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• W98079908 abstract "Iran is fortunate in its strategic situation. It has no historical enemies, no irredenta, no source of permanent tensions on its frontiers. It is well endowed with resources, material and human and well-situated. Iran has a distinct identity and culture and a unity denied many of its neighbors. It has failed to capitalize on these assets due to an excessive cultivation of past grievances and an ideological view of current challenges. It has thus squandered the country's potential. A more pragmatic approach to the greatest challenge of the day-globalization-would be in Iran's interest. The problems accumulating in the Islamic republic are not solved by invocation of slogans and the attribution of blame to past or current scapegoats. Whether Iran can make the adjustment that this implies and whether some elements in the leadership are prepared to be judged by their performance and be accountable to the public remains uncertain though central to the chances of the Islamic Republic being able to assume its rightful place in the family of nations. Iran has evolved considerably over the past decade, but it still has some way to go before it becomes a normal state, defining and pursuing its national interests dispassionately. This article focuses on the challenges which remain for Iran before it accomplishes that goal. It emphasizes the strategic slumber that has characterized the country's external relationships. This slumber stems from a complex of ideological blinders, and a cultivation of historical grievances, which, combined, serve to distort Iran's appreciation of its environment, and hence are an obstacle to the country's coming to terms with that environment. While it can be argued that Iran has changed since its revolutionary days, is more pragmatic, and less inclined to pursue ideological interests divorced from Iran's national interests, this hardly disposes of the issue. There is still a struggle within Iran over how to define those interests and promote them. Many of the mistakes which Iran has made in the past are culturally determined, the result of a mindset, and thus persistent, and need to be grappled with comprehensively. Finally, recent mistakes do matter. Nations build reputations (status and prestige) only with difficulty, yet can destroy them relatively easily. The excesses of the revolutionary period need to be acknowledged by Iran itself, if it is to deal with the rest of the world on a realistic basis. Strategy may be defined as the integration of a broad set of means (instruments) in the service of a desired end. It implies one or more goal(s); a meshing of multiple means to the desired end(s) and a relatively long-term perspective.' Iran's approach differs in each case. Its national style has been to adopt contradictory goal(s); to fail to co-ordinate the means; to take a short term view, tactical at best; and to strike a position of part moral superiority and part outrage, in place of a workable policy. Iran does not have an enviable record in strategy, in understanding the context and adapting means to ends. The entire record of its conduct of the war with Iraq (1980-88) reads like a primer in how not to conduct war: It cancelled $11 billion in arms on order from the United States, and purged the military while provoking Iraqi President Saddam Husayn with threats of destabilisation; By seizing US diplomats as hostages in 1979 it ensured that there would be little sympathy for Iran in Washington if Iran became embroiled in a war: In adopting the strategy of people's war, which China was just abandoning, Tehran recycled a fashionable strategy of doubtful utility to a state which had its prime assets located near its adversary's border; It politicized its armed forces, eliminated ranks, and insisted that faith could do what technology and expertise could not. It then pursued a strategy in which it assessed victory by the degree of its own commitment rather than the attainment of battlefield objectives. …" @default.
• W98079908 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W98079908 date "2000-01-01" @default.
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• W98079908 title "Iran's strategic predicament: 864" @default.
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