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• W99481370 abstract "Author: Georgy ZINOVIEV ... Relations in U. S. -PRC-Taiwan triangle deserve rather close attention since they have a direct impact on security and stability not only in this region, but also throughout entire world. At root of American-Chinese relations, still unresolved Taiwan question, history of which goes back to such events as Japanese-Chinese war of 1894 - 1895, Second World War and ensuing civil war in China, postwar organization of world, and Cold War, is potentially one of most explosive issues in current international relations. If it develops according to worst possible scenario, this question, which Chinese side may still settle with use of force (since it has never totally rejected this possibility), is capable of escalating into a full-scale military conflict, which could even entail use of nuclear arms, between most powerful and most populated states of world. ... In order to gain a better understanding of current state and prospects for settling Taiwan question, it seems expedient to take a brief look at how normative base in relations between Washington and Beijing was formed. ... After Kuomintang government was banished to Taiwan in 1949 after its defeat in civil war in China, United States, without recognizing People's Republic of China, believed that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was doomed and had no intentions of rendering it military assistance. At that time, American leadership had absolutely no doubt about Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of Chinese territory seized at one time by Japan and restored to China after former surrendered in Second World War in compliance with Cairo and Potsdam declarations signed by Allied powers. On January 5, 1950, President Harry Truman declared that America recognized China's sovereignty over Formosa and had no intention of seizing island or any other part of China.1 He stated, The United States will not render military assistance or give advice to Chinese forces on On same day, Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained, do not intend to use force in connection with current situation on Formosa. We do not intend to seize island. We do not intend ... Georgy Zinoviev, M. Sc. (Hist.). ... Pages. 58 ... to become involved in military action on island of Formosa in any form. On January 12, Acheson said that the U. S. defense perimeter in region runs from Aleutian Islands, to Japan, and on to Philippines, whereby South Korea and Taiwan were not mentioned as its components.2 ... After war on Korean Peninsula began on June 25, 1950, U. S. reconsidered its policy in region. America stated that the occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be a direct threat to security in Asia region and to U. S. forces carrying out their legal and necessary functions there. As early as June 27, President Truman announced that he had Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.3 At same time, he ordered the Chinese government on Formosa to halt all air and sea operations against mainland. In same statement, Truman defined America's new position with respect to Taiwan: The decision on Formosa's future status should be put off until stability is restored in Pacific Region, a peace treaty is signed with Japan, or this matter is taken up for review by UN. Article 2 of peace treaty signed on September 9 in San Francisco with Japan (which was not signed either by Soviet Union or by any representative of China) stipulates that Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and Pescadores (Taiwan and Penghu Archipelago), but does not mention restoring them to China.4 ... After Chinese troops entered Korea, U. S. intensified its efforts to build a system of anti-communist alliances in region aimed at deterring PRC. With help of U. S., Kuomintang government in Taiwan, which continued calling itself government of Republic of China (ROC), and Japan signed a peace treaty on April 28, 1952 (just a few hours before San Francisco treaty was enacted) in which return of Taiwan and Penghu to China was not clearly formulated. ... On February 2, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower, new American president, declared that U. S. Seventh Fleet deployed in Taiwan Strait would not hinder any military action undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek's forces against PRC. In August 1954, Chiang Kai-shek began to concentrate significant military forces around Jinmen and Mazu, groups of islands located close to PRC coast and controlled by Kuomintang troops. Beginning in September 1954, PRC began mass bombing of Jinmen islands, and then of other islands in Taiwan Strait.5 ... On December 2, 1954, U. S. and ROC governments entered a Mutual Defense Treaty. Each party to Treaty pledged that it would regard any armed attack in West Pacific area directed against territory of other side to be dangerous to its own peace and security and would act to meet common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." @default.
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• W99481370 date "2003-12-31" @default.
• W99481370 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W99481370 title "THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND THE HISTORY OF FORMING A NORMATIVE BASE FOR AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS" @default.
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