasonable (tax and environmental cleanup) terms with foreign companies, and that the dismissal of Chernomyrdin and Chubais removes two key players whose commitments or controversiality, respectively, had been inhibiting rationalization of regulatory and tax policy. My interlocutor may yet lose a lot of money; or her firm might do quite well in its purchases of factories that produce construction materials. But when foreign businesspeople are willing to put large sums of their own money on the line, rather than investing it in any number of other countries and ventures around the world, it should give us pause. Their decision is usually not based on a whim. There is likely to be some basis in their minds for optimism. Readers of this issue of Demokratizatsiya might be forgiven their inability to understand the bases for such optimism. The articles by Brovkin and Blank paint a frightening picture of a fragmented, utterly predatory state, the officials of which are eager and able to treat the country's economic surplus as their personal troughs. The alliance between these officials and the monopolists who own the largest banks and control the largest sectors of the economy, as well as the capacity of these networks to deploy large-scale private violence against challengers to their monopolies, presents a picture of entrenched, thoroughly corrupted, and seemingly unassailable state-fragments. And if we follow the logic of Blank's conception of what this portends for the future of the Russian economy, we must conclude that long-term investment is not only a risky, but perhaps even a crazy, proposition. If the choice, as he puts it, is between Norway and Nigeria, the probability is clearly greater of a slide toward the Nigerian sinkhole than of a march toward the idyllic Norwegian prospect. It is easier to project forward in time the indefinite continuation of the fragmented and predatory conditions than to imagine the convergence of forces that would turn the Russian Federation into even a minimally cohesive, stable, and effective developmental state. Brovkin and Blank are properly outraged by what they see going on in Russia. Especially when judged against the standards of liberal-democratic and liberal-market models, the Russian case diverges hugely from all three of the base-points typically invoked: (1) the hopes and expectations of 1990-91; (2) the ideal-typical conception of market democracy; and (3) the real-world practice of advanced market democracies in northern Europe and North America. Outrage at the extent of such divergence is understandable. But what the system's current configuration portends for economic development, political stability, and relations with other states is perhaps less obvious. If we direct our thoughts not to Nigeria versus Norway but to Greece, Portugal, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, and India, we may have an intermediate band of comparative referents that are more indicative of possible Russian futures in coming decades. Moreover, how we think about comparative referents and varieties of exchange relations is as important as which comparative referents we invoke. Thus, if we think of the role of money in the politics of Italy, South Korea, and Japan, we may question the assumption that large-scale corruption is incompatible with impressive rates of economic growth--as indeed China has already shown us under a late-Communist regime. …" @default.
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• W928219276 date "1998-06-22" @default.
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• W928219276 title "The State of the Russian State: Diagnoses and Prognoses" @default.
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