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• W991805156 abstract "Introduction Preliminaries Since Ronald Dworkin wrote Hard Cases,' coherence has been a pivotal-perhaps pivotal-explanatory and justificatory concept in theories of and adjudication.2 Crudely put, Dworkin's view is that a purported proposition of is valid if it follows from most coherent set of principles that explains and justifies settled, black-letter law.3 Although coherentist methods permeate modern theories of law4 and justice,5 and although coherence is crucial explanatory and justificatory concept in many theories, including Dworkin's6 and Weinrib's,? theorists of and justice have been curiously vague about what coherence is, and about when a legal system, a legal theory, or a set of norms is coherent. The regrettable result is that claims regarding coherence-especially regarding its normative virtues-cannot be adequately assessed: our understanding of coherence is too meager for us even know where begin. In a larger project of which this Article constitutes a part,8 I intend remedy this unfortunate state of affairs by developing an analytic framework within which categorize differing conceptions of coherence. I then plan demonstrate framework's explanatory power by analyzing claims about coherence made by John Rawls, Lon Fuller, Ernest Weinrib, and Ronald Dworkin. In this Article, I restrict myself Dworkin. I do so because he has developed most prominent and influential coherence theory of and adjudication. My overall aim is canvass some normative virtues and vices of his theory, which he initially labeled the rights thesis9 and now denominates law as integrity.'o While noting one serious normative flaw in Dworkin's coherentist theory-it sometimes applies retroactively, even when correctly followed-I argue that gradually will improve morally over time if Dworkin's theory is correctly employed by judges. Moreover, contrary views of Dworkin and his critics, I argue that his view is less conservative than conventional wisdom asserts. According that wisdom, best theory of settled lawwhich is, for Dworkin, law-must fit overwhelming bulk of settled For this reason, it is claimed that Dworkinian methodology projects ideology embedded in settled into future, and is thus inherently conservative.2 To contrary, I urge that requirement of fit with settled in Dworkinian coherentist theory is much lower than is commonly assumed. This allows moral aspects of Dworkin's theory dominate ideology implicit in settled law. Coherence theories-qua coherence theories-may not only evolve toward critical morality; they are also potentially subject radical transformations toward justice. Dworkin's theory has flexibility-under certain circumstances, described in Part IV-to be morally superior in terms of outcomes what both Dworkin and his critics have previously thought. Still, there are other extant jurisprudential theories. Depending upon circumstances, judges who follow either Hartian positivism (or some form of strict construction) or natural theory will produce morally better outcomes overall than those who follow Dworkin's mixed methodology which partakes of both positivist description and natural normativity. Under no circumstances is Dworkinian coherentism preferable methodology evaluated in terms of producing morally best outcomes. The measure of morally best outcomes will consider percentage of morally correct outcomes, distribution of morally incorrect decisions in terms of their closeness to or distance from morally correct decisions, distribution of decisions as a function of their importance in protecting significant rights and interests, number of interactions that each decision will regulate, and like. Although I do not maintain that moral correctness of outcomes is only criterion for assessing jurisprudential methodologies and legal theories, nevertheless, I do believe that it is most important criterion. …" @default.
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• W991805156 date "1999-05-01" @default.
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• W991805156 title "Why No Judge Should Be a Dworkinian Coherentist" @default.
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