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• W99126111 abstract "Given the widespread presence of metaphors in science a question arises as to how to explain the relevance of what is considered figurative, that is, imprecise, in an enterprise that seems to demand the opposite. Metaphorical language has been traditionally understood as something aesthetic rather than cognitive, emotional rather than rational, expressive rather than informative, and ambiguous rather than precise. There is a conflict between this type of language (or its conception), on the one hand, and the image of science (or its idealized version), on the other. Although an increased interest in the cognitive aspect of metaphors has prompted research on the role that metaphors play in science, and even though a significant amount of literature has been produced on the issue, this task hardly ever succeeds in entirely avoiding the standard dualistic schema. The results rarely overcome the impression of a »compromise« whereby, on the one hand, the »hard« sciences accept and make use of elements commonly considered unscientific, that is, literary or »soft« in nature; on the other hand, there is a tendency to relativize the exactness of science by augmenting the role of informal and non-literal language in particular. In the first case, the reduction of metaphoricity to its more or less marginal effects is evident; in the second, there is a clear over-extension of metaphorical competence. But as long as one adheres to strict separation in the various domains of symbolic activities (of which the dualism of the scientific and the extra-scientific is only one example), it will always be necessary to measure the »costs« of a compromise in the sense of »sacrificing« the authenticity of one discipline through the influence of another. In this way a very elementary premise is overlooked, namely, the fundamental and almost trivial fact that the performers of different creative activities are always human beings who bear the authentic structure, capabilities and limitations that are peculair to them.1 Regardless of how different the various symbolic instruments they use in their investigations may be, they are first and foremost used by human beings. Thus before there is a physicist, philosopher or poet who, in his specific way, seeks to unfold the unknown, there is a human being who takes on the role of physicist, philosopher or poet. From this human point of view the whole universe, as the biochemist Charles Birch suggested, should be viewed as the »humiverse«. Human beings and their entire experience are of central importance to what they are doing, thinking, knowing, investigating, etc." @default.
• W99126111 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W99126111 date "1997-01-01" @default.
• W99126111 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W99126111 title "How to Make Our Ideas Clear With Metaphors" @default.
• W99126111 doi "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2254-4_6" @default.
• W99126111 hasPublicationYear "1997" @default.
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